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A foreign subsidiary’s performance depends on its ability to manage the 
institutional context of its resource decisions. In response to the evolving institutional 
contexts facilitated by economic liberalization, MNEs have dramatically increased their 
ownership levels in their FDIs in some emerging economies. Nevertheless, the 
international business field has yet to sufficiently understand the consequent performance 
of those FDIs with increasingly higher MNE ownership levels. To address this gap, this 
dissertation is guided by three research questions. First, how does economic liberalization 
influence an MNE’s ownership choice in emerging economies? Second, how does 
economic liberalization change the relationship between an MNE’s equity ownership and 
its subsidiary’s profitability? Third, how does economic liberalization influence a foreign 
subsidiary’s survival? 
Utilizing a multi-theoretic lens, this dissertation investigates these questions by 
comparing Japanese investments from 1990 to 2009 in China, the largest emerging 
economy, and in the United States, the largest advanced economy. 
Essay 1 investigates how economic liberalization and subsidiary experience 
influence an MNE’s ownership choice. It posits that an MNE increases its ownership 
level in China to accommodate the process of economic liberalization and that an MNE 
tends to maintain equity-based relationships with local actors as subsidiary experience 
increases. In contrast, in the United States an MNE only increases its ownership level 
with the accumulation of subsidiary experience. 
Essay 2 examines the evolving relationship between MNE ownership level and 
subsidiary profitability (the O-P relationship). It suggests that China’s economic 
liberalization has incurred institutional uncertainty that negatively influences an MNE’s 
O-P relationship. Moreover, with declining institutional uncertainty, an MNE’s O-P 
relationship positively evolves as China’s economic liberalization expands. Even so, or 
most years during 1990-2009, an MNE’s O-P relationship remains negative in China, 
indicating that high equity control does not lead to superior subsidiary profitability in 
ii 
 
China. Empirical results show that the O-P relationship in the United States has evolved 
as well. 
Essay 3 examines the survival of a foreign subsidiary under the conditions of 
economic liberalization, and the relationship between MNE ownership level and 
subsidiary survival (the O-S relationship). It suggests that the profitability of a foreign 
subsidiary is associated with its survival. Moreover, institutional uncertainty is positively 
associated with subsidiary survival. While the survival rate of Japanese subsidiaries in the 
United States does not change, it declines over time in China with decreasing institutional 
uncertainty.  
This dissertation provides a detailed picture of MNE ownership and subsidiary 
performance under the condition of economic liberalization.  
Keywords: emerging economy; institutional voids; economic liberalization; institutional 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Cross-border ownership strategy, defined as the degree of ownership of a 
multinational enterprise (MNE) investing abroad, can affect the overseas subsidiaries’ 
likelihood of success and the overall probability of survival (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; 
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino, 1994). Prior studies, most of which substantiated their 
conclusions with data prior to 2000, have investigated how an MNE’s ownership choice 
influences its overseas performance, via subsidiary profitability and/or survival. It has 
been suggested that the relationship between MNE ownership and subsidiary profitability 
(the O-P relationship) in emerging economies might be different from those in advanced 
economies. Wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs) tend to have higher profitability than 
international joint ventures (IJVs) established in North America or Europe because of 
interest alignment, mutual trust, and security of firm specific assets (Nitsch, Beamish, and 
Makino, 1996; Woodcock et al., 1994). In contrast, IJVs have better profitability than the 
WOSs in emerging economies because governments often limit location-specific 
resources that are critical to performance to IJVs so as to protect indigenous enterprises 
from the threat of competition (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Makino and Beamish, 1998; 
Oman, 1988). Moreover, prior studies also have suggested that the relationship between 
MNE ownership level and subsidiary survival (the O-S relationship) is positive and 
nonlinear (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005). Therefore, it is of critical 
importance for MNEs to adopt an appropriate ownership strategy overseas in order to 
generate profits and survive in a foreign country. 
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the global economy. 
The time-varying institutional contexts and MNEs’ responses have been challenging 
scholars’ prior understanding of an MNE’s ownership choice and corresponding 
performance outcomes. One of the most fundamental institutional changes is the rapid 
development of emerging economies that use economic liberalization as their primary 
engine of growth (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000). 
When regulatory liberalization of foreign direct investments (FDIs) is an important 
dimension of economic liberalization in the host country, MNEs increasingly adopt WOS 




Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). Based on data 
compiled in this dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically increased their average 
ownership level in FDIs in China during the period of China’s economic liberalization. In 
contrast, over the same period, they have only slightly increased their average ownership 
level in FDIs in the United States. Figure 1.1 delineates this emerging phenomenon. 
Figure 1.1 Average Values of Japanese Ownership Levels 
 
In spite of a preference by many MNEs for majority or sole ownership, rapid 
changes in the institutional environment require MNEs to cope with various uncertainties 
which they had never encountered before (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 2010; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to revisit an MNE’s ownership 
choice and the O-P/O-S relationship. Otherwise, scholars are unable to prescribe how 
MNEs can utilize their cross-border ownership strategies to secure the success of their 
overseas investments.  
This dissertation is guided by three research questions. First, how does economic 
liberalization influence an MNE’s ownership choice in emerging economies? Second, 
how does economic liberalization influence the relationship between an MNE’s equity 




change the survival prospect of a foreign subsidiary and the relationship between an 
MNE’s equity ownership and its subsidiary’s survival? By exploring these three questions, 
this dissertation bolsters MNEs’ comprehension of possible strategies to develop and 
secure competitive advantages in foreign countries.  
This chapter proceeds with a brief review of the existing literature pertaining to 
the research questions. The chapter also identifies research gaps which can be addressed 
to further the understanding of MNEs’ ownership strategies and the O-P/O-S relationship. 
It then discusses the core theoretical foundations that inform this dissertation research. It 
briefly concludes with an outline of each essay as an overview of the research that 
constitutes the dissertation. 
Literature Review 
Historically, IB scholars have studied MNEs’ ownership choice and the O-P/O-S 
relationship by considering transactional, institutional and experience influences (Chang 
et al., 2013; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Demirbag, Glaister, and Tatoglu, 2007; Dhanaraj 
and Beamish, 2004). To address the research questions, this dissertation primarily focuses 
on institutional influences, but incorporates other types of influences such as asset 
specificity into the analysis. 
Prior studies of MNEs’ ownership strategy and the O-P/O-S relationship consider 
different types of institutional influences. In general, the sources of institutional 
influences can be categorized into institutional pressure and institutional uncertainty. 
Studies focusing on the influence of institutional pressure mainly examine how an MNE 
responds to relevant institutions in its ownership strategy so that its actions can be 
perceived as legitimate (i.e., desirable, proper or appropriate) by the host/home country, 
peers and the MNE itself (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Xia, Tan, and Tan, 
2008). This stream implicitly assumes that (i) the MNE has clear knowledge of 
institutions that are fixed for some meaningful period, and (ii) lack of legitimacy may 
result in poor local performance. Based on these assumptions, this stream advocates that 
institutions (as a set of norms, cultural beliefs, and regulations) shape an MNE’s practices 




2008; Scott, 1995). Moreover, this stream posits that institutional pressure influences an 
MNE’s ownership choice by mechanisms that are distinct from transactional or 
experience factors. While transactional and experience factors address the question about 
what ownership structure the MNE wants in order to achieve better local performance, the 
influence of institutional pressure addresses the question about what ownership structure 
the MNE should have, irrespective of the optimal performance (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). 
In addition, assuming that the MNE has clear knowledge of institutions, this stream does 
not consider the influence of experience. 
Regulatory restriction/liberalization and peer pressure are two types of 
institutional pressure that an MNE must cope with in its ownership choice (Child, 1997; 
Peng, 2003). The pressure from regulatory restriction on FDI may bring about a “forced” 
local ownership for an MNE, even where transaction cost economics (TCE) does not 
predict the existence of the IJV (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). In contrast, an 
MNE encounters less pressure when the host country liberalizes this restriction. An MNE 
may respond to the institutional pressure stemming from reference groups or peers that it 
is associated with, and increase its ownership level irrespective of efficiency 
considerations (Chang et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2008).  
Institutional pressure influences an MNE’s overseas performance by constraining 
resource allocation. For example, with regulatory restriction, an MNE seldom obtains the 
necessary subsidies and/or incentives from the host government to ensure profit in WOS 
operation (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Oman, 1988). As a result, IJVs tend to have a 
better performance than WOSs (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Oman, 1988). In contrast, 
WOSs may have a better performance than IJVs in developed countries where MNEs can 
arrange their ownership structures based on firm factors such as asset specificity (Nitsch 
et al., 1996; Woodcock et al., 1994). This stream implies that an MNE’s ownership 
strategy interacts with the institutional pressure inherent in the host country to influence 
the subsidiary performance.  
Studies focusing on the influence of institutional uncertainty examine how an 
MNE arranges its subsidiaries’ ownership structures based on the extent to which it can 




Zaheer, 1999; Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004). Assuming that it takes time for the MNE to 
accumulate experience about the local institutions and corresponding practices, this 
stream explicitly or implicitly draws on TCE logics such as the resource complementarity 
of potential partners (Hennart, 2009). It has been suggested that an MNE’s local 
performance is threatened by the deficiency in the knowledge/capabilities of coping with 
a broad array of host country characteristics that constitute the host country’s institutional 
environment, including political and legal rules, and the social norms. This produces 
significant uncertainty or competitive disadvantage for an MNE (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999; North, 1990). It can be inferred that with adequate local institutional knowledge the 
MNE may consider a higher ownership level to secure its specific assets unless it is 
prevented by local regulation. In contrast, if an MNE has not acquired the institutional 
advantages that are critical to its overseas performance, it may access them by sharing 
ownership with indigenous partners (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Hennart, 2009). Moreover, experience can improve the MNE’s institutional 
knowledge and reduce institutional uncertainty over time, leading to positive ownership 
adjustment (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Hennart, 1991; Makino and Delios, 1996). This 
stream implies that an MNE’s ownership choice interacts with the institutional 
uncertainty to influence the subsidiary performance.  
 Prior studies have contributed to our understanding of an MNE’s cross-border 
ownership strategy and the consequent performance within relatively static institutional 
environments. Nevertheless, previous research has yet to consider a more dynamic 
context that simultaneously reshapes institutional pressure and institutional uncertainty 
that an MNE confronts. Studying such a dynamic and complex context is necessary and 
important in order to comprehensively understand an MNE’s ownership choice and 
subsidiary performance in an emerging economy.  
Emerging Economies 
The institutional context in an emerging economy is complicated by the 
coexistence of institutional voids and economic liberalization (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; 




represent underdeveloped capital markets, infrastructure, intermediary markets, 
regulatory systems, contract-enforcing mechanisms or other market-supporting 
institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). On the other hand, economic liberalization may 
fill institutional voids by establishing formal market-oriented mechanisms and structures 
that facilitate market exchange (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Taking China as an example, 
economic liberalization (i) facilitates regulatory liberalization, (ii) decentralizes decision-
making power from the central government to provincial and/or city governments and 
local enterprises, (iii) privatizes property rights, (iv) establishes relevant legal systems to 
improve incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms, and (v) formulates favorable 
industrial policies that influence resource allocations (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis, Desai, 
and Francis, 2000). Therefore, economic liberalization facilitates institutional changes in 
terms of both depth and breadth regarding their influences on economic activities. 
These institutional changes reshape institutional pressure and uncertainty that an 
MNE must cope with in its ownership choice. They also complicate the O-P/O-S 
relationship. On one hand, economic liberalization facilitates institutional transition that 
replaces institutional voids with market-supporting institutions over time (Peng, 2003). 
On the other hand, institutional transition proceeds unevenly across political hierarchies 
and geographies, and an MNE increasingly confronts political, social and economic 
institutions at the subnational level rather than at the country level (Chan, Makino, and 
Isobe, 2010; Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014). Thus the combination of institutional voids 
and market-based rules varies in time and space, resulting in subnational disparity in 
institutional pressure and uncertainty (Chan et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014). Institutional 
transition and subnational disparity cause the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of 
institutional conditions varying across the geographic scope and over time (Dess and 
Beard, 1984; Tan and Tan, 2005). These factors complicate an MNE’s understandings of 
the states of institutions and their cause-effect on subsidiary performance, constituting the 
main sources of uncertainty that a foreign MNE must cope with in an emerging economy. 
Nevertheless, prior literature has yet to synthesize the institutional uncertainty stemming 
from institutional transition and subnational disparity into the research on MNE 




This dissertation systematically synthesizes time- and space-varying institutional 
influences stemming from the process of economic liberalization to further scholarly 
understanding of an MNE’s ownership choice and the O-P/O-S relationship in an 
emerging economy. Accordingly, this dissertation adopts an institution-based view, in 
conjunction with TCE, learning perspective, the resource-based view (RBV), and real 
options perspective (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Kogut, 1991; Meyer, 2001; Wright, 
Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). The performance of a subsidiary is determined 
by its sustained competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). A subsidiary’s sustained 
competitive advantages depends on its ability to manage the institutional context of its 
resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008b; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, 
and Jiang, 2008). These decisions are usually concerned with securing firm-specific 
assets and acquiring/accessing complementary local assets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; 
Hennart, 2009). Moreover, institutional uncertainty increases the importance of keeping 
options available (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008a; Cuypers and Martin, 2007; 
Vassolo, Anand, and Folta, 2004), thus influencing an MNE’s decision on subsidiary 
termination as well. When the institutional context varies over time and across 
geographies, its variation should be included in theoretical analysis and empirical testing 
in performance research. 
Research Setting 
This dissertation compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States. There 
are several advantages for such a research setting. First, examining MNEs from one 
country such as Japan can control for the endogeneity issue caused by country origin that 
influences an MNE’s ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Shaver, 1998). Moreover, a 
number of prior studies have empirically examined Japanese FDIs (Makino and Beamish, 
1998; Woodcock et al., 1994), providing a basis for comparison with this dissertation.  
Second, this research setting allows for comparison of Japanese FDIs in China, the 
largest emerging economy undergoing an institutional transition, with those in the United 
States, the largest advanced economy sustaining a relatively mature free-market 




empirical tests. This setting also controls for the confounding effects of multiple host 
countries (Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004; Pattnaik, Choe, and Singh, 2015). Although 
advanced economies advocate free market institutions, they still differ in other 
dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g., country culture) that influence a 
foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Xu et al., 2004). In addition, emerging economies 
employ heterogeneous approaches to economic liberalization (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 
2000). These different approaches may facilitate distinct institutional changes in scope, 
intensity, and duration (Brouthers and Lamb Jr, 1995; Roland, 2002), potentially 
complicating theoretical analysis and empirical testing when involving more than one 
emerging economy. 
Third, China advocates a gradualist, dual-track strategy for economic 
liberalization, a process by which a market track is introduced and gradually strengthened 
while the central planning track is maintained and progressively diminished (Lau et al., 
2000; Park, Li, and Tse, 2006). This dual-track nature results in incremental economic 
liberalization lasting for a lengthy period of time, making it possible to identify the 
overall trends of China’s institutional conditions by accessing well-documented 
governmental policies and relevant academic studies.  
Data and Methods 
Data used in this dissertation is from the Merged Toyo Keizai and Needs Datasets 
(2012 Edition). Many prior studies referred to in this dissertation used earlier editions of 
the Toyo Keizai datasets (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Nitsch et al., 1996; Woodcock et 
al., 1994). Using the data from the same organization improves the reliability of this 
dissertation. The dissertation adopts longitudinal and multilevel methodologies so that the 
evolutionary nature of an MNE’s ownership choice and its subsidiary performance can be 
empirically identified (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, and Mathieu, 2007; Hoskisson et al., 
2000). Moreover, this dissertation also addresses endogeneity issues caused by an MNE’s 
ownership choice with panel data and instrumental variables (Hamilton and Nickerson, 





This dissertation is organized as a collection of three integrated essays. Figure 1.1 
delineates the structure of the dissertation, detailing the focal phenomena, the theoretical 
foundations underpinning this dissertation, and the contributions that link the essays 
together. Essay 1 integrates regulatory liberalization, institutional uncertainty and peer 
pressure into the analysis of MNE ownership choice. Essay 2 and Essay 3 jointly 
investigate the evolution of subsidiary performance, and the O-P/O-S relationships under 
the conditions of economic liberalization. In particular, Essay 3 identifies the association 
and differentiation between subsidiary profitability and survival. 
Essay 1 
The first essay (Chapter 2), entitled “Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of 
Institutional Response”, investigates how Japanese MNEs are adapting their ownership 
choices to accommodate China’s gradual economic liberalization process and the 
relatively mature free-market system in the United States. Prior studies focus on China’s 
regulatory condition on foreign equity ownership. They suggest that regulatory 
liberalization allows decisions about partner choice to be increasingly based on rational 
considerations of strategic intention, risk and transaction costs. In contrast to existing 
research, Essay 1 involves broader aspects of economic liberalization such as political 
decentralization and corresponding subnational disparity in institutions. Moreover, 
existing literature suggests that subsidiary experience reduces an MNE’s reliance on local 
partner(s) and leads to higher MNE ownership level. While this statement remains true in 
an advanced economy where rule-based exchanges dominate, Essay 1 argues that it 
should be re-examined within China’s institutional context. The institutional uncertainty 
stemming from economic liberalization increases the importance of relationship-based 
exchanges. In this vein, subsidiary experience in China is associated with relationship-
based operation rather than rule-based operation. As such, Essay 1 posits that a Japanese 
MNE increases its ownership levels in China to accommodate the process of economic 
liberalization. However, a Japanese MNE also tends to maintain equity-based 




a Japanese MNE only increases its ownership levels in the United States with the 
accumulation of subsidiary experience. 
Empirical tests based on growth-curve models support the theory developed in 
Essay 1, showing the significance, substance, and dynamism of an MNE’s institutional 
response in terms of overseas ownership choice. 
Essay 2 
The second essay (Chapter 3), entitled “The Evolving Relationship between MNE 
Ownership and Subsidiary Profitability”, examines the O-P relationship under the 
condition of economic liberalization. Existing literature suggests that a Japanese MNE’s 
ownership level is positively associated with the subsidiary profitability in developed 
countries and negatively associated with those in developing countries. Essay 2 
investigates an underexplored topic: the evolution of the O-P relationship during China’s 
economic liberalization. Consistent with Essay 1, Essay 2 argues that China’s economic 
liberalization not only has improved institutional openness towards foreign investments, 
but also has incurred institutional uncertainty that an MNE must cope with. While 
institutional openness positively adjusts an MNE’s O-P relationship, institutional 
uncertainty negatively alters it. Moreover, along with the economic liberalization, China’s 
institutional openness is increasing, reducing an MNE’s reliance on local partners to enter 
the market. Meanwhile, China’s institutional uncertainty is declining, reducing an MNE’s 
reliance on local partners to understand the state of local institutions and their cause-
effect on subsidiary performance. Therefore, a Japanese MNE’s O-P relationship 
positively evolves with China’s economic liberalization. Empirical tests based on 
multilevel longitudinal models support this proposition. Even so, for most years during 
1990-2009, a Japanese MNE’s O-P relationship remains negative in China. A negative O-
P relationship indicates that high equity control does not lead to superior subsidiary 
profitability in China. Even after addressing the endogeneity issue caused by ownership 





The third essay (Chapter 4), entitled “MNE Ownership, Subsidiary Survival and 
Economic Liberalization”, examines the survival prospect of a foreign subsidiary and the 
O-S relationship under the condition of economic liberalization. Prior studies suggest that 
an MNE’s ownership level is positively associated with subsidiary survival (Dhanaraj and 
Beamish, 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005), and leave two research gaps. First, an MNE 
chooses it overseas ownership level according to the institutional context within which it 
operates. This highlights the necessity of addressing the endogeneity issue caused by 
organizational choices when investigating an MNE’s O-S relationship (Reeb et al., 2012; 
Shaver, 1998). Second, the survival of a foreign subsidiary is associated with its short-
term profitability and future opportunities. Although Essay 2 addressed subsidiary 
profitability and the O-P relationship, it is necessary to investigate how the real options of 
future opportunities influence subsidiary survival and the O-S relationship. Accordingly, 
Essay 3 suggests that institutional uncertainty positively relates to the survival of a 
foreign subsidiary because of the importance of keeping options available. With declining 
institutional uncertainty in China, there is a decreasing need for an MNE to seize future 
opportunities by maintaining non-performing subsidiaries. This results in a declining 
survival rate of foreign subsidiaries in China. Essay 3 also identifies the association and 
differentiation between subsidiary profitability and survival. After controlling for 
endogeneity issues caused by ownership choices and subsidiary profitability, an MNE’s 
O-S relationship is constantly insignificant in China and the United States. 
Dissertation-Related Presentations 
Prior to the submission of the dissertation for final examination, the theoretical 
and empirical analyses presented in the following three essays have evolved through 
extensive developmental feedback received from my supervisor and proposal committee 
members as well as multiple public forums including doctorial consortiums, academic 
conferences and invited scholarly presentations. With respect to Essay 1 (Chapter 2), the 
author presented an early version at the Academy of International Business Annual 




Environment of IB interest track. It was nominated for the 2014 Temple/AIB Best Paper 
Award. With respect to Essay 2 (Chapter 3), the author presented an early version at the 
2014 Association of Japanese Business Studies Annual Conference. It was nominated for 
the Palgrave Macmillan/AJBS Best Paper Award.  
Writing Style 
The three essays adopt the same research setting and a comparative methodology. 
Therefore, they use the same procedure to select samples, and involve similar arguments 
about institutional conditions in China and the United States. Inevitably, there is some 
repetition regarding methodology and institutional contexts. The author retains them for 
the completeness of each essay. Any repetition within essays will be eliminated at the 
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Chapter 2. Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of 
Institutional Response: Japanese MNEs’ Ownership 
Choices in China and the United States 
Introduction 
The OLI paradigm describes that a multinational enterprise (MNE) always has a 
configuration of firm specific ownership advantages (O), location specific advantages (L), 
internalization advantages (I), and strategic objectives as well (Dunning, 1977; Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008). As one means of realizing internalization advantages (Dunning, 
1977), ownership strategy is critical for multinational enterprises (MNEs) as it affects the 
overseas subsidiaries’ likelihood of success as well as the probability of survival 
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Woodcock, 
Beamish, and Makino, 1994). International business (IB) research has investigated the 
predictors of MNEs’ ownership patterns in foreign countries by considering various 
transactional, institutional, and experience influences (Delios and Beamish, 1999; 
Demirbag, Glaister, and Tatoglu, 2007).  
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic institutional changes in emerging 
economies facilitated by their economic liberalization. To cope with these evolving 
institutional contexts, MNEs have increasingly adopted WOS entries and sometimes even 
converted existing IJVs to WOSs (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013; Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). Based on data compiled in this 
dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically increased their average ownership level in 
FDIs in China during the period of China’s economic liberalization. In contrast, over the 
same period, they have only slightly increased their ownership levels in FDIs in the 
United States. This emerging phenomenon delineated by Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, requires 
scholars to understand the influence of economic liberalization on MNEs ownership 
choice. 
Prior studies have particularly been concerned with two competing institutional 




hand, emerging economies are frequently characterized by “institutional voids”. The term 
refers to the absence of market-oriented regulatory systems or contract enforcing 
mechanisms which facilitate the efficient functioning of free markets (Khanna and Palepu, 
1997). Thus, MNEs must develop relevant cross-border strategies to manage 
underdeveloped institutions that either prevent market transactions or increase their costs 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). IB theorists have suggested that MNEs may respond 
to institutional voids, such as foreign ownership restriction, through partnerships with 
local firms (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Delios & Beamish, 1999). On the other hand, 
emerging economies are recognized as rapid-growth countries using economic 
liberalization as their primary engine (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, 
and Wright, 2000). Since economic liberalization will fill institutional voids with market-
based rules, foreign MNEs must respond to the liberalization process to continuously 
reconfigure and secure their competitive advantages in emerging economies. Several 
studies have posited that regulatory liberalization as an important aspect of economic 
liberalization, may reduce the number of minority affiliates and even facilitate the 
conversion of existing international joint ventures (IJVs) into wholly owned subsidiaries 
(WOSs) (Contractor, 1990; Puck et al., 2009).  
Nevertheless, most studies assume that economic liberalization is a singular event 
or a steadily proceeding reform over time and across geographic space. These studies 
have not sufficiently incorporated the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of the 
institutional environment of an emerging economy into the research on MNEs’ ownership 
strategies. For a variety of reasons, this issue deserves more attention. First, when 
regulatory liberalization proceeds incrementally, it creates a changing threshold for levels 
of foreign ownership and influences the extent to which an MNE can secure its firm-
specific advantages and acquire/access local complementary resources. Whether and how 
the MNE responds to the dynamics of regulatory liberalization reflects the MNE’s ability 
to simultaneously reconfigure and secure its competitive advantages in a context with 
rapid dynamics (Teece, 2007). 
Second, regulatory liberalization influences the extent to which other factors play 




bring about a “forced” local ownership even where transaction cost economics (TCE) 
does not predict the existence of the IJV (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). 
Incremental regulatory liberalization relaxes the threshold over time, allowing MNEs to 
increasingly decide their ownership levels based on firm-specific factors. If this threshold 
effect is not considered in the theoretical model, particularly when investigating the 
MNE’s ownership strategies with longitudinal data, a study may under- or over-estimate 
the influence of other factors. 
Third, the process of economic liberalization usually unevenly proceeds within the 
political hierarchy and across the breadth of geographic scope (Boisot and Child, 1996; 
Park, Li, and Tse, 2006). It results in prominent institutional transition and subnational 
variation for a long time period (Chan, Makino, and Isobe, 2010; Peng, 2003). These 
important characteristics of task environments may influence the cross-border ownership 
strategy of MNEs in a more complicated way than has been incorporated into existing 
studies. 
Fourth, prior studies suggest that the experience in the host country may be 
associated with higher foreign ownership levels (Contractor, 1990; Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Puck et al., 2009). Nevertheless, frequent institutional changes in an emerging 
economy may invalidate an MNE’s prior experience with local conditions. In addition, 
the influences of both economic liberalization and subsidiary experience can be perceived 
as functions of time. Without simultaneously including them in theoretical analysis and 
empirical testing, it is unclear whether they are still respectively associated with a higher 
foreign ownership level when they coexist.  
This study purports to shed light on these underexplored and important research 
gaps by examining the growth trajectories of ownership levels of Japanese MNEs in the 
past two decades. To address such a challenge, this study adopts an institution-based view, 
which draws upon TCE and the learning perspective (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 
2001; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). A subsidiary’s sustained 
competitive advantage depends on its ability to manage the institutional context of its 
resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, 




assets and acquire/access complementary local assets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; 
Hennart, 2009). When institutional context varies over time, its evolution should be 
included in theoretical analysis and empirical testing. In addition, this study focuses on 
the influences of economic liberalization and subsidiary experience, and examines 
whether and how they are empirically distinguished from each other. The present study 
also includes other influences identified in existing literature as control variables. 
This paper proceeds with a literature review and a description of the research 
setting that was used. Then it develops a set of hypotheses to delineate the distinct 
influences of the economic liberalization process and subsidiary experience on MNE 
ownership choice. It proceeds to examine hypotheses using a latent growth-curve model 
and data spanning a wider period of time. Finally, it discusses empirical results that 
confirm or diverge from existing work and presents implications to IB research and 
practitioners. 
Literature Review 
Theories on Ownership Strategy 
The IB field has extensively investigated the predictors of MNEs’ ownership 
strategies by considering transactional, institutional, and experience influences (Anderson 
and Gatignon, 1986; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Demirbag et al., 2007; Jung, Beamish, 
and Goerzen, 2010). 
TCE discusses  the most efficient governance structures – markets, hierarchies, or 
a hybrid of the two – to govern a specific set of transactions (Williamson, 1975, 1985). It 
has been particularly useful in understanding the establishment of an MNE’s ownership 
levels in its overseas subsidiaries by answering two questions: (1) what specific assets 
does the MNE possess to exploit in the host country; and (2) what complementary assets 
does the MNE purport to acquire or access in the host country (Hennart, 2009). For the 
first question, TCE posits that the degree of ownership assumed in the foreign operation 
confers a proportional degree of control over the uses to which the firm-specific assets 




higher the considered level of the ownership when the MNE invests in a foreign country 
(Chen and Hennart, 2002; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Demirbag et al., 2007). With 
greater control comes increased resource commitments and risk. This means that the 
ownership decision involves a trade-off between control and resource commitments 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Regarding the second question, TCE suggests that when 
complementary resources are subject to market inefficiency or asymmetric information, 
an MNE may adopt a relatively lower level of ownership in order to access the local 
based assets and/or to keep the real options open (Hennart, 2009). To secure firm-specific 
advantages and access complementary resources, an MNE should be able to manage the 
institutional context of its resource decisions in the host country (Brouthers et al., 2008; 
Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2008). 
Although institutional influences are usually analysed based on institutional 
theory, they are closely associated with TCE because one critical locally based resource is 
institutional knowledge, and a lack thereof constitutes a significant competitive 
disadvantage for the MNE (Hymer, 1976). Institutions encompass a broad array of 
political and legal rules, and the social norms that constitute the home/host country’s 
institutional environment for business operation (Delios and Beamish, 1999; North, 1990).  
To formulate appropriate organizational choices, an MNE needs to have knowledge of the 
state of institutions and their cause-effect on firm performance (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008; Milliken, 1987). In this vein, institutional influences are associated with two 
aspects of MNE operations: (1) the establishment of legitimacy in the host country, i.e., 
the local responsiveness; and (2) the transfer of strategic orientations and organizational 
practices shaped in the home country to the foreign subsidiary, i.e., the internal 
consistency (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). While the former is associated 
with acquiring or accessing complementary resources in the host country, the latter is 
concerned with the security of firm-specific advantages developed in the home country. 
The IB field investigates the local responsiveness and internal consistency with 
two streams of literature. One stream explores how the unilateral national characteristics 
(either of the home country or of the host country) influence the MNE’s ownership 




avoidance may be positively related to the MNE’s ownership levels in a foreign country 
(Erramilli, 1996; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Hofstede, 1980). Another example is that 
underdeveloped property rights in the host country may be associated with a higher level 
of MNE control in order to secure firm-specific assets (Delios and Beamish, 1999). The 
other stream focused on institutional distance explores the influence of the similarities or 
dissimilarities between the host and home institutional environments. Institutional 
distance raises the uncertainty, risk, and hence the cost of operating in the foreign country 
(Hennart and Larimo, 1998). Some studies posit that greater institutional (or cultural) 
distance predicts higher ownership control levels in order to enhance internal consistency 
and minimize transaction costs (Hennart and Larimo, 1998). Other research proposes that 
greater institutional distance is associated with lower equity ownership so as to maintain 
local responsiveness (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004). A 
trade-off between internal consistency and local responsiveness is thus important. 
Nevertheless, the institutional uncertainty that an MNE confronts ultimately stems from 
the complexity, dynamism and hostility of institutional environments in the host country 
(Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and Litschert, 1994), as these factors retard the MNE in 
understanding the state of institutions and their cause-effects on the firm performance 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Milliken, 1987). Neither unilateral national characteristics 
nor institutional distance can sufficiently capture these three dimensions. 
As argued by IB theorists, firms with experience in the host country may learn 
about local institutions and develop organizational capabilities adapted to the 
environment. They therefore face fewer institutional disadvantages (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). Multiple studies have suggested a positive relationship between an MNE’s 
ownership level and its experience in the host country (Delios and Beamish, 1999; 
Hennart, 1991; Makino and Delios, 1996; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish, 
2008). Nevertheless, an experienced MNE may also develop capabilities in managing 
local partners to access institutional advantages that are difficult to acquire (Cantwell, 
Dunning, and Lundan, 2010; Hennart, 2009). In particular, an MNE would have a weaker 
need to rely on a high equity ownership to deal with unexpected contingencies in a 
rapidly changing environment (Jung et al., 2010). The experience in the host country 




institutions and their cause-effect on firm performance, and it does not always result in 
higher equity control. 
Prior literature has contributed to our understanding of cross-border ownership 
strategy by analyzing transactional, institutional and experience influences. As 
institutional conditions determine the cause-effect of transactional and experience factors 
on firm performance, these three types of influences are not independent from each other. 
The literature has not sufficiently investigated their interdependence. To address such a 
challenge requires an institutional setting with remarkable dynamism so that their 
interdependence can be theoretically and empirically identified. An emerging economy 
employing economic liberalization can satisfy such a requirement. 
Economic Liberalization 
When studying an MNE’s ownership strategy in an emerging economy, prior 
studies mainly focus on influences of the regulation and/or deregulation of foreign 
ownership. Regulatory restriction on foreign equity participation may bring about a 
“forced” local ownership even where TCE does not predict the existence of the IJV,  
resulting in a lower MNE ownership level (Contractor, 1990; Delios and Beamish, 1999; 
Delios and Henisz, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). In contrast, with regulatory 
liberalization, an MNE may reduce the number of 50-50 and minority affiliates and 
convert existing IJVs to WOSs in order to secure firm-specific advantages or to be 
isomorphic to successful peers (Chang et al., 2013; Puck et al., 2009; Xia, Tan, and Tan, 
2008). Nevertheless, most studies assume either regulatory restriction or liberalization as 
the basis for their arguments (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Puck et al., 2009).  This assumption 
leaves the influence of regulatory transition on MNE ownership level unexplored. 
Moreover, economic liberalization involves other components in addition to 
regulatory liberalization. It may also involve the decentralization of political power, 
privatization of property rights, establishment of legal systems, and formulation of 
industrial policies (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000; Park et al., 
2006). Along with economic liberalization, the interaction of existing institutional voids 




political hierarchy and across geographies over time (Boisot and Child, 1996; Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Park et al., 2006). This can result in institutional 
transition and subnational variation for a long period of time (Chan et al., 2010; Peng, 
2003). Therefore, although regulatory liberalization increasingly relaxes the threshold of 
foreign ownership, the changing complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional 
environments incur fluctuating institutional uncertainty (Dess and Beard, 1984). These 
factors complicate an MNE’s ownership choice. 
In brief, studying the foreign investments in an emerging economy can further 
scholarly understanding about how transactional, institutional and experience influences 
will interdependently affect an MNE’s ownership choice. 
Research Setting 
This study compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States from 1990 to 
2009 for multiple reasons. First, the country of origin may influence an MNE’s overseas 
ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Zhao, Luo, and Suh, 
2004). Focusing on MNEs from a single country such as Japan can reduce the 
endogeneity issue caused by organizational choices. Moreover, a number of prior studies 
have empirically examined Japanese MNEs’ ownership choices in their FDIs (Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; Jung, Beamish, and Goerzen, 2008; Jung et al., 2010), providing a basis 
for comparison with the present work. 
Second, such a research setting allows for comparison of Japanese ownership 
choices in China, the largest emerging economy undergoing an institutional transition, 
with those in the United States, the largest advanced economy sustaining a relatively 
mature free-market institutional environment (Chan et al., 2010). This provides a large 
sample size for empirical tests. Moreover, this research setting controls for the 
confounding effects of multiple host countries as well (Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004; 
Pattnaik, Choe, and Singh, 2015). Although advanced economies advocate free market 
institutions, they still differ in other dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g., 
country culture) that influence a foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Xu et al., 2004). In 




liberalization (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000; Roland, 2002). Different approaches may 
facilitate distinct institutional changes in scope, intensity, and duration (Brouthers and 
Lamb Jr, 1995; Roland, 2002), influencing a foreign MNE’s ownership choice diversely. 
Therefore, involving multiple advanced or emerging economies will complicate 
theoretical analysis and empirical testing.  
Third, since there are still no exact measurements for a country’s institutional 
transition, this study needs an emerging economy within which the general trends of 
institutional conditions can be estimated. While some countries adopted a “big bang” 
approach for a fast and comprehensive implementation of all major reforms (Newman, 
2000; Roland, 2002), China advocates a dual-track strategy for economic liberalization.  
This is a process by which a market track is introduced and gradually strengthened while 
the central planning track is maintained and progressively diminished (Boisot and Child, 
1996; Lau et al., 2000; Park et al., 2006). This dual-track nature results in incremental 
economic liberalization lasting for a lengthy period of time, allowing for the identification 
of the overall trends of China’s institutional environments by accessing well-documented 
governmental policies and relevant academic studies. 
China’s incremental economic liberalization process is reflected in the regulatory 
liberalization of inward foreign investments. Ownership regulations on FDIs in China 
began to change with the Open Door Policy. The Joint Venture Law of 1979 allowed IJVs 
between foreign MNEs and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for the first time (Ye, 2012). 
In 1986 the Chinese government launched the Law of Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
which permitted MNEs to establish WOSs for the first time (Ye, 2012). At that time 
however, WOSs were only allowed in a few industries with limited product scope and 
scales of operation. In 1995 the government issued the most prominent set of ownership 
laws, “Regulations for Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment,” and its appendix, 
“Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industries”. The former introduced the 
general types, rules, and procedures of foreign investments in China, and was revised in 
2002. The latter (known as the Catalogues) listed industries in detail in terms of 
encouraged, permitted, restricted, or prohibited categories. The industries or relevant 




permitted products, processes and scales of operation. The industries or products in the 
“restricted” category were usually limited to IJVs. The “prohibited” category refers to 
industries in which foreign investment is completely restricted. The government revised 
the Catalogues in 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007, and 2011 by upgrading more and more 
“prohibited” or “restricted” categories and relevant products to “permitted” and 
“encouraged”.1 Based on this incremental regulatory liberalization, this study assumes 
that the progress of China’s economic liberalization can be operationalized as a function 
of time. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the institutional-based view, a Japanese MNE is likely to adopt high 
equity control in overseas operations in order to achieve external legitimacy and/or 
internal consistency. One stream of institutional theory, the national character theory, 
posits that countries vary systematically in psychological characteristics and that MNEs’ 
subsidiary ownership strategies will reflect the home country’s characteristics (Hennart 
and Larimo, 1998; Shetty, 1979). According to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, Japanese 
culture is characterized as having moderate power distance and high uncertainty 
avoidance
2
 (Hofstede, 1980). These ratings indicate that Japanese MNEs are likely to 
seek high ownership levels in their foreign subsidiaries, otherwise they may be perceived 
illegitimate by their Japanese peers (Erramilli, 1996; Hennart and Larimo, 1998). In 
addition, with high equity control an MNE can achieve internal consistency by 
transferring strategic orientations and best practices to its foreign subsidiaries (Kostova, 
Roth, and Dacin, 2008). Nevertheless, for Japanese FDIs in China, earlier studies suggest 
that the regulatory restriction may suppress the preference for high ownership choice 
(Beamish, 1993; Delios and Beamish, 1999). Moreover, economic liberalization in China 
relaxes the regulatory restriction on foreign ownership and introduces emerging 
institutional uncertainty, influencing foreign ownership in a complicated way. 
                                                          
1
 The summary about China’s regulatory liberalization is synthesized from the website of the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (www.mofcom.gov.cn) and Ye (2012). 
2
 Japanese power distance value is 54, ranked 23rd out of 56 countries, and Japanese uncertainty avoidance 




The Influence of Economic Liberalization 
Regulatory liberalization in China relaxes the threshold of foreign ownership, 
making it possible for MNEs to operate with higher equity control. In the initial stage of 
economic liberalization, regulative restriction in China exerted a coercive influence and 
determined the ownership structure that MNEs could legitimately possess regardless of 
their desired structure for efficiency and/or internal consistency (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Kostova, 1999; Scott, 1995). The result is that early IJVs in 
China were usually created in place of WOSs due to government pressure, often with 
government partners (Beamish, 1993). Gradually, regulatory liberalization offered a 
broader choice of partnership arrangements to MNEs and allowed decisions about 
ownership choice to be increasingly based on rational considerations of strategic intention, 
risk and transaction costs (Child and Tse, 2001). With regulatory liberalization MNEs 
increasingly established majority IJVs and WOSs in China, and even converted existing 
IJVs to WOSs in order to secure their specific assets and/or mimic successful peers from 
the same home country or industry, irrespective of the rationality of the efficiency (Davis 
et al., 2000; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Guillén, 2003; Lu, 2002; Xia et al., 2008).  
Although these theoretical conclusions are consistent with reality, they may be 
incomplete in terms of the total effect of economic liberalization. As of 1990 the number 
of majority IJVs and WOSs in China continued to rise along with the process of 
regulatory liberalization. By 1997 the number of foreign WOSs exceeded the number of 
IJVs in China for the first time (Xia et al., 2008; Xiong, 2009). This trend was 
strengthened after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). In December, 
2001 Panasonic declared that it would convert its 50 IJVs in China into WOSs. In 
Motorola’s board meeting in 2001 directors asserted that  sole proprietorships would be 
the natural choice with China’s joining the WTO (Xiong, 2009). An underlying 
assumption in these conclusions is that institutional uncertainty remains the same as 
before. This may not be true. As previously discussed, the deficiency in institutional 
knowledge raises the uncertainty and cost of operating in a foreign country.  This creates 
a significant competitive disadvantage for an MNE (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Hymer, 




institutional advantages (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Li and Li, 2010; Xu et al., 
2004). It is thus necessary to examine the sources of institutional uncertainty and their 
evolutionary trajectories along with China’s economic liberalization and evaluate whether 
the level of institutional uncertainty would prevent an increase of foreign ownership level. 
Prior studies have identified complexity, dynamism, and hostility as important 
environmental attributes. In the present study, the attributes can be understood as 
heterogeneity, instability, and inequality of institutional conditions where greater values 
indicate higher institutional uncertainty towards FDIs (Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and 
Litschert, 1994). In addition, the hostility of the institutional environment towards FDIs is 
closely associated with the institutional pressure because it indicates the extent to which 
an MNE confronts institutional restriction/openness in the host country. The present study 
argues that coexisting institutional transition and subnational disparity intensify the 
complexity, dynamism, and hostility of China’s institutional environment, constituting the 
main sources of institutional uncertainty for FDIs.  
MNEs increasingly confront subnational institutions in China along with 
economic liberalization. As mentioned, in the early stage of economic liberalization, 
MNEs usually chose their investment locations and local partners from a limited scope 
dictated by the central government and their subsidiaries were under the central 
government’s monitoring (Beamish, 1993). Therefore, the influence of subnational 
regional environments was mitigated by centralized decision-making mechanisms. With 
deepening economic liberalization, China’s central government has gradually relaxed 
country-level restriction on FDIs and decentralized decision-making power to local 
governments and firms (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis et al., 2000; Park et al., 2006). This 
allows MNEs to access different locations and partners with decreasing central 
government control, interact with local stakeholders more directly, and spread their 
investments across a broader geography.   
With increasing embeddedness in subnational regions, MNEs investing in China 
are influenced by subnational disparity in political institutions in a variety of ways (Chan 
et al., 2010; Ma, Tong, and Fitza, 2013; Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014a). First, the 




Sun, and Peng, 2012), resulting in fuzzy boundaries between central and local controls 
across geographic locations. Second, China’s central government delegates some 
regulatory functions to the local level (Luo, 2005; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Such 
delegation is often ambiguously and equivocally stipulated, leaving opportunities for 
subjective interpretation by local authorities (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, and Lu, 2010; Shi et 
al., 2014a). Lacking sufficient institutions to support a free market, local authorities 
continue to be influenced by the legacy of a socialist system and subnational culture when 
formulating subnational regulations and policies (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006; Peng, 
2003).  
Third, China’s dual-track approach purports to liberalize markets without 
eliminating the pre-existing rents of economic agents (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 
2000; Roland, 2002). The political decentralization usually gives rise to local 
protectionism and regionalism, allowing local agents to maximize self-interest (Ma et al., 
2013). This agency problem creates “ad hoc rule bending” by local authorities and pushes 
economic actors to rely on relationship-based exchanges more than on rule-based ones 
(Lin, 2001; Park and Luo, 2001; Peng, 2003; Shi et al., 2014a). Subnational variation in 
political institutions heightens the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional 
environments that MNEs confront. This constitutes the main source of uncertainty in 
sensing the state of local rules, understanding their cause-effects on value-added activities, 
and formulating organizational choices (Luo, 2003; Luo, 2007; Milliken, 1987; 
Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).  
Moreover, existing literature has thoroughly documented that China has 
significant within-country variation in culture at the province or region level (Chan et al., 
2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2012). Subnational cultures as informal institutions are 
usually used to bridge existing institutional voids (North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2011). Cultural-based informal institutions are usually intangible and 
sophisticated, and require time for MNEs to understand (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). It is 
also difficult for an MNE to understand the fuzzy boundaries between formal institutions 
and cultural-cognitive institutions. For example, guanxi, defined as ‘a relationship with 




element that intensifies relationship-based exchanges in China (Standifird and Marshall, 
2000). Its significance to the local business community varies at the subnational regional 
level, complicating an MNE’s strategy at the country level (Park and Luo, 2001). 
Subnational disparity in cultural/social institutions heightens the institutional uncertainty.  
China also has significant within-country variation in economic development. 
Economic institutions involve intermediaries and common infrastructure that support 
economic transaction (Chan et al., 2010; Porter, 1990). They influence an MNE’s choices 
of subnational locations and ownership structure (Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen, 2013; 
Ma and Delios, 2007). With central government’s macro-control and local governments’ 
political intervention, subnational economic institutions change over time (Pan and Chi, 
1999). Subnational disparity in social and economic institutions heightens the institutional 
uncertainty.  
In conclusion, China’s economic liberalization not only results in a gradual 
institutional transition from a central planning track to a market track, but also causes 
subnational disparity in political, social, and economic institutions. The coexisting 
institutional transition and subnational disparity give rise to the complexity, dynamism, 
and hostility of China’s institutional environments, resulting in institutional pressure and 
institutional uncertainty that MNEs confront. Figure 2.1 summarizes the theoretical 
foundation for the present study. As mentioned, institutional pressure and institutional 
uncertainty exert competing influences on an MNE’s ownership choice. While MNEs can 
rapidly understand and respond to explicit institutional pressure, it is relatively more 
difficult for them to identify and cope with institutional uncertainty. 
Further, institutional uncertainty in China evolves following a certain trend. As 
mentioned, China has adopted a dual-track approach in economic liberalization. 
Strengthening the market track is embodied in institutionalizing formal market rules and 
decreasing institutional voids. Literature suggests that the complexity, dynamism, and 
hostility in China’s institutional environment decline over time (Tan and Tan, 2005), 
reducing an MNE’s reliance on relationship-based exchanges in subnational regions 
(Peng, 2003; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Decreasing institutional uncertainty allows an 




with China’s economic liberalization, Japanese MNEs will gradually increase their 
ownership levels in China. 
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Foundation 
 
Compared to China’s situation, the United States has consistently had a mature 
free-market economy. There has been no major recent regulatory change on FDIs in the 
United States. Although political, economic, and social institutions vary across regions 
within the United States as well, the extent to which they vary in the United States is 
much less than in China (Chan et al., 2010). This study thus argues that a Japanese MNE 
will not significantly change its ownership levels in the United States.  
Hypothesis 1a: Japanese MNEs will increase their ownership levels in 
China during the period of economic liberalization. 
Hypothesis 1b: Japanese MNEs will not change their ownership levels in 
the United States during the same period. 
Subsidiary Experience 
An MNE may increase its ownership levels in its foreign investments by two 
means: (1) establishing new subsidiaries with higher ownership levels than before; and (2) 
increasing the existing subsidiaries’ ownership levels. The second one can be influenced 
by the subsidiary’s operating experience, which is usually measured by subsidiary age 




the reliance on the local partners, leading to higher ownership level (Hennart, 1991; 
Makino and Delios, 1996; Wilkinson et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, China’s economic liberalization may change the nature of the 
subsidiary experience. First, because of the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of 
subnational institutions, relationship-based exchanges would still outweigh the rule-based 
ones for a period of time (Lin, 2001; Park and Luo, 2001; Peng, 2003; Shi et al., 2014a). 
Although managerial ties with local agents can help a foreign subsidiary in relationship-
based exchanges, a WOS still has disadvantages in learning about local government 
intentions and linking its managerial ties compared with local firms (Chen, Ding, and 
Kim, 2010; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Therefore, MNEs 
usually establish equity partnerships with local governments or firms that have privileged 
political ties (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). The complexity of the subnational culture and 
changing subnational regulation intensify this trend. In this vein, subsidiary experience is 
relevant to the ability to cooperate with local actors, rather than to the ability to operate 
independently.  
Second, it is costly to reduce or discontinue a relational contract when 
relationship-based exchanges still prevail. Increasing equity share in an IJV or converting 
the IJV to a WOS means that the MNE is trying to reduce and even discontinue a 
relational contract with local actor(s) that are closer to the local power center. Reduction 
or discontinuity of a relational commitment requires mutual agreement. The lack of 
mutual agreement may damage trust in the relationship or more generally a firm’s 
reputation in the local business community (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). This would 
increase the ex ante and/or ex post transaction cost. The longer the relational commitment, 
the more difficult it is to reduce or discontinue it. 
In contrast, Japanese MNEs can rely on relatively efficient market mechanisms to 
increase their equity ownership in existing subsidiaries with the mature free-market 




Hypothesis 2a: In China, the operating experience of a Japanese 
subsidiary will be negatively related to its ownership level during the 
period of China’s economic liberalization.  
Hypothesis 2b: In the United States, the operating experience of a 
Japanese subsidiary will be positively related to its ownership level during 
the same period. 
Figure 2.1 delineates the theoretical model. 
Figure 2.2 Theoretical Model 
 
Methodology 
The empirical methodology used for this study should solve two problems. First, 
Japanese ownership patterns in China and the United States may share a number of 
explanatory factors to different degrees. Second, they also may be influenced by 
systematic differences in the types of Japanese investments in China and United States 
This study addresses the second problem in sample selection. To solve the first problem 
this study follows the rationale in Gomes-Casseres (1990) and incorporates the country 





𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 
 α0 + (𝛼1 − 𝛼0) ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  ∑ 𝛽0𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑(𝛽1𝑖 − 𝛽0𝑖) ∙ 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1
    (2.1)  
where 
Country is a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the subsidiary operated in China),  
xi is an independent variable that influences the MNE’s ownership strategies, 
n is the number of independent variables, 
α0, β0i are the intercept and slope for Japanese subsidiaries in the United States, 
α1, β1i are the intercept and slope for Japanese subsidiaries in China. 
As mentioned, the present study focuses on the influences of economic 
liberalization and subsidiary experience and controls for other influences identified by 
prior studies. It therefore employs latent growth-curve modelling because the relevant 
techniques explicitly model the trajectories of individual subjects over time, delineating 
how these trajectories vary both systematically and randomly (Singer and Willett, 2003). 
A quadratic growth-curve model was chosen because it includes non-linear effects. 
Moreover, since the influence of subsidiary experience measured by subsidiary age is also 
an occasion-based variable, this study employs a double growth-curve model with two 
occasional dimensions.  
This study constructs the latent growth-curve model with occasion, subsidiary, 
MNE, and subnational levels. Moreover, since MNE and subnational levels are crossed 
but not nested, the model uses necessary techniques to address the random effect between 
them. As such, the final empirical model consists of four levels and two occasional 
dimensions. Finally, since the latent growth-curve model is a special case of random-
coefficient models  (Singer and Willett, 2003), the model assumes that the coefficients of 





The initial sample included observations of Japanese subsidiaries during 1990-
2009 from the merged Toyo Keizai and Needs dataset (2012 Edition). Many of the prior 
studies to which this research refers used earlier editions of the Toyo Keizai datasets 
(Delios and Beamish, 1999; Jung et al., 2010; Makino and Beamish, 1998a; 
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996). Using the data from the same organization improves the 
reliability of this study. 
To solve the second question (the systemic difference in selecting host countries)  
mentioned by Gomes-Casseres (1990), this study discards the observations from Japanese 
MNEs that only invested in either the United States or China during 1990-2009. To 
highlight the effect of economic liberalization, this study drops subsidiaries invested in 
agriculture, forestry, and mining industries within which there were distinct industry-
specific regulations that were given priority over the Catalogues in China
3
. This study 
also excludes Japanese subsidiaries that functioned as local headquarters as almost all of 
them are WOSs. To focus on strategic investments, this study drops subsidiaries with less 
than 5% Japanese ownership during their lifetimes since they were considered portfolio 
investments (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Finally, this study drops subsidiaries with 
missing data. With this careful screening, the final dataset consists of 653 Japanese MNEs, 




Dependent and Independent Variables 
The dependent variable for the present study is the Japanese ownership level, 
measured as the percentage of total Japanese ownership in the subsidiary in China or the 
United States. 
                                                          
3
 The differences in regulatory rules between natural resource related industries and other industries are 
synthesized from the website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(www.mofcom.gov.cn). 
4
 Compared to the number of Japanese subsidiaries (2,261), the number of observations (19,373) between 
1990-2009 is relatively small. This is because (i) subsidiaries were established at different time, (ii) they 





This study involves independent variables to examine hypotheses. Based on the 
rationale of growth-curve modelling, the occasion variables that manifest the influence of 
economic liberalization are simply the time (since 1990) and its square value (Time and 
Time2). The occasion variables that manifest the subsidiary experience effect are the 
subsidiary age (since its establishment) and its square value (Subsidiary age and 
Subsidiary age2). Moreover, based on Equation (2.1) this study includes a country 
dummy (Country, measured as 1 if the subsidiary was operated in China), and 
interactions between it and the occasion variables (Time X Country, Time2 X Country, 
Subsidiary age X Country, Subsidiary age2 X Country).  
Control Variables 
This study controls for other factors that may influence a Japanese MNE’s 
overseas ownership choice. To control for the possible nonlinear influences from different 
decades, due to the global economy or other country dynamics, the paper includes two 
dummy variables to identify whether those subsidiaries were established before 1990, 
during the 1990s (reference), or in the 2000s. For example, China joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December, 2001. To fulfil a member country’s obligations in the 
WTO, China accelerated the liberalization of regulation during the 2000s. This study also 
considers the interactions of the country and decade dummy variables. Because of the 
collinearity between the subsidiary age and the variable Established before 1990, finally 
this study only includes the variable Established in the 2000s. 
Second, this study considers an MNE’s experience in a subnational region. Prior 
studies considered the influence of an MNE’s host country presence, computed as the log 
of the sum of subsidiary-year units in the host country. This measure was used because 
accumulated operation may provide a valuable local knowledge base to respond to 
environmental contingencies (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Nevertheless, due to the subnational variation in political, social, and economic 
institutions, regional experience more appropriately represents an MNE’s local 
knowledge base than country presence does. This study deconstructs an MNE’s country 
presence into subnational regional experience, regional diversity, and regional 




within a subnational region, i.e., a province, municipality, or state. Nevertheless, this 
study drops the variable because it is highly correlated with the subsidiary experience. 
Moreover, simultaneously operating in multiple subnational regions may intensify the 
uncertainty that an MNE confronts (Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian, Li, Li, and Qian, 2008). 
This study thus includes regional diversity measured by the number of subnational 
regions where an MNE operates in China or the United States. Based on the sample 
screening process previously described, the present study involves 25 subnational regions 
in China and 39 in the United States. The study includes regional concentration measured 
by the number of sibling subsidiaries in the focal region as it influences the focal 
subsidiary’s strategic importance and embeddedness in the local networks (Andersson, 
Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Roth and Morrison, 1992). The study also considers the 
interaction items of regional diversity and regional concentration with the country dummy.  
Third, investment motives indicate a subsidiary’s strategic position in the parent 
firm’s market expansion and global integration and they influence the subsidiary’s 
operating mode (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Li, 1995). Following Goerzen et al.’s (2013) 
approach, this study categorizes original investment purposes into nine types: Local 
market seeking, Global production network, Global distribution network, Local 
information collection, Local labor seeking, Follow global stakeholders, New product 
development, Local resource seeking, and International risk hedging. 
Fourth, this study includes industry and sector categories since they present the 
various levels of marketization or concentration that influence an MNE’s overseas 
ownership choice (Boisot and Child, 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Zhao et al., 2004). 
Following prior studies (e.g., Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004), the study includes eight 
industry and two sector dummy variables for the subsidiary level in order to remove the 
confounding industry and sector effects (the reference is the manufacturing of electronics). 
Industry dummy variables for the MNE level are not used because of the collinearity 
between the industrial categories of the subsidiary and its MNE parent. Nevertheless, the 
MNE from one sector may invest in other sectors in the host country (e.g., a Japanese 
manufacturer may invest in wholesale or retail sector in China), and therefore there is no 




therefore includes two sector dummy variables for the MNE level (the reference is the 
manufacturing sector). However, an MNE from the service sector usually still invests in 
the same sector in foreign countries (correlation = 0.679). The study therefore drops the 
variable Subsidiary in service to reduce multi-collinearity.  
Fifth, the study controls for MNE-specific factors that positively relate to an 
MNE’s cross-border ownership choice. The study includes the MNE’s asset specificity, 
measured by advertising and R&D intensities (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj and 
Beamish, 2004). The study includes the MNE size (measured by the ln function of the 
number of employees in the MNE) since large MNEs may have more flexibility in 
reallocating their subsidiary portfolio (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 
2004). The study also includes an MNE’s profitability, measured by its return on sales 
(ROS). It may represent the MNE’s overall competitive advantages influencing  the 
ownership choice (Barney, 1991).  
Finally, the study includes subsidiary-specific factors. The size (measured by the 
ln function of the number of employees) represents the subsidiary resource commitment 
that may negatively relate to the MNE ownership level (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Delios and Beamish, 1999). The study includes the percentage of Japanese expatriates in 
a subsidiary since it also represents the level of the MNE’s control (Gaur, Delios, and 
Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Makino, Beamish, and Zhao, 2004). A Japanese MNE may 
invest in a subsidiary with other Japanese MNEs or multiple local partners. Since the 
number of partners in a joint venture may alleviate the liability of foreignness and also 
increase the ex ante or ex post costs stemming from the complexity of the transaction 
(Gong, Shenkar, Luo, and Nyaw, 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Makino and 
Beamish, 1998b). The study therefore includes two dummy variables to indicate whether 
the subsidiary had investment from more than one Japanese MNE or more than one local 
firm.  
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity 
This study centres all continuous independent variables in order to reduce multi-




independent variables’ descriptive statistics and their Pearson correlation matrix. 
According to Table 2.1, the correlation between time and subsidiary age is 0.150 (p-value 
< 0.001). Therefore, there is no collinearity problem between the two occasional 
dimensions. The greatest correlation value of this model is 0.587 (between MNE size and 
The number of subnational regions). The study further evaluates the multi-collinearity of 
the whole model based on variance inflation factor (VIF).  The maximum VIF value is 
less than 10, indicating that there is no serious multi-collinearity problem (Neter and 
Michael, 1990). 
Figure 1.1 delineates the mean values of Japanese ownership levels in the two 
countries during 1990-2009. It indicates that Japanese MNEs prominently increased their 
average ownership levels in China and slightly increased them in the United States. 
Results 
With the unconditional model (i.e., the regression on Japanese ownership using 
only information about analysis levels but without any independent or control variable), 
the intraclass correlations (ICC) for the constructed four-level model can be calculated. 
The ICC between subsidiaries, MNEs and subnational regions are 0.899, 0.101 and 0.202 
respectively. This indicates the necessity of four-level modeling (Singer and Willett, 
2003). 
Table 2.2 provides the hierarchical regression process for latent growth-curve 
modeling with increasing Wald chi-square value. Model 1 only includes most control 
variables. Model 2 adds the influences of subnational regional factors. Model 3 adds the 
influences of subsidiary experience. Model 4 includes the influence of institutional 
changes, providing the results for hypotheses tests. The regressions use centered 
continuous variables. When the centered variable Time equals zero, the actual time is 
2001 but not 1990 according to Table 2.1. Similarly, when centered Subsidiary age is 





Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 
 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Japanese ownership 83.619 25.080 1           
2 Time 11.070 5.363 0.018 1          
3 Established in 2000s 0.152 0.359 0.043 0.394 1         
4 Subsidiary age 11.551 9.592 0.186 0.150 -0.362 1        
5 The number of siblings in region 0.294 0.482 -0.107 0.113 0.051 -0.019 1       
6 The number of subnational regions 0.705 0.658 -0.230 0.113 0.010 -0.006 0.338 1      
7 Country 0.442 0.497 -0.363 0.294 0.351 -0.476 0.150 0.186 1     
8 Local market seeking 0.725 0.446 0.030 -0.046 -0.044 0.096 -0.129 -0.083 -0.118 1    
9 Global production network 0.397 0.489 -0.209 0.159 0.100 -0.216 0.077 0.108 0.322 -0.132 1   
10 Global distribution network 0.307 0.461 0.009 0.073 0.001 -0.031 -0.034 -0.052 0.111 -0.015 0.011 1  
11 Local information collection 0.261 0.439 0.177 -0.132 -0.076 0.162 -0.107 -0.147 -0.291 0.106 -0.249 0.061 1 
12 Local labor seeking 0.153 0.360 -0.087 0.086 0.114 -0.162 0.052 0.026 0.342 -0.027 0.233 0.081 -0.134 
13 Follow global stakeholders 0.085 0.279 0.053 0.035 0.031 0.004 -0.024 -0.003 -0.043 -0.005 -0.018 0.020 0.019 
14 New product development 0.080 0.271 0.036 -0.041 -0.010 -0.027 0.016 -0.042 -0.096 -0.123 -0.058 -0.022 0.118 
15 Local resource seeking 0.083 0.276 -0.065 -0.017 0.015 -0.070 0.035 0.023 0.134 -0.004 0.059 0.043 -0.029 
16 International risk hedging 0.052 0.223 0.003 -0.120 -0.089 0.047 -0.037 0.012 -0.173 0.019 -0.065 -0.028 0.076 
17 Manufacturing food 0.031 0.172 -0.040 -0.006 -0.022 -0.020 -0.045 0.004 0.036 -0.030 0.037 -0.008 -0.024 
18 Manufacturing apparel 0.032 0.175 -0.034 0.026 -0.010 -0.065 0.145 0.083 0.146 -0.113 0.137 0.009 -0.088 
19 Manufacturing chemical and medical 0.081 0.273 -0.072 0.020 0.013 -0.076 -0.002 0.039 0.098 -0.001 0.228 0.001 -0.066 
20 Manufacturing transport 0.112 0.315 -0.150 0.037 0.053 -0.103 -0.018 0.045 -0.013 0.009 0.190 -0.093 -0.112 
21 Manufacturing machinery 0.066 0.248 -0.038 0.018 0.024 -0.050 -0.008 -0.003 0.089 0.004 0.180 -0.023 -0.097 
22 Manufacturing metal 0.047 0.211 -0.103 0.031 0.028 -0.049 0.001 0.074 0.069 -0.006 0.141 -0.013 -0.066 
23 Manufacturing non metal 0.037 0.189 -0.030 0.008 -0.005 -0.042 -0.015 0.029 0.028 0.058 0.127 -0.010 -0.055 
24 Manufacturing other 0.018 0.134 -0.018 -0.007 -0.008 -0.022 -0.013 -0.028 0.036 -0.003 0.108 0.016 -0.007 
25 Subsidiary Wholesale and retail 0.300 0.458 0.292 -0.037 -0.027 0.282 -0.082 -0.160 -0.308 0.198 -0.464 0.096 0.253 
26 MNE wholesale or retail 0.122 0.328 -0.033 0.021 -0.030 0.030 0.098 0.064 0.064 -0.046 -0.069 0.099 0.070 
27 MNE service 0.103 0.304 0.013 -0.003 -0.020 0.023 0.015 -0.037 0.000 -0.093 -0.227 0.004 0.035 
28 MNE advertising intensity 0.453 1.311 0.040 0.107 -0.007 0.049 0.009 -0.009 0.037 -0.017 0.001 0.034 -0.064 
29 MNE R&D intensity 1.167 2.234 0.058 0.206 0.051 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.035 0.014 0.045 0.013 -0.034 
30 MNE size 8.463 1.397 -0.160 -0.026 -0.121 0.077 0.266 0.587 0.069 -0.058 0.059 -0.125 -0.141 
31 MNE ROS 0.036 0.077 0.038 0.027 0.024 0.015 -0.024 -0.044 -0.018 0.006 0.011 -0.014 -0.019 
32 Subsidiary size 4.124 1.795 -0.241 0.103 -0.089 0.094 0.119 0.280 0.241 -0.027 0.390 -0.036 -0.299 
33 Subsidiary expatriate rate 0.152 0.625 0.085 -0.041 0.022 0.002 -0.037 -0.056 -0.104 0.003 -0.107 -0.006 0.110 
34 More than one  Japanese partner 0.232 0.422 -0.273 -0.016 -0.024 -0.153 0.048 0.131 0.246 -0.024 0.156 0.022 -0.137 





  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
12 Local labor seeking 1              
13 Follow global stakeholders -0.045 1             
14 New product development -0.037 -0.007 1            
15 Local resource seeking 0.261 -0.070 -0.039 1           
16 International risk hedging -0.042 0.044 -0.026 -0.049 1          
17 Manufacturing food 0.039 -0.045 -0.003 0.181 -0.042 1         
18 Manufacturing apparel 0.149 -0.041 -0.038 0.033 -0.023 -0.032 1        
19 Manufacturing chemical and medical 0.015 -0.017 -0.008 0.029 -0.035 -0.053 -0.054 1       
20 Manufacturing transport 0.002 0.095 -0.075 -0.023 0.119 -0.063 -0.064 -0.105 1      
21 Manufacturing machinery 0.053 -0.018 -0.057 -0.031 0.019 -0.047 -0.048 -0.079 -0.094 1     
22 Manufacturing metal 0.009 -0.007 -0.049 0.007 -0.005 -0.039 -0.040 -0.066 -0.079 -0.059 1    
23 Manufacturing non metal 0.059 0.020 -0.019 0.059 0.046 -0.035 -0.035 -0.058 -0.070 -0.052 -0.044 1   
24 Manufacturing other 0.032 -0.014 0.030 0.000 -0.027 -0.024 -0.025 -0.040 -0.048 -0.036 -0.030 -0.027 1  
25 Subsidiary Wholesale and retail -0.214 -0.018 -0.074 -0.075 -0.053 -0.116 -0.118 -0.194 -0.232 -0.174 -0.145 -0.128 -0.089 1 
26 MNE wholesale or retail -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 0.028 -0.043 -0.035 0.182 -0.046 -0.114 -0.093 0.039 -0.029 -0.015 0.216 
27 MNE service -0.059 0.053 0.094 -0.038 -0.045 -0.060 -0.044 -0.101 -0.120 -0.090 -0.075 -0.066 -0.039 -0.191 
28 MNE advertising intensity -0.007 -0.059 0.015 0.003 -0.011 0.147 0.053 0.040 -0.069 -0.036 -0.051 -0.032 0.091 0.032 
29 MNE R&D intensity 0.027 -0.064 0.057 -0.021 -0.046 -0.042 -0.051 0.161 -0.079 0.016 -0.054 0.005 -0.025 0.014 
30 MNE size -0.013 -0.039 -0.028 -0.012 0.046 -0.012 -0.013 -0.072 0.099 -0.014 0.026 0.013 0.021 -0.152 
31 MNE ROS 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.014 -0.025 0.015 -0.026 0.063 -0.020 0.004 -0.032 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006 
32 Subsidiary size 0.220 -0.007 -0.101 0.066 0.062 0.058 0.113 0.025 0.239 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.051 -0.394 
33 Subsidiary expatriate rate -0.068 0.009 0.018 -0.018 -0.007 -0.022 -0.031 -0.032 -0.057 -0.036 0.010 -0.032 -0.020 0.111 
34 More than one  Japanese partner 0.047 0.013 -0.067 0.027 -0.004 0.065 0.075 0.083 0.110 0.024 0.140 0.045 -0.032 -0.198 
35 More than one local partner 0.046 -0.014 -0.028 0.039 -0.032 0.022 0.048 0.002 0.068 -0.022 0.070 0.020 0.011 -0.133 
 
  26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
26 MNE wholesale or retail 1          
27 MNE service -0.127 1         
28 MNE advertising intensity -0.055 0.004 1        
29 MNE R&D intensity -0.177 -0.140 0.084 1       
30 MNE size -0.198 -0.005 0.040 -0.038 1      
31 MNE ROS -0.095 -0.009 0.032 -0.008 -0.037 1     
32 Subsidiary size -0.123 -0.109 0.063 -0.009 0.409 0.002 1    
33 Subsidiary expatriate rate 0.013 0.016 -0.026 0.000 -0.072 -0.001 -0.258 1   
34 More than one  Japanese partner 0.017 -0.042 -0.016 -0.070 0.139 -0.041 0.185 -0.076 1  




Table 2.2 Four-Level Latent Growth Modeling 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Time Effect     
 Time    -0.066(0.076) 
 Time2    0.002(0.003) 
 Time X Country    1.513(0.201)*** 
 Time2 X Country    -0.032(0.007)*** 
 Establish in 2000s    2.924(1.953) 
     
Subsidiary Experience     
 Subsidiary age   0.163(0.049)** 0.219(0.072)** 
 Subsidiary age2   -0.003(0.002)† -0.005(0.003)† 
 Subsidiary age X Country   -0.079(0.085) -1.062(0.206)*** 
 Subsidiary age2 X Country   0.002(0.004) 0.027(0.007)*** 
     
Subnational Experience     
 The number of siblings in region  -0.382(0.320) -0.380(0.320) -0.416(0.319) 
 The number of siblings in region X Country  0.360(0.486) 0.298(0.488) 0.198(0.487) 
 The number of subnational regions  -1.003(0.312)** -1.040(0.313)** -1.113(0.312)*** 
 The number of subnational regions X Country  1.622(0.444)*** 1.578(0.450)*** 1.330(0.450)** 
     
Country Dummy     
 Country (China =1; U.S. = 0) -17.682(1.594)*** -17.773(1.600)*** -17.115(1.651)*** -26.773(1.943)*** 
     
Investment Purpose     
 Local market seeking -0.495(0.247)* -0.497(0.247)* -0.515(0.248)* -0.551(0.247)* 
 Global production network -0.203(0.274) -0.209(0.274) -0.227(0.274) -0.273(0.274) 
 Global distribution network 0.447(0.221)* 0.457(0.221)* 0.438(0.221)* 0.474(0.221)* 
 Local information collection 0.665(0.267)* 0.663(0.267)* 0.631(0.267)* 0.630(0.267)* 
 Local labor seeking 0.847(0.312)** 0.850(0.312)** 0.841(0.312)** 0.902(0.311)** 
 Follow global stakeholders 1.065(0.338)** 1.078(0.338)** 1.093(0.338)** 1.019(0.338)** 
 New product development -0.268(0.405) -0.270(0.405) -0.269(0.405) -0.267(0.404) 
 Local resource seeking 0.354(0.429) 0.344(0.429) 0.361(0.429) 0.430(0.428) 
 International risk hedging -1.032(0.502)* -1.046(0.502)* -1.056(0.503)* -1.075(0.502)* 
     
Subsidiary Industry and Sector     
 (reference: manufacturing electronics)     
 Manufacturing food -4.461(1.941)* -4.414(1.940)* -4.426(1.939)* -3.829(1.907)* 
 Manufacturing apparel 1.074(1.692) 1.052(1.692) 1.020(1.692) 1.919(1.676) 




 Manufacturing transport -0.901(0.719) -0.788(0.720) -0.722(0.720) -0.978(0.716) 
 Manufacturing machinery -1.004(0.723) -0.965(0.723) -0.946(0.723) -0.979(0.720) 
 Manufacturing metal 0.286(0.844) 0.363(0.844) 0.379(0.844) 0.268(0.840) 
 Manufacturing non metal -0.153(0.844) -0.088(0.844) -0.099(0.844) -0.019(0.840) 
 Manufacturing other -0.931(1.136) -0.935(1.136) -0.878(1.136) -0.732(1.132) 
 Wholesale or retail 0.922(0.492)† 0.928(0.492)† 0.845(0.492)† 0.703(0.491) 
     
MNE Industry and Sector     
 (reference: manufacturing)     
 MNE in wholesale or retail -0.067(0.758) -0.103(0.757) -0.129(0.757) -0.054(0.750) 
 MNE in service -0.258(1.288) -0.212(1.287) -0.262(1.286) -0.064(1.259) 
     
MNE Specific Factors     
 MNE advertising intensity 0.255(0.087)** 0.253(0.087)** 0.231(0.087)** 0.206(0.088)* 
 MNE R&D intensity 0.119(0.045)** 0.126(0.045)** 0.110(0.045)* 0.094(0.045)* 
 MNE size 0.211(0.247) 0.245(0.250) 0.102(0.254) 0.257(0.250) 
 MNE ROS 0.598(0.678) 0.578(0.677) 0.576(0.678) 0.423(0.679) 
     
Subsidiary Specific Factors     
 Subsidiary size -0.330(0.096)** -0.348(0.096)*** -0.417(0.100)*** -0.399(0.099)*** 
 Expatriate rate -0.353(0.318) -0.362(0.318) -0.353(0.319) -0.529(0.313)† 
 More than one Japanese partner 2.004(0.332)*** 1.967(0.332)*** 2.010(0.333)*** 2.137(0.333)*** 
 More than one local partner -11.737(0.541)*** -11.756(0.541)*** -11.735(0.541)*** -11.447(0.541)*** 
      
 Cons. 89.726(1.108)*** 89.604(1.110)*** 89.496(1.121)*** 89.136(1.084)*** 
      
 Log likelihood -67549.227 -67541.344 -67534.308 -67453.581 
 Wald Chi2 741.56*** 757.57*** 771.81*** 985.72*** 
 ΔLR Chi2 / 15.77** 14.07** 161.45*** 







Model 4 indicates that Japanese ownership in subsidiaries in China was lower than 
in the United States in 2001 and the difference is 26.77%. While Japanese ownership does 
not change over time in the United States, it increases in China following a growth curve 
(coefficients are 1.513 and -0.032)
5
. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a and 1b are supported. In 
addition, subsidiary experience is positively associated with Japanese ownership in the 
United States (coefficients are 0.219 and -0.005), supporting Hypothesis 2a. In contrast, it 
negatively relates to Japanese ownership in China (the coefficients are -0.843 and 0.022)
6
, 
supporting Hypothesis 2b. 
Discussion 
This study investigates an underexplored question: how does an MNE respond to 
the economic liberalization of an emerging economy given transactional, institutional, 
and experience influences? With latent growth-curve modelling, the empirical tests herein 
support the four hypotheses delineated in Figure 2.1, and distinguish an MNE’s 
institutional response from other influences. This provides a detailed understanding of the 
MNE’s ownership choices. 
Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of Institutional Response 
Based on the empirical results, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 provide a visual 
illustration of the influences of economic liberalization and subsidiary experience on 
Japanese ownership levels in China and the United States. Figure 2.3 indicates that 
Japanese MNEs increased their ownership levels in China substantively in the past two 
decades. In contrast, Japanese ownership levels in the United States remained relatively 
stable during this period. Figure 2.4 indicates that the Japanese ownership level decreased 
along with accumulated subsidiary experience in China. By the same measurement, 
Japanese ownership in the United States increased slightly.  
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coefficients for subsidiaries in the United States are insignificant (-
0.066 and 0.002). When calculating coefficients for subsidiaries in China (Country = 1), there is no need to 
subtract coefficients for subsidiaries in the United States (1.513 and -0.032).  
6
 Regarding variables Subsidiary age and Age
2
, coefficients for subsidiaries in the United States are 
significant (0.219 and -0.005), and they should be considered when calculating coefficients for subsidiaries 
in China (Country =1). Coefficients for subsidiaries in China are calculated as -0.843 (i.e., -1.062 + 0.219) 




The aforementioned two figures show the significance and dynamism of Japanese 
institutional response. By sensing economic liberalization and learning from local 
operations, Japanese MNEs adopt cross-border ownership choices that continuously 
evolved by interacting with updating institutional conditions of the host country (Meyer 
and Nguyen, 2005). They not only adapt to the host country’s extant institutional voids 
(Kwok and Solomon, 2006), but also adapt to the host country’s progress of economic 
liberalization.  
MNEs’ institutional response is also substantive. According to Figure 2.3, 
Japanese MNEs increased their ownership levels in subsidiaries in China by about 30% in 
the past two decades (from 42% to 72%). Comparatively, asset specificity that prior 
studies usually emphasize affected Japanese ownership levels less than economic 
liberalization did. In the present study, advertising intensity and R&D intensity positively 
influence an MNE’s ownership choice (coefficients are 0.206 and 0.094), and this 
conclusion is consistent with prior research. According to the maximum values of two 
variables in this study (19% and 34% of total sales respectively), the maximum influence 
of asset specificity on ownership level can be calculated as 7.11%. This suggests that 
neglecting institutional response will lead to an incomplete understanding of MNEs’ 
ownership choices. 
Control Variables 
The empirical tests also generate interesting results for some control variables. 
First, regional diversity influences an MNE’s ownership choice differently in the United 
States and China. According to Model 4 in Table 2.2, regional diversity is negatively 
associated with Japanese ownership level in the United States, but not in China. With 
mature free-market institutions and relatively mild subnational disparity in the United 
States, an MNE may integrate operations across different regions and manage the overall 
resource commitment in the country. This negatively influences the ownership level in 
individual subsidiaries (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). By comparison, underdeveloped 
market institutions and prominent subnational disparity in China force an MNE to decide 
its ownership choices at the subnational regional level rather than at the country level, 














Second, investment purposes vary according to the extent to which a foreign 
subsidiary needs to access the local complementary resources. Local market seeking and 
international risk hedging negatively relate to MNE ownership level because of the need 
for local responsiveness. In contrast, participating in global distribution networks, local 
labor seeking, or following global stakeholders requires a subsidiary to have a greater 
internal consistency, resulting in a higher MNE ownership level. 
Finally, if a Japanese MNE establishes an IJV with more than one local partner, its 
ownership level would be much lower than it would be in a situation involving only one 
local partner (coefficient = -11.447). In 1990s, on average 18% of Japanese subsidiaries 
in China were established with more than one local partner and this percentage decreased 
to 10% in the 2000s. By comparison, those percentages in the United States were 1% in 
1990s and 0% in 2000s. “Forced” joint ventures with multiple partners in 1990s were 
another specific institutional phenomenon in China that arose from strong regulation and 
government bargaining power. Thus, the decreasing number of joint ventures with more 
than one local partner may provide additional evidence on how Japanese MNEs 
responded to China’s economic liberalization.  
Robustness Checks 
The present study involves a robustness check using a subset of samples. The 
check excludes subsidiaries with 20 or fewer employees in order to avoid mixing regular 
subsidiaries with representative offices (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). The robustness 
check also does not include subsidiaries with Japanese ownership levels lower than 20% 
as a very low foreign MNE ownership level implies very high mortality rate of the 
subsidiary (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). All four hypotheses continue to be supported. 
The study also test conclusions drawn by involving Japanese subsidiaries in other 
emerging (India, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, etc.) and advanced (U.K., Germany, 
Australia, France, etc.) economies. All hypotheses are strongly supported. The results 




their markets, the incremental nature of institutional transition and MNEs’ institutional 
response may be generalizable (Peng, 2003). 
Contributions and Next Steps 
The dynamic context in an emerging economy is complicated by the coexistence 
of inadequate market-oriented systems and ongoing economic liberalization. The present 
study is one of the first papers to examine how MNEs respond to this complexity, thus 
contributing to the IB field. This study suggests that institutional conditions may vary 
across geographic space and over time, and this variation should be included in 
theoretical analysis and empirical testing when investigating MNEs’ organizational 
choices. In particular, integrating three institutional influences (regulatory openness, 
institutional uncertainty, and peer pressure) stemming from different levels into analysis, 
this study identifies that regulatory liberalization is not the only institutional condition 
that influences an MNE’s ownership choice in an emerging economy. Second, this study 
delineates how Japanese MNEs adopt cross-border ownership choices that continuously 
evolve along with the local institutions. The theoretical and empirical findings enrich the 
OLI paradigm by depicting an evolutionary relationship between institutional 
environment (L factor) and MNEs’ responses in terms of cross-border ownership 
strategies (I factor) (Cantwell et al., 2010; Dunning, 1977; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
Third, this study indicates that the application of existing theories should be contingent on 
institutional contexts. When institutional context changes, the inherent causality of 
existing theories may be altered as well. For example, the influence of subsidiary 
experience on MNEs’ ownership choices may be different for subsidiaries in an emerging 
economy from those in an advanced economy, as the former emphasizes relationship-
based experience and the latter emphasizes rule-based experience.  
These theoretical conclusions have implications for managers. Constantly 
scanning institutional conditions is a precondition for an MNE to appropriately reorganize 
critical assets including complementary resources and seize volatile opportunities in an 
emerging economy (Teece, 2007). In particular, local experience as an acquired critical 
resource for foreign subsidiaries may exert different influences in distinct institutional 




independence of local operation. Rather, they should analyse the nature of experience that 
they accumulate during local operations. Moreover, as mentioned, the empirical results 
indicate that the number of subnational regions in which an MNE operates exerts 
difference influences on its ownership choice in the United States and China (Table 2.2). 
This distinction implies that due to the subnational disparity in China’s institutions, it may 
be challenging for an MNE to integrate all subsidiaries within the focal country in order 
to achieve the desired scale economy. Therefore, managers should formulate an 
integration strategy contingent on institutional conditions as well. For example, MNEs 
may widely spread their subsidiaries in the United States in order to be close to local 
markets because of relatively weak subnational disparity. In contrast, MNEs may want to 
allocate their subsidiaries in subnational regions in China with similar institutional 
environments in order to efficiently integrate their operations.  
This study leaves several issues for future research. First, although the present 
study delineates the evolution of Japanese ownership along with economic liberalization, 
it has not explained whether MNEs overreact or underreact to institutional changes. It is 
thus unclear whether the changes of ownership levels lead to better subsidiary 
performance. Economic liberalization may improve the overall business climate of a 
country, resulting in better operating efficiency not directly associated with ownership 
choices. In addition, advances in the OLI paradigm have suggested that a firm’s 
capability and flexibility of coordinating the various critical assets that it creates or 
accesses, rather than ownership control, is becoming more critical to its performance 
(Cantwell et al., 2010; Li and Li, 2010). Therefore, within complicated contemporary 
contexts, the relationship between an MNE’s ownership choice and its subsidiaries’ 
performance deserves more academic attention. 
Second, literature has suggested that foreign MNEs are diverse in local partner 
selection (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Shi et al., 2012). In addition, 
domestic firms in China are heterogeneous in terms of their embeddedness in central 
planning or market tracks, positions in domestic network alliance, strategic orientation, 
and operational capabilities (Luo, 1998; Peng and Heath, 1996; Shi, Sun, Pinkham, and 




aligning operations (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Wilkinson, 1995; Park and Ungson, 2001). 
Lacking relevant data, the present study is unable to address their influences on an 
MNE’s ownership choice. These factors call for further research. 
Third, other mechanisms in addition to equity ownership and expatriate staffing 
may relate to the level of control to a subsidiary (Luo, 2003; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), 
and managerial ties in addition to equity-based relationship may benefit a subsidiary in 
relationship-based exchanges (Acquaah, 2007; Li, Zhou, and Shao, 2009; Peng and Luo, 
2000). Future research may consider whether these factors influence an MNE’s cross-
border ownership choice. 
Fourth, this research uses a subsidiary’s investment purpose and the number of its 
sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region as rough proxies in addressing the 
influence of its strategic position on the parent MNE’s ownership choice. These proxies 
cannot fully explain the degree to which a foreign subsidiary is integrated in global 
subsidiary networks, which in turn influences the requirement for internal consistency. 
Since an MNE’s ownership choice may be leveraged by network characteristics 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 2009), future research may incorporate them into subsequent 
analyses. 
Fifth, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas 
operation mode (Banerji and Sambharya, 1996). Keiretsu membership is defined in terms 
of the origin of the owner of the firm, the affiliated main-banks, and the conventional 
buyer-supplier links (Makino and Beamish, 1998b). Lacking relevant data, the present 
study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese partners. Future research may 
control for the influence of Keiretsu membership of Japanese MNEs. 
Sixth, the present study has neither separated formal institutions from informal 
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility 
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature usually categorizes regulatory rules as 
formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng and 
Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions differ in 




et al., 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the present study has 
only utilized the general trends of China’s institutional environment between 1990-2009 
in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide the institutional 
uncertainty further based on the differences between formal and informal institutions, and 
refine the analysis of their influences on MNEs’ ownership choices in overseas markets. 
Seventh, the present study attributes subnational disparity in institutions to 
institutional uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have started to 
investigate subnational legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level 
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2008). 
Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into subnational 
certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of institutions on 
MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the subnational 
level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions at the 
country level. For example, since some subnational regions in China such as Shanghai 
and Shenzhen have emerged, it is feasible for future research to categorize China’s 
subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas, so that the heterogeneity of 
MNEs’ ownership choices within China can be explicitly identified. 
Last but not least, it would be useful to examine the generalizability of our 
conclusions with subsidiaries of MNEs from other countries. 
Conclusion 
 By incorporating multiple theoretical lenses, as well as longitudinal and 
multilevel methods, this study investigates how an emerging economy’s economic 
liberalization influences a Japanese MNE’s ownership choice. The empirical results 
suggest that a Japanese MNE increases its ownership levels in China to accommodate the 
process of economic liberalization.  However, a Japanese MNE also tends to maintain 
equity-based relationships with local actors with subsidiary experience. In contrast, a 
Japanese MNE only increases its ownership levels in the United States with the 
accumulation of subsidiary experience. This study reveals a more fine-grained image of 
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Chapter 3. The Evolving Relationship between MNE 
Ownership (O) and Subsidiary Profitability (P)  
Introduction 
Cross-border ownership strategy, defined as the degree of ownership of a 
multinational enterprise (MNE) investing abroad, can affect the overseas subsidiaries’ 
likelihood of success and the overall probability of survival (Delios and Beamish, 1999; 
Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Prior studies, most of which 
substantiated their conclusions with data from before 1995, have suggested that the 
relationship between MNE ownership and subsidiary financial performance (O-P 
relationship) in developing countries is different from that in developed countries. Wholly 
owned subsidiaries (WOSs) tend to have a better financial performance than international 
joint ventures (IJVs) established in North America or Europe because of interest 
alignment and security of firm-specific assets (Nitsch, Beamish, and Makino, 1996). In 
contrast, IJVs are more frequently used and are more profitable than WOSs in developing 
countries because governments often limit location-specific resources critical to 
performance to IJVs. This limitation protects indigenous enterprises from the threat of 
competition (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Pan and Chi, 1999). Therefore, it is critical for 
MNEs to adopt an appropriate ownership strategy overseas in order to generate profits.  
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the global economy. 
These evolving contexts have challenged scholars’ prior understanding of MNEs’ O-P 
relationship. One of the fundamental changes is the rapid development in some 
developing countries (emerging economies) where economic liberalization has been a 
primary engine of growth (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 
2000). When regulatory liberalization of foreign direct investments (FDIs) is one of the 
most important aspects of economic liberalization in the host country, MNEs increasingly 
adopt WOS entries and even convert existing IJVs to WOSs (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 
2013; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). This 




markets exerting an increasing impact on the global economy. Before 1990, minority IJVs 
in China were usually created in place of WOSs due to government pressure (Beamish, 
1993; Xiong, 2009). After 1990, the number of majority IJVs and WOSs continued to rise 
along with the process of regulatory liberalization. By 1997, the number of foreign WOSs 
exceeded that of IJVs in China for the first time (Xia, Tan, and Tan, 2008; Xiong, 2009). 
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), accelerating this trend 
further. In that same year, Panasonic declared that it would convert its 50 IJVs established 
in China into WOSs. Meanwhile, Motorola’s directors asserted that being a sole 
proprietorship in China would be a natural choice with China’s joining the WTO (Xiong, 
2009). Based on data developed in this dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically 
increased their average ownership level in FDIs in China during the period of China’s 
economic liberalization. In contrast, over the same period, they have only slightly 
increased their average ownership level in FDIs in the United States. This emerging 
phenomenon delineated by Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, requires scholars to understand 
whether existing conclusions about MNEs’ O-P relationship still hold true under the 
condition of economic liberalization. 
The trend of majority or sole ownership of foreign investments in China has 
received attention in regards to its consequences. China’s governments have been 
concerned with how this trend influences indigenous enterprises and the economy. They 
have reacted by drafting new legislation to safeguard its growing economy and domestic 
players (Sun, 2012; Xiong, 2009). An example is China’s Anti-Monopoly Law which took 
effect in August 2008 (Wei, 2011). In addition, scholars have noticed that MNEs 
sometimes mimic the dominant strategy of successful peers when deciding their operating 
modes in foreign countries. Therefore, a high ownership level does not necessarily benefit 
the subsidiary performance (Chang et al., 2013; Child and Tsai, 2005; Xia et al., 2008). 
Although several studies have investigated foreign MNE’s O-P relationship using 
a context of emerging economies (Chang et al., 2013; Douma, George, and Kabir, 2006), 
there is still no study that has directly examined whether economic liberalization has 
changed MNEs’ O-P relationship in emerging economies. Moreover, the institutional 




have been well documented (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng, 2003; Shi, Markóczy, and 
Stan, 2014a). However, these important phenomena of task environments have not been 
systematically incorporated into scholarly understanding of the O-P relationship. The 
present study purports to shed light on this underexplored and important area by 
examining whether the O-P relationship has evolved along with institutional transition.   
To address such a challenge, the present study adopts an institution-based view, 
which draws upon the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective and the resource-
based view (RBV) (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2003; Delios and Henisz, 2000; 
Meyer, 2001; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). The performance of a 
subsidiary is determined by its sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). A 
subsidiary’s sustained competitive advantage depends on its ability to manage the 
institutional context of its resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008; 
Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008), which are usually concerned with how to 
secure firm-specific assets and acquire/access complementary local assets (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008; Hennart, 2009). When institutional context varies over time, its evolution 
should be included in theoretical analysis and empirical testing in performance research. 
Such an approach is advocated because the conclusions that are drawn from institutional 
context at one point of time may not be generalizable to its next state. 
Moreover, economic liberalization has substantively influenced organizational 
choice in subsidiary operating mode, resulting in possible endogeneity that needs to be 
addressed in firm performance research (Brouthers et al., 2003; Reeb, Sakakibara, and 
Mahmood, 2012; Semadeni, Withers, and Trevis Certo, 2014; Shaver, 1998). The present 
study addresses the endogeneity issue by simplifying the research setting, using panel 
data, including necessary control variables, and conducting a robustness check with 
instrumental variables (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998).    
This study proceeds with a literature review and a description of the research 
setting used. Then it formulates a set of hypotheses that delineates the evolution of the O-
P relationship. Afterwards, it examines hypotheses using longitudinal methods and data 




results that confirm or diverge from existing work and presents implications to IB 
research and practitioners. 
Literature Review 
Scholars have been concerned with the importance of an institution-based view to 
IB strategy (Peng et al., 2008). Literature suggests that a financially successful firm 
would not only possess advantages in specific assets and organizing mechanism, but also 
have institutional advantages (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Institutional advantages can 
be defined as the formal and informal institutions that govern the value-added processes 
within the firm and between the firm and its stakeholders (Cantwell, Dunning, and 
Lundan, 2010). To obtain and utilize institutional advantages in a foreign country, an 
MNE needs to understand the state of local institutions and their effects on firm 
performance, and then formulate appropriate organizational choices (Milliken, 1987). 
When studying MNEs’ O-P relationship from an institutional point of view, IB 
scholars focus on the host country’s institutional openness, i.e., the extent to which the 
host country allows MNEs to choose their operating modes freely (Nitsch et al., 1996; 
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino, 1994). Due to restrictive institutions in developing 
countries, an foreign MNE has fewer choices regarding the scale of operations and the 
scope of products than a local player (Makino and Beamish, 1998a). It also seldom 
obtains the necessary subsidies or incentives from the host government to ensure profits 
in the WOS operation (Guisinger, 1985; Pan and Chi, 1999). As a result, foreign MNEs 
engage more often with local partners because an IJV tends to have institutional 
advantages such as faster approval, wider and quicker market access, and favorable 
investment incentives. Ceteris paribus, an IJV is more profitable than a WOS (Oman, 
1988; Yan and Gray, 1994). By comparison, in developed countries MNEs enjoy similar 
institutional advantages to local players, and they can arrange their ownership structures 
based on firm factors such as intangible assets. Early studies thus suggested that overall 
WOSs tend to have a better performance than IJVs (Nitsch et al., 1996; Woodcock et al., 
1994). This research stream implies that an MNE’s ownership strategy interacts with the 




explicitly assumes that MNEs have clear knowledge of the host country’s institutions and 
their cause-effects on firm performance. 
Another stream of literature examines the influence of institutional knowledge 
about the host country that an MNE possesses (Narula, 2010). This type of literature 
examines how an MNE arranges its subsidiaries’ ownership structures based on the extent 
to which it can understand and cope with local institutions that involve a broad array of 
host-country characteristics such as political and legal rules and the social norms (Delios 
and Beamish, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; North, 1990). Explicitly or implicitly 
drawing on TCE logic, such as the resource (knowledge) complementarity of potential 
partners (Hennart, 2009), this stream assumes that MNEs choose appropriate ownership 
structures that benefit their local performance. It also assumes that it takes time for an 
MNE to learn about the local institutions and corresponding practices (Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 2005; Delios and Beamish, 1999). Based on these two assumptions, this 
stream suggests that the deficiency in the knowledge of how to cope with local 
institutions, produces significant institutional uncertainty or disadvantage that threatens 
an MNE’s local performance (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; 
North, 1990). One can therefore infer that an MNE with adequate local institutional 
knowledge may consider using a higher ownership level to secure its specific assets 
unless it is prevented by local regulation. In contrast, if an MNE lacks institutional 
knowledge that is critical to its local performance, it can access such knowledge and 
reduce the corresponding uncertainty by sharing ownership with indigenous partners 
(Beamish and Banks, 1987; Hennart, 2009). This stream thus implies that an MNE’s 
ownership strategy interacts with its institutional knowledge to influence subsidiary 
performance. In addition, experience in the host country can improve an MNE’s 
institutional knowledge and reduce relevant uncertainty in local operation. Therefore, 
experience may result in better subsidiary profitability and/or positive ownership 
adjustment (Makino and Delios, 1996; Yiu and Makino, 2002). 
The two literature streams contribute to the scholarly understanding of an MNE’s 
cross-border ownership strategy and the consequent performance within a relatively static 




that changes the institutional openness and simultaneously incurs institutional dynamics 
that invalidate an MNE’s existing institutional knowledge. Studying such a dynamic and 
complex context is necessary and important for comprehensively understanding the O-P 
relationship in emerging economies that provide the main growth opportunities for MNEs.  
Emerging Economies 
Emerging economies are often characterized by existing institutional voids and 
economic liberalization (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997). Institutional voids represent underdeveloped capital markets, infrastructure, 
intermediary markets, regulatory systems, contract-enforcing mechanisms or other 
market-supporting institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Economic liberalization as the 
primary engine of rapid development of emerging economies may fill institutional voids 
by establishing formal market-oriented mechanisms and structures that facilitate market 
exchange (Hoskisson et al., 2000).  
The coexistence of these two characteristics complicates the institutional 
environments that an MNE needs to cope with in an emerging economy. Through 
regulatory liberalization and the establishment of market-oriented mechanisms, an 
emerging market becomes increasingly open to FDI. Without prior ownership restriction, 
an MNE may promote its equity control to secure its competitive advantages (Chang et 
al., 2013; Hennart, 1991). However, an MNE may also increase its ownership control 
when high equity control becomes the dominant strategy of successful peers (Child and 
Tsai, 2005; Xia et al., 2008). In this case, high ownership level enhances the legitimacy 
within the reference group but does not necessarily benefit the subsidiary’s performance 
(Chang et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2008).  
Economic liberalization also incurs institutional uncertainty that can be defined as 
the degree of instability within an institutional environment (Luo, 2007). In order to 
support the effective (though inefficient) functioning of the market, informal institutions 
are usually used to bridge existing institutional voids in an emerging economy (North, 
1990; Peng, 2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). The informal institutions endure because 




established by economic liberalization to be fully institutionalized (Peng, 2003). The 
knowledge of cultural-based informal institutions is usually too intangible, sophisticated, 
and sticky for MNEs to understand and utilize independently in a short period of time 
(North, 1990; Peng, 2003). Therefore, a market orientation is usually coupled with 
existing but changing institutional voids and robust informal institutions. This 
complicates the state of institutions and their cause-effects on firm performance (Milliken, 
1987). By contrast, local firms may have advantages in understanding and predicting 
local institutional changes, leading to better performance (Chen, Ding, and Kim, 2010; 
Henisz, 2000). Therefore, MNEs may still need to cooperate with indigenous firms to 
access the complementary institutional knowledge (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Hennart, 
2009). 
In brief, existing institutional voids and ongoing economic liberalization in an 
emerging economy not only change the institutional openness of the host country, but 
also cause an MNE to confront institutional uncertainty because of an absence of local 
institutional knowledge. This influences the MNE’s ownership strategy and the O-P 
relationship in a complicated way. 
Research Setting 
This study compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States during the 
period from 1990 to 2009. It does so for multiple reasons. First, the country of origin may 
influence an MNE’s overseas ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Makino and Neupert, 
2000; Zhao, Luo, and Suh, 2004) and/or profitability (Jung, Beamish, and Goerzen, 2008; 
McGahan and Victer, 2010). Focusing on MNEs from one country can reduce the 
endogeneity issue caused by organizational choices (Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998). As 
a number of prior studies have empirically examined Japanese FDIs (Makino and 
Beamish, 1998a; Woodcock et al., 1994), they have provided a basis for comparison with 
the present work. Moreover, using panel data helps to further reduce any endogeneity 
concerns (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). 
Second, such a research setting allows for a comparison of Japanese O-P 




has been undergoing an institutional transition while the United States is the largest 
advanced economy that sustains a relatively mature free-market institutional environment 
(Chan, Makino, and Isobe, 2010). This provides a large sample size for empirical tests. 
Moreover, this research setting controls for the confounding effects of multiple host 
countries (Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004b; Pattnaik, Choe, and Singh, 2015). Although 
advanced economies advocate free market institutions, they still differ in other 
dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g., country culture) that influence a 
foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004). In addition, emerging 
economies employ heterogeneous approaches to economic liberalization (Lau, Qian, and 
Roland, 2000; Roland, 2002). Different approaches may facilitate distinct institutional 
changes in scope, intensity, and duration (Brouthers and Lamb Jr, 1995; Roland, 2002), 
influencing a foreign MNE’s ownership choice diversely. Therefore, involving multiple 
advanced or emerging economies will complicate theoretical analysis and empirical 
testing. 
Third, since there are still no exact measurements of the host country’s 
institutional openness and uncertainty, this study needs an emerging economy within 
which one can estimate the general trends of institutional openness and uncertainty. 
While some countries adopted a “big bang” approach for a fast and comprehensive 
implementation of all major reforms (Newman, 2000; Roland, 2002), China advocates a 
gradualist, dual-track strategy for economic liberalization. This is a process by which a 
market track is introduced and gradually strengthened, and the central planning track is 
maintained and progressively diminished (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000; Park, 
Li, and Tse, 2006). This dual-track nature results in incremental economic liberalization 
lasting for a lengthy period of time, allowing for the identification of the overall trends of 
China’s institutional openness and uncertainty by accessing well-documented 
governmental policies and relevant academic studies. In particular, prior studies have 
suggested that China’s incremental economic liberalization can be operationalized as a 
function of time (Zhang, 2015). Along with this process, Japanese MNEs have 
significantly increased their ownership levels in their investments in China. This is in 
comparison to the behaviour of Japanese MNEs in the United States where they increased 





As mentioned, prior studies have shown that in developed countries WOSs tend to 
have a higher financial performance than IJVs (Nitsch et al., 1996), and in developing 
countries IJVs have a better financial performance than WOSs (Beamish and Banks, 1987; 
Pan and Chi, 1999). Previous studies investigated Japanese subsidiaries operating at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, higher Japanese ownership levels may relate to higher 
profitability for subsidiaries in the United States and lower profitability for those in China. 
The following restates these hypotheses with a time condition.  
Hypothesis 1a: Japanese ownership level was negatively associated with a 
subsidiary’s profitability in China in the early 1990s. 
Hypothesis 1b: Japanese ownership level was positively associated with a 
subsidiary’s profitability in the United States in the early 1990s. 
Evolution of the O-P Relationship 
Regulatory liberalization improved China’s institutional openness gradually and 
allowed MNEs to choose their operation modes more freely than before. Therefore, with 
increasing institutional openness, higher ownership levels in China may improve 
Japanese MNEs’ profitability (Woodcock et al., 1994).  
However, this inference does not consider the evolution of the O-P relationship 
based on a complete picture of China’s institutional environment. Prior studies have 
identified complexity, dynamism, and hostility as important environmental attributes.  
These attributes can be understood as heterogeneity, instability, and inequality of 
environmental elements towards FDIs (Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and Litschert, 1994). 
China’s economic liberalization process gradually relaxed country-level restriction on 
FDIs,  decentralized decision-making power to local governments and firms, privatized 
property rights, established relevant legal systems, and formulated industrial policies that 
influenced resource allocation (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000; 
Park et al., 2006). This process facilitated institutional changes both within the political 




2006). Moreover, China’s dual-track approach purports to liberalize markets without 
eliminating the pre-existing rents of economic agents, but not fully imitate free-market 
institutions (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000). These characteristics interactively 
and significantly change important attributes of the institutional environment in China 
(Lau et al., 2000; Park et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2014a).   
Along with the gradual economic liberalization, MNEs increasingly confront 
subnational regional environments (Chan et al., 2010; Ma, Tong, and Fitza, 2013; Shi et 
al., 2014a). In the early stages of the economic liberalization, MNEs usually chose their 
investment locations and local partners from a very limited scope dictated by the central 
government. Their subsidiaries were also subject to the central government’s monitoring 
(Beamish, 1993). The influence of subnational regional environments was thus mitigated 
by centralized decision-making mechanisms. With decreasing central government control, 
MNEs can access a broader scope of locations and domestic players. Consequently, they 
can interact with local stakeholders more directly and spread their investments across a 
broader geography. Therefore, MNEs investing in China are increasingly influenced by (i) 
political, (ii) social, and (iii) economic institutions of subnational regions (Chan et al., 
2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2014a). The present study argues that coexisting 
institutional transition and subnational disparity intensify the complexity, dynamism, and 
hostility of China’s institutional environment.  
 (i) Political institutions. China has significant within-country variation in political 
decentralization at the province and even city level where the central government exerts 
time-varying degrees of control (Huang and Sheng, 2009; Shi, Sun, and Peng, 2012). 
Therefore, despite the nationwide implementation of corporate law and other market-
related policies, subnational differences remain pronounced and change over time (Shi et 
al., 2012), resulting in fuzzy boundaries between the central and local controls across 
geographical locations. Moreover, to decentralize the political power, the central 
government delegates some regulatory functions to the local level (Luo, 2005; Meyer and 
Nguyen, 2005). Such delegation is often ambiguously and equivocally stipulated, leaving 
opportunities for subjective interpretations by local authorities (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, and 




local authorities continue to be influenced by the legacy of a socialist system and 
subnational culture when formulating subnational regulations and policies (Kriauciunas 
and Kale, 2006; Peng, 2003). Moreover, the political decentralization usually gives rise to 
local protectionism and regionalism, allowing local agents to maximize self-interest (Ma 
et al., 2013). This agency problem not only engenders “ad hoc rule bending”, but also 
opens the door for economic actors to rely on relationship-based exchanges more than on 
rule-based ones (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lin, 2001; Shi et al., 2014a). In conclusion, 
subnational disparity in political institutions heightens the complexity, dynamism, and 
hostility of institutional environments that MNEs confront, constituting the main source 
of environmental uncertainty in sensing the state of local rules, understanding their cause-
effects on value-added activities, and formulating organizational choices (Luo, 2007; 
Milliken, 1987; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).  
(ii) Social institutions. Along with political decentralization, MNEs increasingly 
confront subnational disparity in social institutions. China has significant within-country 
variation in culture at the province or regional level (Chan et al., 2010; Kwon, 2012; Shi 
et al., 2014a). Subnational culture as informal institution is usually used by local agents to 
bridge institutional voids when relevant formal institutions are underdeveloped (Peng, 
2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). This makes it impossible for MNEs to bypass 
subnational culture’s influence in their local operation. However, the knowledge of 
subnational culture is usually too intangible and sophisticated for MNEs to learn in a 
short period (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). Particularly, it is difficult for MNEs to 
understand the fuzzy boundaries between formal institutions and cultural-cognitive 
institutions. Therefore, the subnational disparity in social institutions intensifies the 
complexity that MNEs need to cope with. 
(iii) Economic institutions. The development of economic institutions varies 
across the subnational regions within China (Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013). 
Economic institutions involve intermediaries that provide support services to firms and 
the common infrastructure that supports regional economic transaction (Chan et al., 2010; 
Porter, 1990). Regions with underdeveloped economic institutions may pose challenges 




develop these subsidiaries’ competitive advantages (Ma et al., 2013; McEvily and Zaheer, 
1999). Therefore, MNEs may choose advantageous subnational regions in which to invest 
according to their strategic purposes. Regional economic institutions may influence 
MNEs’ choices of subnational locations, ownership structure and subsidiary performance 
(Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen, 2013; Pan and Chi, 1999). With central government’s 
macro-control and local governments’ political intervention, subnational economic 
institutions change over time (Pan and Chi, 1999). Therefore, the variation of subnational 
economic institutions may alter the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional 
environments, resulting in operating uncertainty in value-added activities. 
To summarize, China’s economic liberalization not only results in a gradual 
institutional transition from a central planning track to a market track, but also causes 
subnational disparity in political, social, and economic institutions. The coexisting 
institutional transition and subnational disparity give rise to the complexity, dynamism, 
and hostility of China’s institutional environments, resulting in institutional pressure and 
institutional uncertainty that an MNE has to cope with. Figure 2.1 describes the 
theoretical foundation for the present study. Simultaneously operating in multiple 
subnational regions intensifies this challenge (Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian, Li, Li, and 
Qian, 2008). Comparatively, local firms have advantages in learning government 
intentions and utilizing managerial ties (Chen et al., 2010; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008; 
Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). This explains how those local firms that were advantaged 
under strict central control still maintain their privilege in the liberalizing economy (Lin, 
2001). It also has been suggested that MNEs respond to institutional uncertainty through 
partnerships with local firms that have privileged political ties (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). 
Therefore, because of the coexistence of institutional openness and institutional 
uncertainty, it is difficult to evaluate whether higher ownership levels in China may 
improve Japanese MNEs’ profitability. 
Nevertheless, if institutional openness and institutional uncertainty evolve 
following certain trends, it will create an opportunity to examine the evolution of the O-P 
relationship. As mentioned, China’s economic liberalization has followed a dual-track 




rules and decreasing institutional voids. During this process, on one hand institutional 
openness is growing over time, reducing MNEs’ reliance on equity-based relationships to 
enter the market. On the other hand, the complexity, dynamism, and hostility in China’s 
institutional environment are declining over time (Tan and Tan, 2005), reducing MNEs’ 
reliance on local partners to understand the state of local institutions and their cause-
effects on their investments. At some point, the benefits of rule-based exchange exceed 
those of relationship-based exchange (Peng, 2003). Increasing institutional openness and 
decreasing institutional uncertainty implies that Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in 
China may positively adjust over time, but it may not turn out to be a positive one very 
quickly. 
Compared to China’s situation, the United States has consistently had a relatively 
mature free-market economy. Therefore, the present study assumes that its institutional 
openness and uncertainty have remained at similar levels for the past two decades, and 
Japanese MNEs do not confront major challenges. The above analyses lead to hypotheses 
about the evolution of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship. 
Hypothesis 2a: In China, Japanese MNEs’ negative O-P relationship will 
weaken over time after 1990. 
Hypothesis 2b: In the United States, Japanese MNEs’ positive O-P 
relationship will not significantly change over time after 1990. 
Methodology 
The present study needs to address two issues in the empirical model. First, 
performance patterns in the two countries may share a number of explanatory factors to 
different extents, and these differences should be reflected in the model (Gomes-Casseres, 
1990). Second, there may be systemic differences in inward FDIs in the two countries 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1990). For example, Japanese firms with stronger technological 
advantages were more likely to invest in developed countries than in developing countries 




sample selection. To resolve the first issue, this study follows the methodology in Gomes-
Casseres (1990) and adds the country dummy as well as relevant interactions in the model: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 
=  α0 + (𝛼1 − 𝛼0) ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 +  ∑ 𝛽0𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑(𝛽1𝑖 − 𝛽0𝑖) ∙ 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1
    (3.1)  
where 
Country is a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the subsidiary operated in China),   
xi is an independent variable, 
n is the number of independent variables, 
α0, β0i are the intercept and slopes for Japanese subsidiaries in the United States, 
α1, β1i are the intercept and slopes for Japanese subsidiaries operated in China. 
Moreover, this study constructs a multilevel model with longitudinal data (1990-
2009) of Japanese subsidiaries and their parent MNEs. To fit the multilevel model to an 
ordinal logit regression, GLLAMM (Generalized Linear Latent And Mixed Models) is 
recommended with Stata software (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). This command 
has been used in strategy research (Soule, Swaminathan, and Tihanyi, 2013).  
Samples 
The initial sample included observations of Japanese subsidiaries during the 1990-
2009 period from the merged Toyo Keizai and Needs datasets (2012 Edition). Many of 
the prior studies to which the present study refers used earlier editions of the Toyo Keizai 
datasets (Makino and Beamish, 1998a; Nitsch et al., 1996; Woodcock et al., 1994). Using 
the data from the same organization improves the reliability of this study. 
 To resolve the second question (i.e., the systemic difference in selecting host 
countries) mentioned by Gomes-Casseres (1990), the present study discards the 
observations from Japanese MNEs that only invested in one of the two countries from 
1990 to 2009. This study discards subsidiaries invested in agriculture, forestry, and 




given priority over the country level policies
7
. This study also removes Japanese 
subsidiaries that function as local headquarters, since almost all of them are WOSs. To 
focus on strategic investments, this study discards subsidiaries with less than 5 percent 
Japanese ownership during their lifetimes, since they were considered portfolio 
investments (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). In addition, this study drops subsidiaries with 
fewer than 20 employees to ensure that the sample did not mix viable subsidiaries with 
small representative offices (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). Finally, this study excludes 
subsidiaries with missing data. With this careful screening, the final dataset consists of 
557 Japanese MNEs, 1,608 subsidiaries in China and the United States, and a total of 




The dependent variable for this study is Japanese financial performance, a three-
level ordinal variable. Toyo Keizai conducted an annual survey and asked each 
subsidiary’s general manager to provide a perceived assessment of the subsidiary’s 
financial performance — loss, breakeven, or gain. Prior studies report that this measure 
has adequate reliability (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004). Accordingly, empirical tests 
are based on ordinal logistic regression. 
The first independent variable (IV) in this study is the Japanese ownership level, 
measured as the percentage of total Japanese ownership in the subsidiary (Ownership 
level). The second IV is the interaction between Japanese ownership level and the country 
dummy (Ownership X Country). The third IV is the interaction between Japanese 
ownership level and the time period from 1990 (Ownership X Time). The fourth IV is the 
interaction between Ownership X Time and the country dummy (Ownership X Time X 
Country). 
                                                          
7
 The differences in regulatory rules between natural resource related industries and other industries are 
synthesized from the website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(www.mofcom.gov.cn). 
8
 Compared to the number of Japanese subsidiaries (1,608), the number of observations (7,575) between 
1990-2009 is relatively small. This is because (i) subsidiaries were established at different time, (ii) they 





Based on prior studies, this study controls for variables that may influence 
subsidiary performance in order to reduce endogeneity (Brouthers et al., 2003; Shaver, 
1998). First, prior studies point out that Japanese IJVs established in emerging economies 
exhibit higher performance than those in advanced economies because of more 
technological advantages to exploit (Beamish and Delios, 1997; Makino et al., 2004a). 
Prior studies also suggest that Japanese IJVs formed in Asia exhibit higher performance 
than those in North America because of cultural proximity (Delios and Beamish, 2004). 
Therefore, this study controls for the country effect by adding the country dummy 
(Country = 1 if the subsidiary operates in China). 
Second, this study controls for the time effect on subsidiary performance. On one 
hand, institutional transition in China may imply an improving business climate and 
increasing spillover of best practices, benefiting local operating efficiency (Luo, 1998; 
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009). On the other hand, intensifying competition 
makes it harder to make a profit in China (Beamish and Jiang, 2002; Isobe, Makino, and 
Montgomery, 2000; Pan and Chi, 1999; Pan, Li, and Tse, 1999). Further, it is also 
suggested that there are both advantages for early and late movers in transitional 
economies (Luo and Peng, 1998), and relevant costs and benefits of transactions in an 
transitional economy may change over time (Peng, 2003). Therefore, this study includes 
the time period measured from 1990 (Time) and its square item (Time
2
) considering the 
possible nonlinear effect. This study also controls for the country difference in the time 
effect (Time X Country, and Time
2
 X Country). 
Third, prior studies suggest that a subsidiary’s operating experience may improve 
its profitability (Delios and Beamish, 2001). Therefore, this studies controls for the 
subsidiary’s age. It also considers the nonlinear effect (Delios and Beamish, 2004), and 
the interaction effects with Japanese ownership level and the country difference (Age, 
Age
2
, Age X Country, Age
2
 X Country, Ownership X Age, and Ownership X Age X 
Country).  
Fourth, this study considers an MNE’s experience in a subnational region. Prior 
studies considered the MNE’s host country experience, computed as the ln of the sum of 




valuable local knowledge base to respond to environmental uncertainties and risks 
(Henisz and Delios, 2001; Salomon and Wu, 2012). As mentioned, along with the 
economic liberalization, Japanese MNEs are increasingly exposed to subnational 
institutions, and thus the regional experience is more relevant than the country experience 
to subsidiary performance. In addition, the present study is concerned with the evolution 
of the O-P relationship, indicating that the analysis should be based on the subsidiary unit. 
Therefore, the empirical tests of this study focus on the evolution of institutional 
conditions within subnational region and control for the influence of between-region 
variance.  
This study deconstructs an MNE’s country presence into regional experience, 
regional diversity, and regional concentration. Regional experience is measured by an 
MNE’s accumulated experience within a subnational region, i.e., a province, municipality, 
or state. Nevertheless, this study drops regional experience because it is highly correlated 
with the subsidiary experience (correlation = 0.615). Moreover, simultaneously operating 
in multiple subnational regions may not only intensify the uncertainty that an MNE 
confronts (Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian et al., 2008), but also bring out more 
opportunities for exploitation and exploration (Lu and Beamish, 2004; Luo and Peng, 
1999; Qian et al., 2008). Therefore, the study includes regional diversity measured by the 
number of subnational regions where the MNE operates in China or the United States. 
Based on the sample screening process previously described, the present study involves 
24 provinces or municipalities in China and 36 states in the United States. In addition, the 
data includes regional concentration measured by the number of subsidiaries in the focal 
region, as it influences the subsidiary’s strategic importance and embeddedness in the 
local networks (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Roth and Morrison, 1992). The 
study also considers the interaction items of regional diversity and regional concentration 
with the country dummy. 
Fifth, the study includes the industry and sector categories since they represent 
heterogeneity in the level of marketization or concentration, influencing an MNE’s choice 
of ownership level and/or subsidiary performance (Boisot and Child, 1996; McGahan and 




2004), the present study includes eight industry and two sector dummy variables for the 
subsidiary level in order to remove the confounding industry and sector effects (the 
reference is the manufacturing of electronics). This study does not use industry dummy 
variables for the MNE level because of the collinearity between the industrial categories 
of the subsidiary and its MNE parent. Nevertheless, an MNE from one sector may invest 
in other sectors in the host country (e.g., a Japanese manufacturer may invest in wholesale 
or retail sectors in China). As such, this study includes two sector dummy variables for 
the MNE level (the reference is the manufacturing sector). However, based on a Pearson 
correlation test, MNEs from the service sector usually still invest in the service sector in 
foreign countries (correlation = 0.742). Therefore, the variable Subsidiary in service was 
not included.   
Sixth, this study controls for MNE-specific factors that influence an MNE’s 
ownership choice and/or subsidiary performance. This study includes the MNE size 
(measured by the ln function of the number of employees in the MNE) since large MNEs 
may have more flexibility in reallocating their subsidiary portfolio (Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). This study also considers an MNE’s profitability 
measured by its return on sales (ROS). It may represent the MNE’s overall capabilities of 
making profit (Barney, 1991). Moreover, this study needs to control for subsidiary asset 
specificity as it benefits subsidiary performance when the parent MNE has a higher 
ownership level (Chang et al., 2013; Zhang, Li, Hitt, and Cui, 2007). Lacking subsidiary 
level data, this study includes the MNE’s asset specificity, measured by the advertising 
and R&D intensities (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). 
Seventh, the study involves subsidiary-specific factors. The size (measured by the 
ln function of the number of employees) represents the subsidiary resource commitment 
that may negatively relate to the MNE ownership level (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Delios and Beamish, 1999). Moreover, a Japanese MNE may invest in a subsidiary with 
other Japanese MNEs or multiple local partners. Since the number of partners in a joint 
venture may not only alleviate the liability of foreignness but also increase the ex ante or 
ex post costs stemming from the complexity of the transaction (Gong, Shenkar, Luo, and 




subsidiary’s performance may be affected by these alliance characteristics in a 
complicated way. Therefore, this study includes two dummy variables to indicate whether 
the subsidiary had investment from more than one Japanese MNE or more than one local 
firm. In addition, the data includes the percentage of Japanese expatriates in a subsidiary 
since it also represents the level of an MNE’s control (Gaur, Delios, and Singh, 2007; 
Gong, 2003; Makino et al., 2004a).  
Finally, investment motives indicate a subsidiary’s strategic position in the parent 
firm’s market expansion and global integration, influencing the subsidiary’s operating 
mode and the priority of maximizing profitability (Kim and Hwang, 1992; Pan and Chi, 
1999; Roth and Morrison, 1992). Following Goerzen et al.’s (2013) approach, this study 
categorizes original investment purposes into nine types: Local market seeking, Global 
production network, Global distribution network, Local information collection, Local 
labor seeking, Follow global stakeholders, New product development, Local resource 
seeking, and International risk hedging. 
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity  
This study centers all continuous independent variables in order to reduce multi-
collinearity in the empirical model (Aiken and West, 1991). Table 3.1 provides all the 
descriptive statistics of the variables and their Pearson correlation matrix. According to 
Table 3.1, the greatest correlation value is 0.544 (between The number of regions and 
MNE size). This study further evaluates the multi-collinearity of variables using VIF tests, 
and the maximum VIF value is less than 10, indicating that there is no serious multi-




Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Performance level 2.385 0.783 1           
2 Ownership level 84.019 25.019 -0.068 1          
3 Time 9.244 4.958 0.104 -0.064 1         
4 Subsidiary age 11.644 8.845 0.143 0.189 0.013 1        
5 Number of regions 0.590 0.620 0.045 -0.244 0.093 -0.021 1       
6 Number of subsidiaries within region 0.235 0.420 0.032 -0.110 0.116 -0.012 0.294 1      
7 Country 0.346 0.476 0.061 -0.406 0.401 -0.438 0.194 0.086 1     
8 Local market seeking 0.766 0.424 -0.049 0.030 -0.079 0.085 -0.063 -0.089 -0.128 1    
9 Global production network 0.355 0.479 0.004 -0.233 0.191 -0.239 0.087 0.028 0.336 -0.089 1   
10 Global distribution network 0.311 0.463 -0.024 0.038 0.050 -0.036 -0.093 -0.025 0.082 -0.066 0.065 1  
11 Local information collection 0.316 0.465 0.004 0.194 -0.192 0.162 -0.165 -0.107 -0.299 0.075 -0.222 0.076 1 
12 Local labor seeking 0.140 0.347 0.016 -0.116 0.131 -0.183 0.047 0.059 0.385 -0.060 0.247 0.086 -0.131 
13 Follow global stakeholders 0.098 0.297 -0.044 0.031 0.007 -0.016 -0.030 -0.007 -0.049 -0.017 0.020 0.024 -0.013 
14 New product development 0.081 0.273 -0.030 0.030 -0.035 -0.006 -0.032 0.022 -0.079 -0.083 -0.042 -0.015 0.152 
15 Local resource seeking 0.081 0.273 0.029 -0.066 0.004 -0.060 0.046 0.082 0.148 -0.045 0.054 0.032 -0.046 
16 International risk hedging 0.074 0.263 -0.075 0.038 -0.129 0.026 -0.006 -0.035 -0.180 0.022 -0.042 -0.048 0.087 
17 Manufacturing food 0.026 0.160 0.025 -0.053 0.030 -0.009 0.070 -0.040 0.051 -0.005 0.072 0.019 -0.003 
18 Manufacturing apparel 0.023 0.150 -0.016 -0.071 0.007 -0.046 0.011 0.050 0.093 -0.041 0.106 0.016 -0.076 
19 Manufacturing chemical and medical 0.076 0.264 0.044 -0.124 0.057 -0.084 0.113 0.016 0.130 0.005 0.221 -0.016 -0.065 
20 Manufacturing transport 0.119 0.324 -0.094 -0.130 0.023 -0.130 0.026 0.016 -0.038 0.017 0.200 -0.107 -0.149 
21 Manufacturing machinery 0.054 0.225 -0.018 -0.032 -0.005 -0.070 -0.026 -0.011 0.057 0.021 0.157 -0.004 -0.074 
22 Manufacturing metal 0.043 0.204 -0.028 -0.112 0.052 -0.055 0.095 -0.030 0.107 0.006 0.142 -0.014 -0.078 
23 Manufacturing non metal 0.042 0.201 -0.035 -0.051 0.011 -0.041 0.057 0.014 0.032 0.059 0.142 -0.020 -0.055 
24 Manufacturing other 0.018 0.133 0.037 0.003 0.009 -0.028 -0.046 -0.020 0.047 -0.014 0.144 0.020 -0.028 
25 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail 0.322 0.467 0.059 0.308 -0.126 0.295 -0.176 -0.077 -0.318 0.172 -0.444 0.082 0.253 
26 MNE in wholesale or retail 0.122 0.328 -0.004 -0.022 0.007 0.080 0.003 0.035 0.021 -0.002 -0.088 0.065 0.115 
27 MNE in service 0.119 0.324 0.006 0.048 0.032 0.049 -0.019 0.050 0.028 -0.109 -0.226 0.003 0.001 
28 MNE advertising intensity 0.384 1.196 -0.004 0.068 0.112 0.032 0.004 0.030 0.035 -0.025 0.009 0.025 -0.061 
29 MNE R&D intensity 0.948 1.857 0.033 0.016 0.266 0.001 0.040 0.062 0.088 0.002 0.071 0.010 -0.068 
30 MNE size 8.184 1.268 0.048 -0.148 -0.020 0.038 0.544 0.225 0.101 -0.064 0.035 -0.185 -0.149 
31 MNE ROS 0.034 0.059 0.064 0.040 0.040 0.002 -0.066 -0.032 0.008 0.014 0.008 -0.028 -0.035 
32 Subsidiary size 3.989 1.750 0.066 -0.250 0.103 0.023 0.232 0.063 0.279 0.006 0.412 -0.068 -0.324 
33 Subsidiary expatriate ratio 0.165 0.704 -0.034 0.076 -0.040 0.008 -0.041 -0.031 -0.097 0.001 -0.097 0.004 0.104 
34 More than one Japanese partners 0.230 0.421 -0.019 -0.297 0.006 -0.141 0.136 0.061 0.242 -0.018 0.152 -0.034 -0.174 






 Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
12 Local labor seeking 1             
13 Follow global stakeholders -0.043 1            
14 New product development -0.038 0.019 1           
15 Local resource seeking 0.251 -0.076 -0.042 1          
16 International risk hedging -0.036 0.069 -0.013 -0.060 1         
17 Manufacturing food 0.036 -0.054 0.009 0.170 -0.047 1        
18 Manufacturing apparel 0.108 -0.039 -0.046 0.054 0.007 -0.025 1       
19 Manufacturing chemical and medical 0.002 -0.025 0.014 0.020 -0.028 -0.047 -0.044 1      
20 Manufacturing transport 0.010 0.136 -0.069 -0.018 0.120 -0.060 -0.057 -0.105 1     
21 Manufacturing machinery 0.089 -0.015 -0.030 -0.021 0.008 -0.039 -0.037 -0.068 -0.088 1    
22 Manufacturing metal 0.026 -0.035 -0.059 0.013 0.001 -0.035 -0.033 -0.061 -0.078 -0.051 1   
23 Manufacturing non metal 0.006 0.024 -0.017 0.075 0.043 -0.034 -0.032 -0.060 -0.077 -0.050 -0.045 1  
24 Manufacturing other 0.068 -0.001 0.018 0.029 -0.039 -0.022 -0.021 -0.039 -0.050 -0.032 -0.029 -0.029 1 
25 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail -0.213 -0.048 -0.061 -0.111 -0.040 -0.113 -0.106 -0.197 -0.253 -0.164 -0.147 -0.145 -0.094 
26 MNE in wholesale or retail -0.043 -0.033 -0.009 0.025 -0.044 -0.038 0.114 -0.061 -0.128 -0.082 0.011 -0.034 0.001 
27 MNE in service -0.061 0.043 0.064 -0.034 -0.067 -0.060 -0.027 -0.105 -0.135 -0.088 -0.078 -0.077 -0.044 
28 MNE advertising intensity 0.009 -0.067 0.007 0.020 -0.018 0.111 0.053 0.037 -0.092 -0.019 -0.049 -0.014 0.115 
29 MNE R&D intensity 0.059 -0.054 0.020 -0.006 -0.041 -0.004 -0.023 0.164 -0.073 0.022 -0.029 0.008 -0.005 
30 MNE size 0.030 -0.033 -0.022 0.014 0.021 0.015 -0.026 -0.040 0.104 -0.070 0.066 0.045 0.004 
31 MNE ROS 0.000 -0.025 -0.010 0.036 -0.049 0.029 -0.027 0.070 -0.032 0.015 -0.058 -0.025 -0.007 
32 Subsidiary size 0.262 0.035 -0.084 0.100 0.050 0.061 0.088 0.061 0.288 0.072 0.124 0.139 0.065 
33 Subsidiary expatriate ratio -0.068 -0.003 0.013 -0.024 -0.016 -0.023 -0.020 -0.040 -0.064 -0.029 0.020 -0.036 -0.022 
34 More than one Japanese partners 0.019 0.032 -0.070 0.012 -0.015 0.076 0.083 0.113 0.063 -0.001 0.165 0.041 -0.046 
35 More than one local partners 0.046 -0.018 -0.027 0.048 -0.057 0.017 0.076 -0.013 0.035 -0.013 0.076 0.045 0.034 
 
 Variable 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
25 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail 1           
26 MNE in wholesale or retail 0.247 1          
27 MNE in service -0.222 -0.137 1         
28 MNE advertising intensity 0.017 -0.037 0.059 1        
29 MNE R&D intensity -0.001 -0.164 -0.145 0.147 1       
30 MNE size -0.166 -0.238 0.035 0.033 -0.009 1      
31 MNE ROS -0.023 -0.096 0.041 0.057 0.015 -0.098 1     
32 Subsidiary size -0.418 -0.147 -0.099 0.044 0.040 0.357 0.016 1    
33 Subsidiary expatriate ratio 0.113 0.024 -0.001 -0.028 -0.009 -0.058 0.001 -0.244 1   
34 More than one Japanese partners -0.206 0.011 -0.030 -0.026 -0.058 0.133 -0.064 0.190 -0.074 1  





 With unconditional modeling (i.e., the regression on subsidiary performance 
using only information about analysis levels but without any independent or control 
variable), the intra-class correlations (ICCs) for different levels can be calculated. The 
ICC between subsidiaries is 0.647, and the value between MNEs is 0.164, indicating the 
necessity of three-level modeling (Singer and Willett, 2003). In addition, the ICC 
between subnational regions is less than 0.01, and thus this study does not use the 
regional level in empirical model and only include relevant variables. 
Table 3.2 provides a hierarchical regression process. Model 1 includes most 
control variables. Model 2 includes Japanese ownership level and its interaction with the 
country dummy. Model 3 involves the effects of the subsidiary age and its relevant 
interaction items. Model 4 includes the time items and their country differences. Model 5 
adds the interaction between the time and Japanese ownership level to identify the 
evolution of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship over time. Since two constants are 
consistently significant, Japanese subsidiaries’ financial performance (loss, breakeven, or 
gain) can be explained by empirical models. 
Model 5 empirically examines the four hypotheses. It is worth noting that the 
regressions use centered continuous variables, and when the centered variable Time 
equals zero, the real time is 1999 but not 1990. Therefore in 1999, Japanese MNEs’ O-P 
relationship was negative in both China and the United States (coefficient = -0.009). One 
can calculate the coefficients for 1990 based on equation (3.1), and results are -0.027 in 
China and 0.009 in the United States
9
, supporting Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Moreover, the 
negative Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in China weakens over time (coefficient = -
0.002 + 0.004 = 0.002), supporting Hypothesis 2a. In contrast, the positive O-P 
relationship in the United States weakens over time too (coefficient = -0.002), not 
supporting Hypothesis 2b. 
                                                          
9
 In 1990, the coefficient for subsidiaries in the United States (Country = 0) can be calculated as -0.009 + (-
9) * (-0.002) = 0.009. The coefficient for subsidiaries in China (Country = 1) can be calculated as -0.009 + 




Table 3.2 Three-Level Longitudinal Logistic Regression 
 Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Ownership Level  -0.003(0.004) -0.004(0.005) -0.005(0.005) -0.009(0.005)† 
 Ownership X Country  -0.011(0.006)† 0.003(0.008) 0.000(0.008) -0.011(0.011) 
 Ownership X Time     -0.002(0.001)** 
 Ownership X Time X Country     0.004(0.001)*** 
       
Time Effect      
 Time    0.015(0.015) 0.019(0.016) 
 Time2    -0.010(0.002)*** -0.010(0.002)*** 
 Time X Country    -0.027(0.037) -0.003(0.041) 
 Time2 X Country    0.020(0.004)*** 0.017(0.004)*** 
       
Subsidiary Experience      
 Subsidiary age   0.120(0.011)*** 0.091(0.015)*** 0.086(0.015)*** 
 Age2   -0.003(0.001)*** -0.002(0.001)*** -0.002(0.001)*** 
 Age X Country   -0.136(0.035)*** -0.135(0.041)** -0.135(0.041)** 
 Age2 X Country   -0.027(0.003)*** -0.030(0.003)*** -0.029(0.003)*** 
 Ownership X Age   -0.001(0.000)*** -0.001(0.000)** 0.000(0.000) 
 Ownership X Age X Country   0.003(0.001)*** 0.003(0.001)** 0.001(0.001) 
       
MNE Subnational Experience      
 Number of regions  -0.004(0.158) 0.008(0.158) 0.024(0.159) -0.002(0.160) -0.033(0.160) 
 Number of regions X Country 0.432(0.229)† 0.408(0.229)† 0.035(0.236) 0.064(0.238) 0.102(0.239) 
 Number of subsidiaries within a region 0.126(0.181) 0.127(0.181) 0.144(0.180) 0.078(0.180) 0.070(0.180) 
 Number of subsidiaries X Country 0.550(0.290)† 0.563(0.290)† 0.420(0.292) 0.427(0.293) 0.438(0.294) 
       
Country Dummy      
 Country (China =1; United States = 0) 0.100(0.195) 0.002(0.197) 1.669(0.266)*** 1.063(0.363)** 0.811(0.377)* 
       
Industry and Sector Effect      
 (reference: manufacturing electronics)      
 Manufacturing food 0.550(0.616) 0.520(0.613) 0.439(0.608) 0.377(0.605) 0.341(0.605) 
 Manufacturing apparel -0.605(0.568) -0.633(0.566) -0.774(0.562) -0.724(0.560) -0.804(0.564) 
 Manufacturing chemical and medical -0.047(0.339) -0.082(0.338) -0.024(0.338) -0.040(0.337) -0.064(0.338) 
 Manufacturing transport -0.818(0.291)** -0.862(0.291)** -0.656(0.288)* -0.724(0.289)* -0.737(0.290)* 
 Manufacturing machinery -0.487(0.362) -0.512(0.361) -0.338(0.365) -0.359(0.362) -0.338(0.363) 
 Manufacturing metal -0.402(0.382) -0.406(0.381) -0.466(0.381) -0.509(0.378) -0.520(0.379) 
 Manufacturing non metal 0.133(0.383) 0.098(0.382) 0.304(0.384) 0.235(0.382) 0.211(0.383) 




 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail 0.840(0.226)*** 0.865(0.226)*** 0.617(0.228)** 0.707(0.229)** 0.677(0.229)** 
       
 (reference: manufacturing)      
 MNE in wholesale or retail -0.025(0.297) -0.053(0.296) -0.290(0.298) -0.306(0.297) -0.310(0.298) 
 MNE in service -0.201(0.347) -0.200(0.345) -0.436(0.343) -0.416(0.341) -0.425(0.341) 
       
Other MNE Specific Factors      
 MNE advertising intensity -0.073(0.057) -0.061(0.057) -0.098(0.058)† -0.120(0.058)* -0.123(0.058)* 
 MNE R&D intensity 0.096(0.031)** 0.098(0.031)** 0.020(0.032) 0.003(0.032) 0.001(0.032) 
 MNE size 0.222(0.084)** 0.204(0.084)* 0.088(0.083) 0.093(0.083) 0.086(0.083) 
 MNE ROS 2.021(0.690)** 2.079(0.691)** 2.218(0.699)** 2.561(0.703)*** 2.566(0.704)*** 
       
Other Subsidiary Specific Factors      
 Subsidiary size 0.487(0.057)*** 0.488(0.056)*** 0.265(0.057)*** 0.282(0.057)*** 0.289(0.057)*** 
 Expatriate rate -0.358(0.311) -0.303(0.311) -0.243(0.312) -0.184(0.273) -0.173(0.275) 
 More than one Japanese partners -0.419(0.168)* -0.456(0.168)** -0.457(0.169)** -0.399(0.169)* -0.427(0.170)* 
 More than one local partners 0.285(0.293) 0.007(0.306) 0.029(0.311) 0.040(0.310) 0.015(0.312) 
       
Subsidiary Investment Purpose      
 Local market seeking -0.107(0.124) -0.121(0.124) -0.126(0.126) -0.164(0.126) -0.171(0.127) 
 Global production network 0.107(0.149) 0.103(0.149) 0.080(0.150) 0.070(0.151) 0.062(0.151) 
 Global distribution network -0.213(0.122)† -0.190(0.122) -0.204(0.123)† -0.231(0.123)† -0.226(0.123)† 
 Local information collection 0.428(0.137)** 0.430(0.137)** 0.368(0.138)** 0.329(0.138)* 0.342(0.138)* 
 Local labor seeking -0.237(0.179) -0.247(0.178) -0.187(0.181) -0.194(0.181) -0.186(0.181) 
 Follow global stakeholders -0.258(0.175) -0.234(0.175) -0.122(0.177) -0.143(0.177) -0.145(0.177) 
 New product development -0.242(0.198) -0.234(0.197) -0.245(0.199) -0.281(0.199) -0.288(0.200) 
 Local resource seeking 0.016(0.221) 0.001(0.221) 0.010(0.223) 0.063(0.223) 0.061(0.224) 
 International risk hedging -0.653(0.226)** -0.674(0.225)** -0.449(0.230)† -0.497(0.230)* -0.493(0.230)* 
       
 Cons. (cut11) -2.841(0.252)*** -2.873(0.253)*** -2.993(0.256)*** -3.303(0.260)*** -3.352(0.261)*** 
 Cons. (cut12) -0.599(0.248)* -0.633(0.249)* -0.680(0.252)** -0.977(0.255)*** -1.019(0.256)*** 
       
 Log likelihood -5755.800 -5750.841 -5620.149 -5594.280 -5586.469 
 LR Chi2 278.87*** 288.79*** 550.18*** 601.91*** 617.54*** 
 Δ LR Chi2 / 9.92** 261.38*** 51.74*** 15.62*** 





Several robustness checks have been conducted to further examine the empirical 
results. First, since prior studies have often focused on the dichotomy between WOSs and 
IJVs, a robustness check is conducted with the dichotomous choice of ownership level 
instead of a continuous measure. A subsidiary is defined either a WOS (if Japanese 
ownership level exceeds 95%) or an IJV (Stopford and Wells, 1972). This robustness 
check confirms the empirical results of this study. Moreover, since the choices of 
subnational locations is associated with foreign subsidiaries’ performance (Chan et al., 
2010), this study also includes a robustness check by using Japanese subsidiaries’ average 
profitability and its deviation in subnational regions. The data from Chan et al. (2010) is 
used to replace the country dummy in the empirical model. This robustness check also 
confirms the empirical results. 
Further, a robustness check is completed with instrumental variables. 
Organizational choices may result in endogeneity issues in the research of firm 
performance (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014; Shaver, 1998). The present study 
addresses endogeneity concerns in several ways. First, a research setting is used to reduce 
country effects by focusing on investments of Japanese MNEs in China and the United 
States (Makino and Neupert, 2000; McGahan and Victer, 2010; Pattnaik et al., 2015). 
Second, this study adopts a comparative methodology and panel data to solve 
endogeneity caused by time-varying factors and country differences (Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Reeb et al., 2012). Third, this study involves necessary control variables that 
influence ownership choices and/or performance at subnational, industry and firm levels. 
However, since it is impossible to identify all factors that influence subsidiary 
performance in the empirical model, this study uses instrumental variables to control for 
unobservable effects.   
The instrumental variable approach centers on finding one or more variables, 
called instruments, which influence the independent variable (Japanese ownership level)  
but appear unlikely to affect the dependent variable (subsidiary performance). The chosen 




instrument corresponds with the focal independent variable, and exogeneity, i.e., the 
degree of which an instrument is uncorrelated with the dependent variable (Reeb et al., 
2012; Semadeni et al., 2014).  
Based on prior literature review on China’s economic liberalization, this study 
chooses Time and Time X Country as two instruments. As mentioned, MNEs respond to 
China’s incremental economic liberalization by increasing their ownership levels (Chang 
et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2008), and these two time items are used as proxies for influences 
facilitated by institutional changes. Nevertheless, they are not necessarily associated with 
subsidiary performance significantly because of two competing conditions. On one hand, 
subsidiary performance in China can be enhanced because of the overall improvement of 
business climate (Meyer et al., 2009). However, available to all firms, this improvement 
is volatile because it is not a firm-specific advantage. On the other hand, intensifying 
competitions increase the difficulty for a foreign MNE to make a profit in China 
(Beamish and Jiang, 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). Therefore, one can expect that variables 
Time and Time X China influence Japanese ownership levels directly but do not 
significantly affect subsidiary performance.  
The present study uses Stata command ivreg2 to conduct such an examination 
because it can cope with panel data (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Bascle, 2008). With F-
statistic of 22.932 (threshold = 8.68), the instruments are strongly relevant to the variable 
Ownership level. With insignificant J-statistic (p-value = 0.308), the exogeneity of the 
instruments is satisfied. The empirical tests with GLLAMM confirm their exogeneity too 
(Table 3.2). Therefore, the regression result from ivreg2 has been corrected for the 
endogeneity issue caused by MNEs’ ownership choices (Table 3.3). The coefficients for 
the year 1990 are -0.012 in China and 0.004 in the United States, supporting Hypotheses 
1a and 1b. Moreover, the negative Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in China weakens 
over time (coefficient = 0.001), supporting Hypothesis 2a. Surprisingly, the positive O-P 
relationship in the United States strengthens over time (coefficient = 0.001), neither 




Table 3.3 Robustness Check with Instrumental Variables 
 Variable Model    Variable Model 
 Ownership level 0.013(0.006)*   Manufacturing non-metal -0.138(0.063)* 
 Ownership X Country -0.016(0.006)**   Manufacturing other 0.207(0.076)** 
 Ownership X Time 0.001(0.000)**   Subsidiary in wholesale or retail 0.121(0.044)** 
 Ownership X Time X Country -0.000(0.000)   (reference: manufacturing)  
     MNE in wholesale or retail -0.033(0.044) 
Time Effect    MNE in service 0.031(0.049) 
 Time2 -0.002(0.001)***     
 Time2 X Country 0.005(0.001)***  Other MNE Specific Factors  
     MNE advertising intensity -0.050(0.014)** 
Subsidiary Experience    MNE R&D intensity -0.010(0.008) 
 Subsidiary age 0.022(0.003)***   MNE size -0.003(0.013) 
 Age2 -0.001(0.000)***   MNE ROS 0.734(0.166)*** 
 Age X Country -0.022(0.007)**     
 Age2 X Country -0.005(0.001)***  Other Subsidiary Specific Factors 
 
 Ownership X Age -0.000(0.000)**   Subsidiary size 0.040(0.006)*** 
 Ownership X Age X Country 0.000(0.000)**   Expatriate rate -0.020(0.005)** 
     More than one Japanese partners -0.051(0.031) 
MNE Subnational Experience    More than one local partners 0.037(0.050) 
 Number of regions  0.060(0.045)     
 Number of regions X Country -0.034(0.054)  Subsidiary Investment Purpose  
 Number of subsidiaries within a region 0.060(0.041)   Local market seeking -0.128(0.026)*** 
 Number of subsidiaries X Country -0.016(0.055)   Global production network 0.027(0.032) 
     Global distribution network -0.066(0.025)** 
Country Dummy    Local information collection 0.039(0.027)
 
 Country (China =1; United States = 0) 0.239(0.055)***   Local labor seeking -0.009(0.037) 
     Follow global stakeholders -0.035(0.041) 
Industry and Sector Effect    New product development -0.038(0.045) 
 (reference: manufacturing electronics)    Local resource seeking 0.012(0.044) 
 Manufacturing food 0.140(0.086)   International risk hedging -0.119(0.050)* 
 Manufacturing apparel -0.141(0.079)†     
 Manufacturing chemical and medical 0.104(0.053)*   Cons 2.439(0.055)*** 
 Manufacturing transport -0.134(0.051)**     
 Manufacturing machinery -0.043(0.059)   Wald F statistic 22.932 (threshold = 8.68) 
 Manufacturing metal -0.129(0.066)†   Hansen J statistic 1.040 (p-value = 0.308) 






This study investigates whether Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship evolved during 
the past two decades. The analysis confirms prior studies’ conclusions that in the early 
years WOSs tended to have a higher financial performance than IJVs established in the 
United States (Nitsch et al., 1996), while IJVs had better profitability than the WOSs in 
China (Makino and Beamish, 1998a). Moreover, the results show that Japanese MNEs’ 
O-P relationship positively evolved in China because of incremental economic 
liberalization. Nevertheless, empirical results show that the O-P relationship evolved in 
the United States too, and regressions of GLLAMM and ivreg2 provide conflicting 
directions of the evolution. While GLLAMM provides more accurate evaluation on 
ordinal response with multilevel model, ivreg2 corrects for endogeneity caused by 
ownership choices. This divergence confirms the importance of correcting endogeneity in 
performance research. The following analysis uses the results of GLLAMM to continue 
the discussion of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in China. This study departs from the 
case in the United States and leaves it for further study.  
Evolution of the O-P Relationship in China 
To visually observe the evolution trajectories of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship 
in China, this study adopts a prediction-based procedure to illustrate empirical results 
through graphic presentation. Figure 3.1 plots the O-P relationship for the years 1992, 
2000, and 2009 by controlling for other factors. According to Figure 3.1 (a), the higher 
the Japanese ownership level, the lower the probability that the subsidiary would be 
profitable in China. According to Figure 3.1 (b), the negative O-P relationship weakened. 
In 2009, Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship became slightly positive in China according to 
Figure 3.1 (c), indicating that the ownership level is not substantively important to the 






Figure 3.1 Performance Projections for Subsidiaries in China (1992, 2000, and 2009) 
 
(a) Subsidiaries in China in 1992 
 
(b) Subsidiaries in China in 2000 
 




The present study also conducts predictions of the O-P relationship with three 
dimensions — Japanese ownership level, time, and the probability of gain (for easier 
observability this projection only focuses on the level of gain). Figure 3.2 shows that the 
Japanese MNEs’ negative O-P relationship in China positively adjusts over time, but in 
most years it remains negative. However, according to prior analysis, the reason for this 
negative relationship has changed; while initially due to regulatory restrictions, it is more 
recently a mixed function of institutional openness and uncertainty.  
Model projections indicate that the O-P relationships delineated in early studies 
have evolved significantly. It emphasizes the need for scholars and managers to examine 
how the accepted wisdom may evolve over time. 
Figure 3.2 Performance Projections for Subsidiaries in China (1990 – 2009) 
 
Control Variables 
The empirical tests also generate interesting results for some control variables. 
First, although the time dimension does not influence subsidiary performance in a linear 




trend of subsidiary performance in China presents a U shape in China (Figure 3.2), 
partially consistent with the model of institutional transitions theorized by Peng (2003).  
Second, the operating experience of a subsidiary in the United States improves its 
profitability. In contrast, for a subsidiary in China, the operating experience does not 
benefit its performance. It implies that a subsidiary’s competitive advantages are short-
term in a volatile environment (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), and thus its operating 
experience may not improve its ability to make a profit.  
Third, an MNE’s advertising intensity and R&D intensity do not benefit the 
subsidiary performance. A possible reason is that an MNE’s asset specificity is not 
necessarily equivalent to that of subsidiaries, and the transfer of intangible assets can be 
difficult and costly, impacting subsidiary performance (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; 
Zhang, Li, Li, and Zhou, 2010). 
Contributions and Next Steps 
The present study provides rich implications for IB research. First, this study is 
one of the first papers to point out that MNEs’ O-P relationship in the host country may 
evolve along with institutional changes. Thus, the causal relationship between MNEs’ 
ownership choices and their subsidiaries’ profitability is contingent on the state and 
cause-effects of institutions that vary over time and across geographies. Second, this 
study suggests that when analyzing a firm’s overseas ownership strategies, scholars and 
practitioners should consider the host country’s overall openness toward FDIs as well as 
institutional uncertainty arising from the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of 
institutional environments. Third, this study enriches the TCE literature regarding the 
influence of complementary local resources on subsidiary performance. The TCE 
perspective usually only identifies specific assets as complementary resources that an 
MNE needs to access in order to secure the subsidiary performance, and suggests that the 
efficiency by which markets can transfer complementary local assets varies with the type 
of asset and the host country’s institutional environment (Hennart, 2009). The present 
study posits that institutional advantages stemming from relation-based strategies of local 




institutions still outweigh rule-based ones in the focal subnational region. These 
institutional advantages are difficult to transfer/acquire because of their volatility caused 
by institutional uncertainty. Long-term equity-based relationship with local actors can be 
an effective way to access volatile institutional advantages. 
The present study provides rich implications to IB practice as well. As some 
textbooks point out, many MNEs are more interested in the amount of equity control they 
have over the subsidiary than in their share of the profits (Hodgetts, Luthans, and Doh, 
2006). The interest in equity control is consistent with the growing use of the WOS 
operation mode by Japanese MNEs during the period of economic liberalization in China. 
However, the results presented herein affirm that for Japanese MNEs operating in China, 
ownership is negatively related to subsidiary profitability for most years, implying that 
full ownership does not lead to superior financial performance in China. Moreover, as 
mentioned, the empirical results indicate that subsidiary experience exerts different 
influences on the subsidiary profitability in the United States and China (Table 3.2). This 
distinction implies that when a foreign subsidiary operates in a volatile environment, 
managers in it should track the evolving institutional conditions rather than solely relying 
on existing experience. 
This study draws academic attention to the value in re-examining MNEs’ O-P 
relationship. However, several issues are beyond the scope of this paper. First, as 
mentioned, Hypothesis 2b is not supported: Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship evolved 
significantly in the United States too. There are at least three possible reasons. First, 
although the present study assumes that the institutional environment of the United States 
is relatively stable, there may be frequent institutional changes at the state level (Shi et al., 
2014a), resulting in changes of institutional openness or uncertainty in subnational region. 
Second, the institutional environment of the United States may not be as stable as the 
present study assumes. For example, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) have 
developed Worldwide Governance Indicators
10
 (WGI) to evaluate the governance for 200 
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 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a long-standing research project to develop cross-
country indicators of governance. In its current status, the WGI consist of six composite indicators of broad 
dimensions of governance covering over 200 countries since 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, 




countries. Among six indicators of WGI, government effectiveness captures perceptions 
of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011). According to its longitudinal measure, the 
government effectiveness in the United States decreased gradually from 1996 to 2013, 
while it increased gradually in China over the same period
11
. The degrading government 
effectiveness may result in decreasing institutional openness or increasing institutional 
uncertainty, consequently moderating the O-P relationship in the United States. Third, 
increasing interconnectedness of the global markets may interlink institutions of different 
countries and accelerate the pace of institutional changes at the supranational level, 
continuously heightening overall economic uncertainty in all countries (Cantwell et al., 
2010; North, 2005). This requires MNEs to have more decentralized governance 
structures, involving more locally responsive and internationally connected relationships 
(Cantwell et al., 2010). These two potential reasons call for further study. 
Second, existing literature has suggested that MNEs are diverse in local partner 
selection (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Shi et al., 2012). Literature also 
suggests that domestic firms in China are heterogeneous in terms of their embeddedness 
in central planning or market tracks, positions in domestic network alliance, strategic 
orientation, and operational capabilities (Boisot and Child, 1996; Kriauciunas and Kale, 
2006; Park et al., 2006; Shi, Sun, Pinkham, and Peng, 2014b). The heterogeneity of local 
partners results in variability in coordinating and aligning operations (Brouthers, 
Brouthers, and Wilkinson, 1995; Park and Ungson, 2001). Lacking relevant data, the 
present study is unable to address the variance of subsidiary performance caused by local 
partners, calling for further research. 
Third, this study argues that ownership sharing can be an effective way to access 
critical complementary capabilities necessary to an MNE’s local operation in an uncertain 
institutional environment. Nevertheless, other control mechanisms in addition to equity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
different data sources, capturing governance perceptions as reported by survey respondents, non-
governmental organizations, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations 
worldwide (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011). 
11




ownership may contribute to subsidiary efficiency (Luo, 2003; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), 
and managerial ties may complement an MNE’s institutional advantages in a foreign 
country too (Acquaah, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Peng and Luo, 2000). Therefore, more than a 
firm’s ownership structure, the tightness and continuity of its capability to coordinate the 
various assets it creates, or to which it has access, is becoming more critical to its 
performance (Cantwell et al., 2010). Future research may consider these mechanisms in 
addition to ownership structure. 
Fourth, this study uses a subsidiary’s investment purpose and the number of its 
sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region to roughly address the influence of the 
parent MNE’s strategic orientation on its performance. Nevertheless, these proxies may 
not fully explain the extent to which a subsidiary is integrated within global networks,  
which in turn influences a subsidiary’s financial performance (Andersson et al., 2002; 
Kim and Hwang, 1992; Lee and Song, 2012). Future research may incorporate the 
strategic position of a foreign subsidiary within subsidiary networks into analysis. 
Fifth, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas 
operation mode and the profitability of its overseas subsidiaries (Banerji and Sambharya, 
1996; Brouthers, Gao, and Napshin, 2014; Makino and Beamish, 1998b). Keiretsu 
membership is defined in terms of the origin of the owner of the firm, the affiliated main-
banks, and the conventional buyer-supplier links (Makino and Beamish, 1998b). Lacking 
relevant data, the present study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese 
partners on subsidiary profitability. Future research may control for the influence of 
Keiretsu membership of Japanese MNEs. 
Sixth, the present study has neither separated formal institutions from informal 
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility 
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature has usually categorized regulatory rules 
as formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng 
and Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions 
differ in that the former relates to local government while the latter relates to local market 
(Li et al., 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the present study 




2009 in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide the institutional 
uncertainty further based on the differences between formal and informal institutions, and 
refine the analysis of their influences on MNEs’ O-P relationship. 
Seventh, the present study attributes subnational disparity in institutions to 
institutional uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have investigated 
subnational legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level (Meyer and 
Nguyen, 2005; Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish, 
2008). Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into 
subnational certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of 
institutions on MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the 
subnational level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions 
at the country level. The present study has utilized the average subnational performance 
data of foreign subsidiaries from Chan et al. (2010) to reduce the endogeneity caused by 
subnational disparity. However, it has not identified the heterogeneity of MNEs’ O-P 
relationship within China caused by subnational disparity. Since some subnational 
regions in China such as Shanghai and Shenzhen have emerged, it is feasible for future 
research to categorize China’s subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas, 
so that the heterogeneity of the O-P relationship can be explicitly identified. 
Last, it would be useful to examine Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in other 
emerging and advanced economies, or the O-P relationship of MNEs from other countries. 
Conclusion 
This study shows that Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship has evolved significantly 
in the past two decades. Although China’s incremental economic liberalization has 
improved the country’s institutional openness towards inward FDIs, for a long period the 
IJV is still an appropriate choice in terms of subsidiary profitability because MNEs 
confront institutional uncertainty during incremental economic liberalization. The study 
also shows that Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in the United States has gradually 
changed over time, implying emerging institutional conditions in the United States or 
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Chapter 4. MNE Ownership (O), Subsidiary Survival (S), 
and Economic Liberalization 
Introduction 
A large body of academic research has focused on the survival of a foreign 
affiliate. Survival is an important objective measure of subsidiary performance (Geringer 
and Hebert, 1991; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Prior studies have suggested that a higher 
MNE ownership level in an overseas investment leads to lower mortality risk of the 
subsidiary (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Li, 1995; Lu and Hébert, 
2005). Moreover, some prior studies suggest that foreign subsidiaries in a developing 
country are more likely to survive than those in a developed country (Makino, Beamish, 
and Zhao, 2004a; Tsang and Yip, 2007). 
For a variety of reasons, the literature affords us an incomplete and ambiguous 
understanding of subsidiary survival, often undermining its usefulness in practice. First, 
some studies investigate the profitability and survival of a foreign subsidiary 
simultaneously without distinguishing between these two measures of performance 
(Delios and Beamish, 2004; Makino et al., 2004a; Pan and Chi, 1999). However, 
subsidiary survival is not only correlated with subsidiary profitability, but also associated 
with other organizational goals. Prior studies have suggested that the value of an overseas 
subsidiary can be the sum of two value components: the value of current competitive 
advantages and the value of growth options that it brings to its parent MNE (Brouthers, 
Brouthers, and Werner, 2008a; Cui and Kumar, 2012; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
Therefore, despite the overlap, profitability and survival may reflect different value 
components of an overseas subsidiary, on which MNEs may have different priorities at a 
given time. Failing to address their association and differentiation may result in critical 
research gaps (Delios and Beamish, 2004).  
Second, since both equity ownership levels and subsidiary termination could be 
subjective organizational choices, the relationship between the MNE ownership level and 




presents. Organizational choices regarding the ownership level may result in endogeneity 
issues in the O-S relationship (Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood, 2012; Semadeni, 
Withers, and Trevis Certo, 2014). Therefore, some studies argue that after addressing 
endogeneity issues the O-S relationship is insignificant (Shaver, 1998). Alternatively, as 
previously discussed, the propensity for an MNE to terminate a foreign subsidiary may be 
influenced by the priority placed on different value components. 
These research gaps are especially prominent when focusing on foreign 
subsidiaries in an emerging economy. First, prior studies suggest that the subsidiaries of 
MNEs from developed countries are more likely to survive in developing countries than 
in developed countries because of more opportunities for exploitation (Makino et al., 
2004a; Tsang and Yip, 2007). What these studies fail to consider is that some developing 
countries (i.e., emerging economies) are growing rapidly by employing economic 
liberalization as a primary engine. This factor possibly invalidates the extant conclusions. 
Moreover, institutional transition, subnational variation and emerging uncertainty during 
economic liberalization have been well documented (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng, 2003; 
Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014a). These important changes in environments may alter the 
priority of different value components of a foreign subsidiary for its parent MNE, 
potentially changing its survival prospect (Cui and Kumar, 2012).  
Second, when regulatory liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) is an 
important aspect of economic liberalization in an emerging economy, MNEs increasingly 
adopt wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) entries and even convert existing international 
joint ventures (IJVs) to WOSs (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; 
Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). Based on data developed in this 
dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically increased their ownership levels in FDIs 
in China during the period of China’s economic liberalization. In contrast, over the same 
period, they have only slightly increased their ownership levels in FDIs in the United 
States. This emerging phenomenon delineated by Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, may increase 
the endogeneity concerns in research on subsidiary survival (Shaver, 1998). Moreover, 
several studies have investigated how the equity ownership of an MNE influences the 




economy (Chang et al., 2013; Douma, George, and Kabir, 2006; Zhang, 2015a). 
Nevertheless, there is still no study that has examined whether economic liberalization 
has changed MNEs’ O-S relationship. The present study purports to shed light on these 
underexplored and important research gaps by examining the evolution of subsidiary 
survival and the O-S relationship under the conditions of economic liberalization.   
To address such a challenge, the present study adopts an institution-based view in 
conjunction with transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective and the real options view 
(Brouthers et al., 2008a; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Wright, Filatotchev, 
Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). The survival of a subsidiary is determined by the 
combination of its different values (Cui and Kumar, 2012), and the realization of these 
values depend on the subsidiary’s ability to manage the institutional contexts in which it 
is embedded (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008b; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, and 
Jiang, 2008). Moreover, combined with TCE, the real options perspective has been used 
to examine how institutional conditions influence an MNE’s decision-making on overseas 
investments (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Kogut, 1991; Reuer and Tong, 2005). Based on 
these chosen theoretical lenses, the present study investigates whether and how changes 
in the institutional environments of emerging economies influence the survival prospect 
of foreign subsidiaries and the O-S relationship. 
The present study proceeds with a literature review and an explanation of the 
research setting used. It then formulates a set of hypotheses that delineate the survival 
prospects of foreign subsidiaries. Afterwards, it tests hypotheses using event history 
analysis and data spanning a wider period of time. Finally, it discusses the empirical 
results, and presents implications to IB research and practitioners. 
Literature Review 
Subsidiary Survival and Institutional Environment 
Based on the real options perspective, the survival of a foreign subsidiary can be 
determined by the sum of two value components: the value of current competitive 




Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cui and Kumar, 2012; Kogut, 1991; Tong, Reuer, and Peng, 
2008). The former pertains to the rents derived by exploiting existing assets and capacity 
in current environmental conditions. The latter pertains to the rents derived from future 
opportunities (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cui and Kumar, 2012). Thus, the survival of a 
foreign subsidiary is determined by the sum of its profitability and future opportunities. 
Therefore, subsidiary survival is consequently correlated with, but not equal to, subsidiary 
profitability.  
To achieve these two value components, a foreign subsidiary should be able to 
manage the institutional contexts in which it is embedded (Cantwell, Dunning, and 
Lundan, 2010; Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2008). A successful firm would not only have 
advantages in specific assets and organizing mechanism, but also have institutional 
advantages in the host country (Barney, 1991; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Institutional 
advantages can be defined as the formal and informal institutions that govern the value-
added processes within the firm and between the firm and its stakeholders (Cantwell et al., 
2010; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). To acquire or access institutional advantages in a 
foreign country, an MNE needs to understand the state of institutions and their cause-
effects on firm performance (Milliken, 1987). 
Moreover, institutional conditions may have competing effects on the two value 
components, influencing subsidiary survival in a complicated way. For example, with 
greater institutional uncertainty in the host country, the efficiency of exploiting firm-
specific advantages may be lower, resulting in unfavorable subsidiary profitability and 
termination risk as well. Nevertheless, when uncertainty creates a situation where the 
value of future opportunities cannot be accurately predicted, an MNE may choose to 
retain the subsidiary in order to keep options available (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cuypers 
and Martin, 2007; Vassolo, Anand, and Folta, 2004). The existing literature has yet to 
examine these two competing influences of the institutional environment on the survival 




Subsidiary Survival and MNE Equity Ownership  
Prior studies provide competing conclusions on the O-S relationship as well. 
Some studies suggest that higher equity ownership is associated with greater commitment, 
higher level of managerial attention, and less opportunistic behaviors of the partner(s), 
enhancing subsidiary survival (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Li, 
1995). Another stream argues that this conclusion does not take into account the potential 
endogeneity issue caused by organizational choices or subsidiary financial performance 
(Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014). For example, an MNE may purposely choose 
its ownership level in foreign investments, resulting in non-random samples of ownership 
choices in research. Moreover, an MNE may choose to terminate its foreign subsidiary 
because of poor profitability regardless of its equity ownership. After addressing 
endogeneity issues, an MNE’s equity ownership may not influence subsidiary survival 
(Delios and Beamish, 2004; Hennart, Kim, and Zeng, 1998; Shaver, 1998). No study has 
addressed endogeneity issues in MNE ownership choice and subsidiary profitability 
simultaneously. 
These research gaps in subsidiary survival and the O-S relationship will be 
arguably more prominent in an emerging economy because of the changing institutional 
environment. 
Emerging Economies 
Emerging economies are often characterized by existing institutional voids and 
economic liberalization (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 
2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Institutional voids represent underdeveloped capital 
markets, infrastructure, intermediary markets, regulatory systems, contract-enforcing 
mechanisms or other market-supporting institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). 
Economic liberalization as the primary engine of rapid development of emerging 
economies, may fill institutional voids by establishing formal market-oriented 




For a variety of reasons, the coexistence of these two characteristics complicates 
the institutional environments that MNEs must cope with in an emerging economy. First, 
economic liberalization may influence the evolution of organizational choices in equity 
ownership. At the initial stage of economic liberalization, a restriction on foreign 
ownership may bring about ‘forced’ local ownership, even where TCE does not predict 
the existence of the IJV (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). With economic 
liberalization, MNEs confront declining ownership restriction, which allows higher equity 
control to secure their competitive advantages (Chang et al., 2013; Hennart, 1991). In 
addition, MNEs may also increase their ownership control when high equity control 
becomes the dominant strategy of successful peers (Child and Tsai, 2005; Xia, Tan, and 
Tan, 2008). Thus, the changing patterns of foreign equity ownership should be taken into 
account when examining the O-S relationship. 
Second, influenced by the economic liberalization, an MNE may alter the weight 
of different organizational goals of its subsidiary. Economic liberalization may result in 
institutional uncertainty defined as the degree of instability within an institutional 
environment (Luo, 2007). In order to support the effective (though not efficient) 
functioning of the market, informal institutions are usually used to bridge existing 
institutional voids in an emerging economy (North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2011). The informal institutions endure because of their cognitive-cultural 
nature, and thus it takes time for market-oriented mechanisms established by economic 
liberalization to be fully institutionalized (Peng, 2003). Therefore, a market orientation is 
usually coupled with existing but changing institutional voids and robust informal 
institutions. This complicates the state of institutions and their cause-effects on firm 
performance (Milliken, 1987). The resulting institutional uncertainty may not only 
influence MNEs’ choices of ownership levels in the host country (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999; North, 1990), but also strengthen the importance of foreign subsidiaries as real 
options for future opportunities (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cuypers and Martin, 2007; 
Vassolo et al., 2004), changing the survival prospect of foreign subsidiaries. 
Third, institutional transition in an emerging economy may influence the survival 




may bring an improving business climate and operating efficiency (Luo, 1998b; Meyer, 
Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009). However, intensifying competition makes it harder to 
make a profit (Beamish and Jiang, 2002; Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery, 2000; Pan and 
Chi, 1999). Therefore, it is important to incorporate profitability into analysis when 
studying the survival of foreign subsidiaries. 
Due to the reasons outlined above, the present study mainly examines the survival 
of foreign subsidiaries in an emerging economy with significant institutional changes. 
Research Setting 
This study compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States from 1990 to 
2009. It does so for multiple reasons. First, the country of origin may influence an MNE’s 
overseas ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Zhao, Luo, and 
Suh, 2004). Focusing on MNEs from one country can reduce the related endogeneity 
issue caused by organizational choices (Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998). Moreover, a 
number of prior studies have empirically examined the survival of Japanese subsidiaries 
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Makino et al., 2004a), providing 
theoretical and empirical bases for the present work. Moreover, using panel data helps to 
reduce the endogeneity concerns (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). 
Second, such a research setting allows us to compare the Japanese subsidiaries in 
China with those in the United States. China is the largest emerging economy that has 
been undergoing an institutional transition. The United States is the largest advanced 
economy that sustains a relatively mature free-market institutional environment (Chan, 
Makino, and Isobe, 2010). This research setting provides a large sample size. Moreover, 
this setting controls for the confounding effects of multiple host countries on subsidiary 
survival. Although advanced economies advocate free market institutions, they still differ 
in other dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g., country culture) that 
influence a foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Meschi and Riccio, 2008). In addition, 
emerging economies employ heterogeneous approaches to economic liberalization (Lau, 
Qian, and Roland, 2000; Roland, 2002). Different approaches may facilitate distinct 




Roland, 2002), influencing a foreign MNE’s ownership choice, and the survival prospect 
of its subsidiary. Therefore, involving multiple advanced or emerging economies will 
complicate theoretical analysis and empirical testing.  
Third, there are still no exact measurements of the host country’s institutional 
transition. This study accordingly requires an emerging economy within which the 
general trend of institutional transition can be estimated. While some countries adopted a 
“big bang” approach for a fast and comprehensive implementation of all major reforms 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Newman, 2000), China has advocated a dual-track 
strategy for economic liberalization since 1979. This is a process by which a market track 
is introduced and gradually strengthened, and the central planning track is maintained and 
progressively diminished (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000; Park, Li, and Tse, 
2006; Roland, 2002). This dual-track nature results in incremental economic liberalization 
lasting for a lengthy period of time, allowing for the identification of the overall trends of 
China’s institutional changes by accessing well-documented government policies and 
relevant academic studies. In particular, prior studies have suggested that China’s 
incremental economic liberalization can be operationalized as a function of time (Zhang, 
2015b). Along with this process, Japanese MNEs have significantly increased their 
ownership levels in their investments in China. In contrast, Japanese MNEs have 
increased their ownership levels only slightly in the United States. Figure 1.1 delineates 
this phenomenon.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Subsidiary Survival and Profitability 
As mentioned, the survival of a subsidiary is partially determined by the value of 
its competitive advantages in current environmental conditions, i.e., its profitability (Cui 
and Kumar, 2012; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Prior studies have not addressed the 
association and differentiation between survival and profitability of a foreign subsidiary 




Hypothesis 1: The profitability of a Japanese subsidiary increases the 
probability of its survival. 
Subsidiary Survival and Its Evolution 
Prior studies have suggested that foreign subsidiaries in China are more likely to 
survive than those in the United States because there are more firm-specific advantages 
for MNEs to exploit in China (Makino et al., 2004a; Tsang and Yip, 2007). Since 
exploitation is mainly relevant to value generation in current conditions, this causality can 
be addressed by subsidiary profitability (Hypothesis 1). The present study therefore 
analyzes subsidiary survival based on the options for future opportunities that are shaped 
by institutional environments.  
In addition, prior studies have identified complexity, dynamism, and hostility as 
important environmental attributes. They can be understood as heterogeneity, instability, 
and inequality of environmental elements towards foreign investments (Dess and Beard, 
1984; Tan and Litschert, 1994). The present study argues that coexisting institutional 
transition and subnational disparity intensify the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of 
China’s institutional environment, constituting the main sources of institutional 
uncertainty for FDIs. Based on a comparison with Japanese subsidiaries in the United 
States, this study argues that those in China need to cope with time-varying institutional 
uncertainty incurred by economic liberalization. 
Economic liberalization causes MNEs to increasingly confront subnational 
institutions in China. In the early stage of economic liberalization, MNEs usually chose 
their investment locations and local partners from a limited scope dictated by the central 
government. Their IJV subsidiaries were also under the central government’s monitoring 
(Beamish, 1993). The influence of subnational regional environments was thus mitigated 
by centralized decision-making mechanisms. With economic liberalization deepening, 
China’s central government gradually relaxed country-level restrictions on FDI and 
decentralized decision-making power to local governments and firms (Child and Tse, 
2001; Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000; Park et al., 2006). This enabled MNEs to access 




they can interact with local stakeholders more directly, and spread their investments 
across a broader geography. Therefore, MNEs are increasingly influenced by institutions 
of subnational regions (Chan et al., 2010; Ma, Tong, and Fitza, 2013; Shi et al., 2014a).  
The disparity in subnational institutions causes institutional uncertainty that a 
foreign MNE must cope with. China has significant subnational variation in political 
institutions (Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2014a). First, the central 
government exerts time-varying degrees of control (Huang and Sheng, 2009; Shi, Sun, 
and Peng, 2012), resulting in fuzzy boundaries between central and local controls across 
geographical locations. Second, China’s central government delegated some regulatory 
functions to the local level (Luo, 2005; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). This delegation is 
often ambiguously and equivocally stipulated, leaving opportunities for subjective 
interpretation by local authorities (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, and Lu, 2010; Shi et al., 2014a). 
Lacking sufficient institutions that support a free market, local authorities continue to be 
influenced by the legacy of the socialist system and subnational culture when formulating 
regional regulations and policies (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006; Peng, 2003). Third, 
China’s dual-track approach purports to liberalize markets without eliminating the pre-
existing rents of economic agents (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000; Roland, 
2002). As a result the political decentralization usually gives rise to local protectionism 
and regionalism, allowing local agents to maximize self-interest (Ma et al., 2013). This 
agency problem not only results in “ad hoc rule bending” by local authorities, but also 
pushes economic actors to rely on relationship-based exchanges more than on rule-based 
ones (Lin, 2001; Peng, 2003; Shi et al., 2014a). In conclusions, subnational variation in 
political institutions heightens the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional 
environments that MNEs confront, constituting the main source of environmental 
uncertainty in sensing the state of local rules, understanding their cause-effects on local 
operation, and formulating organizational choices (Luo, 2003; Luo, 2007; Milliken, 1987; 
Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).  
In addition, China has significant subnational variation in culture and economic 
development at the provincial or regional level (Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et 




bridge institutional voids when relevant formal institutions are underdeveloped (Peng, 
2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). This engenders fuzzy boundaries between formal 
institutions and cultural-cognitive institutions, further complicating the state of local 
institutions and their cause-effects on firm operation. In addition, Economic institutions 
involve intermediaries that provide support services to firms and the common 
infrastructure that supports regional economic transaction (Chan et al., 2010; Porter, 
1990). With the central government’s macro-control and local governments’ political 
intervention, subnational economic institutions change over time (Pan and Chi, 1999). 
Subnational disparity in social and economic institutions heightens the complexity, 
dynamism, and hostility of institutional environments, resulting in the institutional 
uncertainty that an MNE confronts.  
In brief, China’s economic liberalization not only results in a gradual institutional 
transition from a central planning track to a market track, but also causes subnational 
disparity in political, social, and economic institutions. The coexisting institutional 
transition and subnational disparity give rise to the complexity, dynamism, and hostility 
of China’s institutional environments, resulting in institutional pressure and institutional 
uncertainty that an MNE has to cope with. Figure 2.1 describes the theoretical foundation 
for the present study. 
The present study argues that institutional uncertainty positively relates to the 
survival of a foreign subsidiary. Literature suggests that institutional uncertainty increases 
the importance of keeping an option available to participate in potential upside benefits in 
the future (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cuypers and Martin, 2007; Vassolo et al., 2004). As 
previously discussed, institutional uncertainty incurred by political decentralization 
induces MNEs to rely to a large extent on relationship-based exchanges (Lin, 2001; Peng, 
2003; Shi et al., 2014a). These exchanges are difficult to discontinue because it requires 
mutual agreement. Without a mutual agreement, the termination of such a relationship 
may damage trust in the relationship or the MNE’s reputation in the local business 
community, resulting in high exit and re-entry costs (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). 
Institutional uncertainty in China evolves following a certain trend, and its 




institutions are embodied in institutionalizing formal market rules and decreasing 
institutional voids. It has been suggested that the complexity, dynamism, and hostility in 
China’s institutional environment are declining over time (Tan and Tan, 2005). This not 
only increases the weight of subsidiary profitability and decreases that of real options 
(Cui and Kumar, 2012), but also reduces MNEs’ reliance on relationship-based 
exchanges in subnational regions (Peng, 2003; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Ceteris 
paribus, with decreasing institutional uncertainty, the survival of Japanese subsidiaries in 
China may decline over time. 
Compared to China’s situation, the United States has consistently had a relatively 
mature free-market economy. The present study thus assumes that its institutional 
environment remained stable for the past two decades and Japanese MNEs did not 
confront unprecedented challenges. Accordingly, this study argues that Japanese 
subsidiaries in China are more likely to survive than those in the United States because of 
higher institutional uncertainty in China, at least for the early period of China’s economic 
liberalization. Moreover, the survival of Japanese subsidiaries may decrease in China 
with declining institutional uncertainty, and will be stable in the United States. 
Hypothesis 2: In the beginning period of China’s economic liberalization, 
Japanese subsidiaries in China will be more likely to survive than those in 
the United States during the same period. 
Hypothesis 3a: As economic liberalization increases, the survival of 
Japanese subsidiaries in China will decrease over time after 1990. 
Hypothesis 3b: As the institutional environment remains stable, the 
survival of Japanese subsidiaries in the United States will not change over 
time after 1990. 
The O-S Relationship and Its Evolution 
As mentioned, some prior studies suggested that the MNE ownership level is 
positively associated with the survival of a foreign subsidiary (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 




institutional uncertainty and the importance of relationship-based exchanges in an 
emerging economy, an IJV has more advantages in learning local government intentions 
and utilizing managerial ties than a WOS (Chen, Ding, and Kim, 2010; Li, Poppo, and 
Zhou, 2008; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Therefore, an IJV provides better value in 
terms of future opportunity than a WOS. Discontinuing an equity-based relationship may 
result in high exit and re-entry costs. Under this situation, the level of MNE ownership 
negatively relates to subsidiary survival. Nevertheless, a few studies argue that after 
correcting the endogeneity issues, the ownership choice does not affect subsidiary 
survival (Delios and Beamish, 2004; Shaver, 1998). The following restates these 
competing conclusions with a time condition since the O-S relationship may evolve along 
with economic liberalization. 
Hypothesis 4a: The greater the Japanese ownership in China or the 
United States, the higher the probability of the survival of subsidiaries in 
the period of the 1990s. 
Hypothesis 4b: Japanese ownership in China or the United States will 
have no significant effect on the survival of subsidiaries in the period of 
the 1990s. 
Similarly, the existing literature implies that MNEs’ O-S relationship may evolve 
along with economic liberalization. With the declining complexity, dynamism, and 
hostility of institutions towards foreign investments, the pressure on MNEs to share 
equity with locals is lowering and the cost to discontinue the current cooperation is 
reducing (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). In this vein, 
MNEs’ O-S relationship may positively shift over time. Nevertheless, this study argues 
that an MNE may discontinue an IJV contract without terminating the subsidiary. On the 
contrary, it may convert the current IJV into a WOS (Chang et al., 2013; Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Puck et al., 2009). This study therefore suggests that the O-S relationship will not 
change in China or in the United States. 
Hypothesis 5a: The Japanese O-S relationship in China will not change 




Hypothesis 5b: The Japanese O-S relationship in the United States will not 
change over time from 1990.  
Methodology 
The present study examines Japanese subsidiaries’ survival in the United States 
and China with discrete event history analysis (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004). To do 
this, the present study needs to address two issues in the empirical model. First, the 
survival patterns in the two countries may share a number of explanatory factors to 
different extents. The empirical model should reflect these differences (Gomes-Casseres, 
1990). Second, there may be systemic differences in inward FDI in the two countries 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1990). For example, Japanese firms with stronger technological 
advantages were more likely to invest in developed countries than in developing countries 
(Makino et al., 2004a). This study addresses the second problem via sample selection. To 
resolve the first issue, the study employs the methodology used in Gomes-Casseres (1990) 
and adds a country dummy as well as its relevant interactions in the model: 
Mortality risk = 
 α0 + (α1-α0) ∙ China +  ∑ β0i ∙ xi
n
i=1
+ ∑(β1i-β0i) ∙ xi ∙ Country
n
i=1
       (4.1)  
where 
Country is a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the subsidiary is operated in China),   
xi is an independent variable, 
n is the number of independent variables, 
α0, β0i are the intercept and slopes for subsidiaries operated in the United States, 
α1, β1i are the intercept and slopes for subsidiaries operated in China. 
Samples 
The event history model is constructed with longitudinal data of Japanese 
subsidiaries and their parent MNEs. The initial sample included observations during 
1990-2009 from the merged Toyo Keizai and Needs datasets (2012 Edition). Many of the 




(Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Using the data from the 
same organization improves the reliability of this study. 
 To resolve the second question (i.e., the systemic difference in selecting host 
countries), the model does not use Japanese MNEs that only invested in one of the two 
countries from 1990 to 2009. The model also discards subsidiaries invested in agriculture, 
forestry, and mining industries, within which there were distinct industry-specific 
regulations that were given priority over the general rules at country level
12
. The model 
also drops Japanese subsidiaries that function as local headquarters, since almost all of 
them are WOSs. To focus on strategic investments, the model discards subsidiaries with 
less than 5 percent Japanese ownership during their lifetimes, since they were considered 
portfolio investments (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). In addition, subsidiaries with less 
than 20 employees are not included to ensure that the sample did not mix viable 
subsidiary organizations with small representative offices (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). 
Finally, subsidiaries with missing data are excluded. This careful screening results in a 
final dataset consisting of 553 Japanese MNEs, 1,553 subsidiaries in China and the 
United States, and a total of 7,368 observations during the period from 1990 to 2008
13
. 
Observations in 2009 are discarded because there was no subsidiary terminated. 
Variables 
The dependent variable for this study is Japanese subsidiary termination risk. 
Consistent with previous research, a subsidiary that ceases to be listed in a particular 
year’s directory, after appearing consistently for one or more years, was deemed as 
terminated (Delios and Beamish, 2001; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). This process 
considers terminations as exits by either divestiture or dissolution. From the Japanese 
MNE’s point of view, both of them suggest a cessation of operations in that subsidiary 
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). 
                                                          
12
The differences in regulatory rules between natural resource related industries and other industries are 
synthesized from the website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(www.mofcom.gov.cn).  
13
 Compared to the number of Japanese subsidiaries (1,553), the number of observations (7,368) between 
1990-2008 is relatively small. This is because (i) subsidiaries were established at different time, (ii) they 





To examine the proposed hypotheses, this study involves several groups of 
independent variables. First, the study includes the subsidiary’s financial performance, 
measured by a perceived assessment of the subsidiary profitability level – Subsidiary 
profit gain, Subsidiary profit breakeven (reference level), or subsidiary profit loss. Prior 
studies report that this measure has adequate reliability (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004). 
Second, the study adds a country dummy (Country = 1 if the subsidiary operates in 
China). Third, this study involves the level of Japanese ownership, measured as the ln 
function of the percentage of total Japanese ownership in the subsidiary (Ownership level). 
Its interaction with the country dummy is also included (Ownership X Country). Fourth, 
this study adds the time period measured from 1990 (Time) and its interaction items. 
Based on the discrete event history analysis method, the model itself has included the 
year index to calculate the hazard function for subsidiaries in the United States (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). There is a collinearity issue between the variable Time and 
the year index. Therefore, this study only involves its interactions with the country 
dummy: Time X Country, Time
2
 X Country. Fifth, the model incorporates interaction 
items to examine whether the Japanese O-S relationship changes over time in the two 
countries: Ownership X Time, and Ownership X Time X Country. 
The present study controls for variables that may influence subsidiary survival in 
order to reduce endogeneity issues (Shaver, 1998). First, since a subsidiary’s operating 
experience may improve its profitability (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004), the model 
controls for the subsidiary’s age.  The model also considers the nonlinear effect (Delios 
and Beamish, 2004), and the interaction effect with the country dummy (Age, Age
2
, Age X 
Country, Age
2
 X Country).  
Second, the model considers an MNE’s experience in a subnational region. Prior 
studies consider the MNE’s host country presence, computed as the ln of the sum of 
subsidiary-year units in the host country, as the accumulated operation may provide a 
valuable local knowledge base to respond to environmental uncertainties and risks 
(Henisz and Delios, 2001; Luo, 1999; Salomon and Wu, 2012). As previously discussed, 
along with the economic liberalization, Japanese MNEs are increasingly exposed to 




Kiyak, and Mena, 2010; Chan et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014a; Shi et al., 2012). Therefore, 
the study deconstructs an MNE’s country presence into subnational regional experience, 
regional diversity, and regional concentration (Zhang, 2015b). Regional experience is 
measured by an MNE’s accumulated experience within a subnational region, i.e., a 
province, municipality, or state. Nevertheless, the model drops this variable because it is 
highly correlated with the subsidiary experience. Simultaneously operating in multiple 
subnational regions may intensify the institutional uncertainty that an MNE confronts 
(Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian, Li, Li, and Qian, 2008). It may also bring out more 
opportunities for exploitation and exploration (Lu and Beamish, 2004; Luo and Peng, 
1999; Qian et al., 2008). The model thus includes regional diversity measured by the 
number of subnational regions where the MNE operates in China or the United States. 
Based on the sample screening process previously described, the present study involves 
24 provinces or municipalities in China and 36 states in the United States. The model also 
includes regional concentration measured by the number of subsidiaries in the focal 
region, as it influences the focal subsidiary’s strategic importance and embeddedness in 
the local networks (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Roth and Morrison, 1992). 
The model considers the interaction items of regional diversity and regional concentration 
with the country dummy. 
Third, the model adds industry and sector categories since they present 
heterogeneity in the level of marketization or concentration, influencing the subsidiary 
life cycle of a foreign subsidiary (Boisot and Child, 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1997; 
Zhao et al., 2004). Following prior studies (e.g., Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004), the present 
study includes eight industry and two sector dummy variables for the subsidiary level in 
order to remove confounding industry and sector effects (the reference is the 
manufacturing of electronics). The model does not use industry dummy variables for the 
MNE level because of the collinearity between the industrial categories of the subsidiary 
and its MNE parent. However, an MNE from one sector may invest in other sectors in the 
host country (e.g., a Japanese manufacturer may invest in wholesale or retail sectors in 
China). As such, the model includes two sector dummy variables for the MNE level (the 
reference is the manufacturing sector). However, based on a Pearson correlation test, 




(correlation = 0.742), and as a result, the model does not include the variable Subsidiary 
in service to reduce multi-collinearity.  
Fourth, the model controls for MNE-specific factors that influence a foreign 
subsidiary’s survival rate. The model  includes the size of an MNE (measured by the ln 
function of the number of employees in the MNE), since large MNEs may have more 
flexibility in reallocating their subsidiary portfolio (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj 
and Beamish, 2004). The model also considers the MNE’s profitability (measured by the 
return on sales (ROS)), as it may represent the MNE’s overall competitive advantages 
(Barney, 1991, 1997). In addition, the model  controls for the asset specificity of an MNE, 
measured by advertising intensity and R&D intensity, as it sustains subsidiary survival 
(Delios and Beamish, 2001).  
Fifth, following prior studies, the model includes subsidiary-specific factors. 
Subsidiary size (measured by the ln function of the number of employees) represents the 
resource commitment that influences subsidiary survival (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Delios and Beamish, 1999, 2004). Moreover, a Japanese MNE may invest in a subsidiary 
with other Japanese MNEs or multiple local partners. The number of partners in a joint 
venture may not only alleviate the liability of foreignness, but also increase the ex ante or 
ex post costs stemming from the complex contract and its implementation (Gong, Shenkar, 
Luo, and Nyaw, 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Makino and Beamish, 1998). The 
Japanese subsidiary’s survival may be affected by these alliance characteristics (Park and 
Russo, 1996). Therefore, the model includes two dummy variables to indicate whether the 
subsidiary had investments from more than one Japanese MNE or more than one local 
firm. In addition, the model includes the percentage of Japanese expatriates in a 
subsidiary since it also represents the level of the MNE’s control or managerial attention 
towards the focal subsidiary (Gaur, Delios, and Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Plourde, Parker, 
and Schaan, 2014).  
Finally, investment motives indicate a subsidiary’s strategic position in the parent 
firm’s market expansion and global integration, influencing the subsidiary’s operating 
mode and life cycle (Li, 1995; Pan and Chi, 1999; Park and Ungson, 2001). Following 




categorizes original investment purposes into nine types: Local market seeking, Global 
production network, Global distribution network, Local information collection, Local 
labor seeking, Follow global stakeholders, New product development, Local resource 
seeking, and International risk hedging. 
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity  
The model  centers all continuous independent variables in order to reduce multi-
collinearity in the empirical model (Aiken and West, 1991). Table 4.1 provides all the 
descriptive statistics of the variables and their Pearson correlation matrix. According to 
Table 4.1, the greatest correlation value is 0.550 (between The number of subnational 
regions and MNE size). The study further evaluates the multi-collinearity of variables 
based on variance inflation factor (VIF). The maximum VIF value is less than 10, 






Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Subsidiary termination 0.025 0.156 0.000            
2 Subsidiary profit gain 0.574 0.495 -0.049 0.000           
3 Subsidiary profit loss 0.189 0.391 0.038 -0.560 0.000          
4 Ownership level (ln) 4.355 0.462 -0.032 -0.071 0.030 0.000         
5 Time 8.970 4.746 0.001 0.121 -0.069 -0.062 0.000        
6 Subsidiary age 11.619 8.817 -0.023 0.120 -0.143 0.137 0.008 0.000       
7 Number of subnational regions 0.590 0.621 0.018 0.049 -0.027 -0.226 0.098 -0.019 0.000      
8 Number of subsidiaries within the region 0.232 0.417 0.076 0.035 -0.019 -0.108 0.107 -0.012 0.301 0.000     
9 Country 0.337 0.473 -0.006 0.084 -0.014 -0.325 0.394 -0.437 0.192 0.080 0.000    
10 Local market seeking 0.767 0.423 -0.030 -0.015 0.077 0.025 -0.079 0.089 -0.063 -0.084 -0.129 0.000   
11 Global production network 0.352 0.478 -0.024 0.029 0.033 -0.200 0.191 -0.246 0.086 0.028 0.339 -0.084 0.000  
12 Global distribution network 0.309 0.462 -0.023 -0.013 0.034 0.038 0.046 -0.038 -0.094 -0.032 0.081 -0.071 0.067 0.000 
13 Local information collection 0.320 0.467 0.018 -0.027 -0.042 0.156 -0.186 0.166 -0.164 -0.103 -0.300 0.073 -0.221 0.082 
14 Local labor seeking 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.041 0.019 -0.095 0.138 -0.184 0.044 0.058 0.390 -0.063 0.252 0.085 
15 Follow global stakeholders 0.098 0.298 -0.015 -0.029 0.051 0.034 0.010 -0.019 -0.029 -0.005 -0.046 -0.021 0.025 0.024 
16 New product development 0.082 0.274 0.050 -0.038 0.006 0.006 -0.033 -0.006 -0.030 0.025 -0.079 -0.084 -0.042 -0.015 
17 Local resource seeking 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.042 -0.009 -0.051 0.011 -0.058 0.044 0.080 0.151 -0.043 0.057 0.034 
18 International risk hedging 0.076 0.265 0.010 -0.077 0.055 0.024 -0.124 0.024 -0.006 -0.034 -0.179 0.023 -0.042 -0.048 
19 Manufacturing food 0.025 0.157 -0.015 0.037 -0.014 -0.059 0.020 -0.007 0.053 -0.038 0.045 -0.012 0.066 0.022 
20 Manufacturing apparel 0.024 0.152 0.009 -0.010 0.020 -0.073 0.017 -0.046 0.011 0.052 0.098 -0.043 0.109 0.017 
21 Manufacturing chemical and medical 0.075 0.263 -0.019 0.060 -0.012 -0.105 0.052 -0.085 0.115 0.014 0.130 0.010 0.216 -0.016 
22 Manufacturing transport 0.118 0.323 -0.027 -0.084 0.086 -0.114 0.020 -0.131 0.026 0.018 -0.040 0.025 0.196 -0.107 
23 Manufacturing machinery 0.055 0.227 -0.001 -0.003 0.035 -0.013 0.004 -0.071 -0.026 -0.009 0.062 0.023 0.160 -0.002 
24 Manufacturing metal 0.043 0.202 -0.017 -0.016 0.039 -0.110 0.050 -0.054 0.099 -0.033 0.106 0.002 0.146 -0.011 
25 Manufacturing non metal 0.043 0.202 0.005 -0.028 0.035 -0.041 0.017 -0.043 0.061 0.014 0.035 0.058 0.142 -0.022 
26 Manufacturing other 0.018 0.133 -0.002 0.041 -0.024 0.006 0.009 -0.028 -0.043 -0.021 0.048 -0.017 0.146 0.022 
27 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail 0.324 0.468 -0.005 0.026 -0.095 0.266 -0.127 0.303 -0.175 -0.076 -0.321 0.170 -0.442 0.081 
28 MNE in wholesale or retail 0.123 0.328 0.033 0.000 0.003 -0.058 0.010 0.083 0.000 0.040 0.023 -0.007 -0.086 0.059 
29 MNE in service 0.118 0.323 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.055 0.031 0.045 -0.019 0.053 0.031 -0.112 -0.224 0.008 
30 MNE advertising intensity 0.386 1.189 0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.064 0.124 0.032 0.008 0.030 0.039 -0.029 0.008 0.024 
31 MNE R&D intensity 0.927 1.827 -0.013 0.033 -0.027 0.020 0.267 -0.002 0.044 0.055 0.087 0.003 0.072 0.009 
32 MNE size 8.188 1.268 0.014 0.053 -0.031 -0.128 -0.014 0.035 0.550 0.224 0.107 -0.062 0.037 -0.188 
33 MNE ROS 0.034 0.059 -0.033 0.082 -0.041 0.038 0.057 0.005 -0.068 -0.030 0.012 0.006 0.009 -0.032 
34 Subsidiary size 3.982 1.752 -0.066 0.115 0.016 -0.223 0.102 0.022 0.232 0.056 0.278 0.013 0.414 -0.070 
35 Subsidiary expatriate ratio 0.167 0.714 0.005 -0.047 0.009 0.064 -0.036 0.008 -0.040 -0.029 -0.095 0.000 -0.096 0.004 
36 More than one Japanese partners 0.231 0.422 -0.014 -0.001 0.041 -0.260 0.013 -0.142 0.134 0.061 0.250 -0.019 0.151 -0.032 





 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
13 Local information collection 1              
14 Local labor seeking -0.133 1             
15 Follow global stakeholders -0.011 -0.042 1            
16 New product development 0.149 -0.043 0.020 1           
17 Local resource seeking -0.046 0.249 -0.077 -0.042 1          
18 International risk hedging 0.086 -0.038 0.070 -0.013 -0.061 1         
19 Manufacturing food -0.003 0.040 -0.053 0.012 0.176 -0.046 1        
20 Manufacturing apparel -0.078 0.109 -0.040 -0.047 0.054 0.006 -0.025 1       
21 Manufacturing chemical and medical -0.065 0.000 -0.022 0.011 0.021 -0.027 -0.046 -0.044 1      
22 Manufacturing transport -0.149 0.011 0.136 -0.070 -0.016 0.122 -0.059 -0.057 -0.104 1     
23 Manufacturing machinery -0.076 0.091 -0.015 -0.031 -0.022 0.008 -0.039 -0.038 -0.068 -0.088 1    
24 Manufacturing metal -0.076 0.031 -0.040 -0.058 0.015 0.003 -0.034 -0.033 -0.060 -0.077 -0.051 1   
25 Manufacturing non metal -0.056 0.008 0.025 -0.017 0.076 0.043 -0.034 -0.033 -0.060 -0.077 -0.051 -0.045 1  
26 Manufacturing other -0.028 0.066 0.000 0.019 0.027 -0.039 -0.022 -0.021 -0.039 -0.050 -0.033 -0.029 -0.029 1 
27 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail 0.256 -0.215 -0.048 -0.061 -0.112 -0.041 -0.111 -0.108 -0.196 -0.253 -0.166 -0.146 -0.146 -0.094 
28 MNE in wholesale or retail 0.119 -0.043 -0.037 -0.009 0.027 -0.045 -0.039 0.116 -0.060 -0.129 -0.083 0.013 -0.034 0.002 
29 MNE in service -0.004 -0.064 0.040 0.059 -0.033 -0.069 -0.059 -0.027 -0.104 -0.134 -0.088 -0.077 -0.077 -0.043 
30 MNE advertising intensity -0.065 0.010 -0.069 0.008 0.021 -0.019 0.119 0.054 0.042 -0.092 -0.019 -0.049 -0.014 0.106 
31 MNE R&D intensity -0.071 0.059 -0.050 0.015 -0.007 -0.041 -0.009 -0.022 0.162 -0.071 0.024 -0.026 0.012 -0.001 
32 MNE size -0.150 0.031 -0.032 -0.021 0.011 0.021 0.016 -0.027 -0.034 0.102 -0.072 0.069 0.046 0.004 
33 MNE ROS -0.042 -0.002 -0.028 -0.019 0.034 -0.051 0.024 -0.028 0.068 -0.032 0.023 -0.053 -0.026 -0.013 
34 Subsidiary size -0.323 0.266 0.036 -0.083 0.099 0.052 0.061 0.090 0.064 0.289 0.074 0.124 0.143 0.063 
35 Subsidiary expatriate ratio 0.103 -0.069 -0.004 0.012 -0.024 -0.017 -0.023 -0.021 -0.040 -0.064 -0.030 0.021 -0.036 -0.022 
36 More than one Japanese partners -0.177 0.020 0.033 -0.070 0.013 -0.015 0.072 0.084 0.117 0.060 0.000 0.163 0.042 -0.045 
37 More than one local partners -0.080 0.050 -0.017 -0.026 0.051 -0.057 0.016 0.077 -0.013 0.033 -0.012 0.072 0.046 0.036 
 
 Variables 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
27 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail 1           
28 MNE in wholesale or retail 0.244 1          
29 MNE in service -0.222 -0.137 1         
30 MNE advertising intensity 0.018 -0.041 0.063 1        
31 MNE R&D intensity -0.003 -0.162 -0.143 0.158 1       
32 MNE size -0.166 -0.238 0.037 0.032 -0.007 1      
33 MNE ROS -0.023 -0.099 0.043 0.059 0.007 -0.101 1     
34 Subsidiary size -0.417 -0.143 -0.099 0.042 0.041 0.354 0.019 1    
35 Subsidiary expatriate ratio 0.112 0.024 -0.001 -0.028 -0.008 -0.058 0.001 -0.243 1   
36 More than one Japanese partners -0.207 0.011 -0.030 -0.025 -0.054 0.134 -0.065 0.192 -0.075 1  





The present study conducts an event history analysis in two ways - with and 
without instrumental variables. There are two reasons. First, Japanese ownership patterns 
in China apparently differed from those in the United States between 1990-2009 (Zhang, 
2015b), indicating that Japanese MNEs purposely choose their ownership strategies. The 
resulting non-random samples may cause endogeneity issues in survival research, unless 
the model is able to include all factors that influence a subsidiary’s survival into the 
empirical model (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014; Shaver, 1998). Although the 
present study has tried to address endogeneity issues by simplifying the research setting, 
adopting comparative methodology, and including control variables (Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004b; Reeb et al., 2012), it is impossible to include all 
factors that influence subsidiary survival. Second, although regression with instrumental 
variables can control for unobservable non-random effects (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni 
et al., 2014), prior survival studies seldom adopt this approach in empirical tests. The 
model conducts event history analyses both with and without instrumental variables to 
provide a direct comparison of results and examine the necessity of addressing 
endogeneity in subsidiary survival research. 
Some prior studies use a Cox proportional hazards model to perform survival 
analysis (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005; Lu and Xu, 2006). However, 
the Cox model provided by STATA has not supported the regression with instrument 
variables. Moreover, for a binary dependent variable, an Instrumented Variables Probit 
(ivprobit) estimator is recommended to address endogeneity issues (Woodldridge, 2002). 
Accordingly, the model uses a probit estimator instead of Cox model to conduct the event 
history analysis without instrumental variables.  
Event History Analysis without Instrumental Variables 
Table 4.2 provides a hierarchical regression process of event history analysis 
without instrumental variables. Model 1 includes all control variables. Model 2 includes 




performance relates to its mortality risk. Model 3 involves the time influences, examining 
whether the Japanese subsidiaries’ mortality risk changes over time in the United States 
and China. Model 4 includes the interactions between time and Japanese ownership level, 
examining whether the O-S relationship changes over time in the two countries. It is 
worth noting that the regressions use centered continuous variables. When the centered 
variable Time equals zero, the real time is 1999, not 1990, according to Table 4.1.  
Model 4 empirically examines the five groups of hypotheses. First, the 
profitability level of a subsidiary significantly decreases its mortality risk (coefficients for 
profit gain and loss are -0.193 and 0.224 respectively), supporting Hypothesis 1. Second, 
according to the coefficients of the year index and their significance, the subsidiary 
mortality risk in the United States does not change over time, except for an increase in 
1998, possibly due to the influence of the economic crisis. However, subsidiary mortality 
risk in China increases over time (coefficient = 0.122). These results also suggest that 
before 1999 the mortality risk of subsidiaries in China was lower than in the United States. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2, 3a, and 3b are supported. Third, the Japanese ownership level 
negatively relates to subsidiary mortality risk in 1999 (coefficient = -0.278), supporting 
Hypothesis 4a but not 4b. In addition, the Japanese O-S relationship does not vary over 
time in the two chosen countries, supporting Hypothesis 5a and 5b. 
Event History Analysis with Instrumental Variables 
The instrumental variable approach centers on finding one or more variables, 
called instruments, which influence the independent variable (Japanese ownership level in 
a foreign subsidiary in this study), but appears unlikely to affect the dependent variable 
(subsidiary survival) (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014; Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter, 2012). Chosen instrumental variables must fulfil two conditions: relevance and 
exogeneity. Relevance here means the degree to which the instruments correspond with 
the focal independent variable. Exogeneity is  the degree to which instruments are 




Table 4.2 Event History Analysis without Correcting for Endogeneity 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Ownership Level (ln) -0.248(0.089)** -0.264(0.091)** -0.258(0.091)** -0.278(0.091)** 
 Ownership X Country 0.099(0.145) 0.087(0.146) 0.042(0.145) -0.035(0.199) 
Time Effect     
 Time X Country   0.114(0.043)** 0.122(0.045)** 
 Time2 X Country   -0.009(0.006) -0.010(0.006) 
 Ownership X Time    -0.022(0.019) 
 Ownership X Time X Country    0.044(0.037) 
Subsidiary profitability     
 Subsidiary profit gain  -0.199(0.083)* -0.190(0.084)* -0.193(0.084)* 
 Subsidiary profit loss  0.225(0.096)* 0.228(0.096)* 0.224(0.097)* 
Subsidiary Experience     
 Subsidiary age -0.001(0.007) 0.004(0.007) 0.005(0.007) 0.005(0.007) 
 Age2 -0.001(0.000)† -0.001(0.000)* -0.001(0.000)* -0.001(0.000)* 
 Age X Country 0.030(0.022) 0.028(0.022) 0.018(0.023) 0.018(0.023) 
 Age2 X Country 0.001(0.003) 0.000(0.003) 0.000(0.003) 0.000(0.003) 
MNE Subnational Experience     
 Number of subnational regions -0.041(0.081) -0.041(0.082) -0.060(0.082) -0.071(0.083) 
 Number of subnational regions X Country -0.017(0.124) -0.019(0.126) -0.035(0.127) -0.019(0.127) 
 Number of subsidiaries within a region 0.388(0.095)*** 0.394(0.096)*** 0.397(0.097)*** 0.399(0.097)*** 
 Number of subsidiaries within a region X Country -0.107(0.149) -0.073(0.151) -0.116(0.151) -0.124(0.151) 
Country Dummy     
 Country (China =1; United States = 0) 0.128(0.145) 0.189(0.148) 0.066(0.168) 0.037(0.175) 
Investment Purpose     
 Local market seeking -0.064(0.078) -0.099(0.080) -0.113(0.080) -0.118(0.081) 
 Global production network 0.019(0.099) 0.025(0.100) 0.006(0.101) 0.001(0.101) 
 Global distribution network -0.140(0.079)† -0.160(0.080)* -0.156(0.081)† -0.158(0.081)† 
 Local information collection 0.051(0.079) 0.062(0.080) 0.053(0.081) 0.051(0.081) 
 Local labor seeking 0.109(0.114) 0.112(0.114) 0.152(0.116) 0.154(0.116) 
 Follow global stakeholders -0.099(0.127) -0.105(0.127) -0.105(0.128) -0.103(0.128) 
 New product development 0.222(0.103)* 0.214(0.104)* 0.207(0.104)* 0.210(0.104)* 
 Local resource seeking -0.013(0.129) -0.025(0.132) -0.040(0.133) -0.038(0.133) 
 International risk hedging 0.097(0.126) 0.076(0.127) 0.066(0.127) 0.066(0.127) 
Industry and Sector Effect     
 (reference: manufacturing electronics)     
 Manufacturing food -0.427(0.304) -0.458(0.319) -0.430(0.318) -0.481(0.330) 
 Manufacturing apparel 0.079(0.214) 0.034(0.219) 0.047(0.220) 0.035(0.220) 
 Manufacturing chemical and medical -0.271(0.173) -0.252(0.175) -0.213(0.175) -0.218(0.175) 




 Manufacturing machinery 0.007(0.168) 0.001(0.169) 0.013(0.171) 0.010(0.171) 
 Manufacturing metal -0.249(0.220) -0.298(0.226) -0.288(0.228) -0.296(0.229) 
 Manufacturing non metal 0.125(0.178) 0.092(0.179) 0.090(0.180) 0.086(0.180) 
 Manufacturing other -0.096(0.273) -0.087(0.282) -0.072(0.284) -0.080(0.285) 
 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail -0.121(0.104) -0.092(0.105) -0.108(0.105) -0.117(0.106) 
 (reference: manufacturing)     
 MNE in wholesale or retail 0.160(0.106) 0.136(0.108) 0.138(0.108) 0.132(0.109) 
 MNE in service -0.084(0.119) -0.095(0.120) -0.095(0.121) -0.103(0.121) 
Other MNE Specific Factors     
 MNE advertising intensity 0.035(0.029) 0.027(0.030) 0.025(0.030) 0.025(0.030) 
 MNE R&D intensity -0.027(0.023) -0.028(0.023) -0.028(0.024) -0.027(0.024) 
 MNE size 0.058(0.036) 0.059(0.036) 0.068(0.037)† 0.067(0.037)† 
 MNE ROS -0.885(0.577) -0.722(0.586) -0.751(0.591) -0.745(0.591) 
Other Subsidiary Specific Factors     
 Subsidiary size -0.167(0.030)*** -0.168(0.031)*** -0.177(0.031)*** -0.175(0.031)*** 
 Expatriate rate -0.386(0.178)* -0.394(0.180)* -0.439(0.182)* -0.440(0.183)* 
 More than one Japanese partners -0.128(0.092) -0.156(0.094)† -0.134(0.094) -0.142(0.094) 
 More than one local partners 0.000(0.169) -0.004(0.172) 0.018(0.174) 0.010(0.176) 
Year Index     
 Y1991 -0.239(0.334) -0.232(0.341) -0.231(0.344) -0.237(0.342) 
 Y1992 0.300(0.265) 0.341(0.268) 0.379(0.269) 0.372(0.268) 
 Y1993 0.339(0.260) 0.381(0.263) 0.390(0.265) 0.387(0.264) 
 Y1994 0.254(0.257) 0.309(0.259) 0.320(0.262) 0.323(0.260) 
 Y1995 -0.065(0.283) -0.040(0.288) -0.022(0.291) -0.018(0.289) 
 Y1996 0.269(0.254) 0.320(0.257) 0.345(0.259) 0.348(0.258) 
 Y1997 0.212(0.256) 0.300(0.259) 0.324(0.262) 0.328(0.260) 
 Y1998 0.348(0.250) 0.420(0.253)† 0.434(0.256)† 0.440(0.254)† 
 Y1999 0.290(0.246) 0.358(0.249) 0.350(0.252) 0.359(0.251) 
 Y2000 0.215(0.247) 0.270(0.250) 0.224(0.254) 0.232(0.253) 
 Y2001 0.080(0.251) 0.130(0.254) 0.051(0.260) 0.056(0.259) 
 Y2002 0.172(0.283) 0.216(0.286) 0.095(0.293) 0.107(0.292) 
 Y2003 -0.027(0.303) -0.002(0.307) -0.163(0.316) -0.156(0.315) 
 Y2004 0.084(0.297) 0.113(0.304) -0.087(0.315) -0.073(0.315) 
 Y2005 -0.148(0.319) -0.051(0.321) -0.271(0.336) -0.258(0.335) 
 Y2006 0.374(0.275) 0.458(0.278) 0.244(0.297) 0.253(0.297) 
 Y2007 0.403(0.269) 0.505(0.272) 0.314(0.302) 0.330(0.301) 
 Y2008 0.267(0.295) 0.349(0.298) 0.198(0.339) 0.219(0.338) 
 Cons. -2.070(0.245)*** -2.040(0.251)*** -2.015(0.254)*** -2.004(0.252)*** 
 Log likelihood -781.451 -769.957 -764.663 -763.806 
 Wald Chi2 212.08*** 235.70*** 241.41*** 237.76*** 




Table 4.3 Event History Analysis after Correcting for Endogeneity 
 Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Ownership Level (ln) -0.055(0.637) -0.095(0.641) 0.109(0.651) 0.158(0.618) 
 Ownership X Country -0.112(0.626) -0.113(0.628) -0.313(0.636) -0.463(0.617) 
Time Effect     
 Time X Country   0.115(0.043)** 0.125(0.044)** 
 Time2 X Country   -0.009(0.006) -0.009(0.006) 
 Ownership X Time    -0.002(0.032) 
 Ownership X Time X Country    0.027(0.044) 
Subsidiary profitability     
 Subsidiary profit gain  -0.190(0.084)* -0.180(0.085)* -0.183(0.085)* 
 Subsidiary profit loss  0.219(0.096)* 0.222(0.096)* 0.218(0.096)* 
Subsidiary Experience     
 Subsidiary age -0.001(0.007) 0.004(0.007) 0.005(0.007) 0.005(0.007) 
 Age2 -0.001(0.000)† -0.001(0.000)* -0.001(0.000)* -0.001(0.000)* 
 Age X Country 0.026(0.022) 0.022(0.022) 0.017(0.022) 0.018(0.022) 
 Age2 X Country 0.002(0.003) 0.001(0.003) 0.000(0.003) 0.000(0.003) 
MNE Subnational Experience     
 Number of subsidiaries within a region 0.388(0.106)*** 0.388(0.108)*** 0.414(0.106)*** 0.419(0.103)*** 
 Number of subsidiaries within a region X Country -0.119(0.147) -0.074(0.149) -0.162(0.151) -0.174(0.150) 
Investment Purpose     
 Local market seeking -0.066(0.078) -0.101(0.080) -0.114(0.080) -0.118(0.080) 
 Global production network 0.021(0.101) 0.028(0.102) 0.001(0.103) -0.002(0.101) 
 Global distribution network -0.134(0.080)† -0.151(0.080)† -0.149(0.081)† -0.152(0.081)† 
 Local information collection 0.045(0.079) 0.053(0.080) 0.047(0.080) 0.047(0.080) 
 Local labor seeking 0.130(0.111) 0.142(0.112) 0.161(0.112) 0.158(0.112) 
 Follow global stakeholders -0.107(0.127) -0.114(0.128) -0.119(0.127) -0.119(0.127) 
 New product development 0.228(0.110)* 0.217(0.111)† 0.226(0.110)* 0.231(0.108)* 
 Local resource seeking -0.017(0.133) -0.024(0.136) -0.056(0.137) -0.057(0.136) 
 International risk hedging 0.088(0.125) 0.063(0.126) 0.062(0.126) 0.063(0.125) 
Industry and Sector Effect     
 (reference: manufacturing electronics)     
 Manufacturing food -0.424(0.316) -0.463(0.330) -0.413(0.331) -0.447(0.343) 
 Manufacturing apparel 0.060(0.215) 0.013(0.220) 0.026(0.220) 0.015(0.219) 
 Manufacturing chemical and medical -0.284(0.172)† -0.265(0.173) -0.231(0.173) -0.234(0.172) 
 Manufacturing transport -0.223(0.157) -0.276(0.159)† -0.231(0.161) -0.232(0.158) 
 Manufacturing machinery -0.010(0.168) -0.018(0.169) -0.009(0.170) -0.010(0.170) 
 Manufacturing metal -0.251(0.226) -0.304(0.233) -0.274(0.234) -0.278(0.233) 
 Manufacturing non metal 0.094(0.177) 0.056(0.179) 0.060(0.178) 0.057(0.178) 




 Subsidiary in wholesale or retail -0.153(0.132) -0.126(0.135) -0.156(0.135) -0.165(0.127) 
 (reference: manufacturing)     
 MNE in wholesale or retail 0.176(0.123) 0.154(0.126) 0.159(0.125) 0.163(0.126) 
 MNE in service -0.092(0.132) -0.098(0.133) -0.117(0.133) -0.127(0.129) 
Other MNE Specific Factors     
 MNE advertising intensity 0.035(0.029) 0.027(0.030) 0.023(0.030) 0.022(0.030) 
 MNE R&D intensity -0.029(0.023) -0.030(0.024) -0.031(0.024) -0.031(0.024) 
 MNE size 0.047(0.031) 0.049(0.031) 0.050(0.031) 0.049(0.031) 
 MNE ROS -0.882(0.577) -0.725(0.585) -0.736(0.588) -0.727(0.587) 
Other Subsidiary Specific Factors     
 Subsidiary size -0.159(0.032)** -0.159(0.032)** -0.168(0.033)** -0.165(0.033)*** 
 Expatriate rate -0.392(0.178)* -0.404(0.180)* -0.436(0.180)* -0.433(0.180)* 
 More than one Japanese partners -0.105(0.104) -0.131(0.105) -0.102(0.106) -0.104(0.106) 
 More than one local partners 0.020(0.168) 0.023(0.172) 0.031(0.172) 0.016(0.174) 
Year Index     
 Y1991 -0.242(0.333) -0.235(0.340) -0.239(0.341) -0.247(0.339) 
 Y1992 0.293(0.264) 0.333(0.267) 0.364(0.268) 0.353(0.266) 
 Y1993 0.332(0.260) 0.373(0.263) 0.376(0.265) 0.366(0.263) 
 Y1994 0.251(0.256) 0.304(0.259) 0.313(0.260) 0.308(0.259) 
 Y1995 -0.062(0.282) -0.038(0.288) -0.018(0.289) -0.024(0.287) 
 Y1996 0.264(0.253) 0.315(0.256) 0.335(0.258) 0.324(0.258) 
 Y1997 0.211(0.255) 0.298(0.258) 0.320(0.260) 0.309(0.259) 
 Y1998 0.354(0.249) 0.428(0.252)† 0.436(0.254)† 0.424(0.254)† 
 Y1999 0.299(0.245) 0.371(0.248) 0.354(0.250) 0.339(0.250) 
 Y2000 0.227(0.246) 0.288(0.249) 0.232(0.251) 0.215(0.252) 
 Y2001 0.098(0.249) 0.156(0.253) 0.060(0.256) 0.038(0.257) 
 Y2002 0.195(0.281) 0.248(0.284) 0.107(0.289) 0.089(0.290) 
 Y2003 0.001(0.300) 0.038(0.304) -0.152(0.312) -0.176(0.314) 
 Y2004 0.099(0.294) 0.141(0.301) -0.103(0.313) -0.125(0.318) 
 Y2005 -0.123(0.316) -0.014(0.318) -0.274(0.333) -0.294(0.335) 
 Y2006 0.400(0.271) 0.497(0.275) 0.233(0.297) 0.203(0.305) 
 Y2007 0.424(0.265) 0.537(0.268) 0.287(0.301) 0.265(0.310) 
 Y2008 0.301(0.291) 0.396(0.294) 0.187(0.337) 0.169(0.345) 
 Cons. -2.055(0.244)*** -2.021(0.251)*** -2.010(0.252)*** -1.988(0.251)*** 
 Log likelihood -2608.934 -2593.190 -2586.216 -2416.234 
 Wald Chi2 143.38*** 156.89*** 163.42*** 165.13*** 
 F Statistics 43.93 40.60 35.83 37.62 
 Exogeneity test (Chi2) 0.09 (p = 0.770) 0.06 (p = 0.804) 0.31(p = 0.580) 0.48 (p = 0.490) 




Based on the event history analysis without addressing endogeneity issues, the 
study finds that neither the regional diversity of an MNE nor the country dummy 
influences a subsidiary’s mortality risk (Table 4.2). Moreover, prior studies have 
suggested that both regional diversity and country dummy affect a Japanese MNE’s 
ownership level (Zhang, 2015b). The study therefore includes The number of subnational 
regions, The number of subnational regions X Country, and Country as three instruments 
for instrumented event history analysis.  
The study employs the same procedure to conduct hierarchical regression with the 
ivprobit estimator, and present results in Table 4.3. The results confirm that the chosen 
variables are valid for instrumented regression. Since all F statistics are greater than the 
threshold value 13.91 (p-value < 0.001), chosen variables are strongly relevant to the 
variable Ownership level (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Since Wald statistics are insignificant, 
chosen variables satisfy exogeneity requirements. Therefore, three variables jointly fulfil 
conditions as instruments and the regression results from ivprobit have been corrected for 
endogeneity.  
According to Model 4 in Table 4.3, the ivprobit regression confirms most of the 
results with the probit estimator, except for Hypothesis 4a and 4b. After correcting for 
endogeneity issue incurred by non-random samples of ownership choices, Japanese 
ownership level does not significantly influence subsidiary mortality risk, supporting 
Hypothesis 4b but not 4a. 
Robustness Checks 
Additional robustness checks were conducted to examine whether our empirical 
results were sensitive to different methods. First, a Cox proportional hazards model was 
used to conduct the survival analysis. The same results were obtained as those of the 
estimator probit in terms of hypothesis tests. Second, estimators probit and ivprobit do 
not explicitly support multilevel analysis. Even so, the estimators provide an option to 




subnational region. These robustness checks generate the same results in terms of 
hypothesis tests. 
Discussion 
This study investigates whether Japanese subsidiaries’ survival evolved during the 
past two decades, and whether Japanese equity ownership levels influenced subsidiary 
survival after controlling for subsidiary profitability. The empirical results with and 
without instrumental variables afford conflicting results regarding whether a Japanese 
MNE’s ownership level influenced its subsidiary’s survival, confirming the necessity of 
addressing endogeneity issues in firm survival research. After correcting for endogeneity 
issues, this study shows that a Japanese MNE’s ownership level does not influence its 
subsidiary’s survival directly. In addition, the higher a Japanese subsidiary’s financial 
performance is, the lower the probability that it would be terminated, confirming the 
strong correlation between subsidiary profitability and survival (Cui and Kumar, 2012; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1991). The empirical results also show that before 1999, the 
survival probability of Japanese subsidiaries in China was higher than that in the United 
States because of the importance of keeping options available. While the survival of 
Japanese subsidiaries did not change in the United States, it declined in China over time 
because of decreasing institutional uncertainty. Figure 4.1 delineates this evolutionary 
difference. 
Control Variables 
The empirical tests also generate interesting results for some control variables. 
First, the number of sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region increases the 
probability of the focal subsidiary’s termination. This indicates that the strategic 
importance of a subsidiary declines when the number of sibling subsidiaries increases. 
Second, the squared subsidiary age is negatively associated with mortality risk. This 
indicates that overall, the operating experience of a subsidiary improves the probability of 
its survival. Third, the embeddedness in global distribution networks enhances a Japanese 
subsidiary’s survival rate because of its strategic position in its parent MNE’s global 




development purpose, its relatively weak relatedness to the parent MNE results in a lower 
survival rate (Cui and Kumar, 2012; Li, 1995; Lu and Xu, 2006; Xu and Lu, 2007). 
Finally, subsidiary size and expatriate rate are negatively associated with 
subsidiary mortality risk, confirming that these two factors help a subsidiary to capture 
more managerial attention, resulting in a greater survival rate (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 
2004; Plourde et al., 2014). 
Figure 4.1 Subsidiary Survival between 1990-2008 
 
Contributions and Next Steps 
The present study provides rich implications for IB research. First, this study is 
one of the first papers to examine how the survival prospects of foreign subsidiaries 
evolves with changing institutional environment. A subsidiary’s mortality risk may 
increase with decreasing institutional uncertainty. To be specific to Japanese MNEs 
operating in China, when the advantages of relationship-based strategies decrease, they 
will become less dependent on local environments and partners for future opportunities. 




(Santangelo and Meyer, 2011; Xia, 2011). Second, the study shows that existing 
conclusions in the literature such as that foreign subsidiaries in developing countries are 
more likely to survive than those in developed countries, are bounded when institutional 
development varies over time and across geographies. Figure 4.1 indicates that after 1999, 
Japanese subsidiaries are more likely to survive in the United States than in China. Third, 
conclusions drawn in the present study constitute a finer-grained understanding of foreign 
subsidiary survival in emerging markets. In particular, this study contributes to 
institution-based review and it identifies that when deciding whether to terminate an 
overseas subsidiary or not, the weights of subsidiary profitability and real options of 
future opportunities change along with institutional transition. In the same vein, this study 
also contributes to the literature that combines TCE and real options perspectives. While 
this combination has been used to explain the international entry mode choice (Brouthers 
et al., 2008a; Kogut, 1991), this study suggests that its explanatory power can improve 
subsidiary survival research as well. Fourth, by controlling for financial performance and 
the endogeneity issue caused by ownership choices, the study highlights that the foreign 
subsidiary’s survival is not associated with the parent MNE’s equity control. In addition, 
although the relationship between MNE ownership level and subsidiary profitability may 
evolve along with institutional changes (Zhang, 2015a), the present study suggests that its 
O-S relationship does not change over time. This confirms the importance of addressing 
endogeneity issues in firm performance research (Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998). 
This study provides rich implications for IB practices as well. First, it suggests 
that managers should pay attention to both profits and future opportunities when 
considering whether to terminate an overseas investment. In particular, given the evolving 
nature of institutional development, managers should carefully estimate the potential re-
entry cost when deciding to terminate a foreign subsidiary in a volatile environment. 
Second, since MNEs’ O-S relationship is longitudinally insignificant, an IJV is as useful 
as a WOS in terms of accessing future opportunities. Therefore, an MNE may achieve 
optimal utility of the resource commitment for a foreign subsidiary by leveraging its 




This study draws academic attention to the value in re-examining MNEs’ O-S 
relationship. However, it leaves several issues for future study. First, although an MNE’s 
ownership level does not influence subsidiary survival, prior studies suggest that it affects 
subsidiary profitability (e.g., Zhang, 2015a). It implies that the O-S relationship might be 
mediated by the subsidiary profitability. Future research may examine the possible 
mediating role of subsidiary profitability by following a four step procedure defined in 
the literature (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
Second, the empirical results suggest that Japanese subsidiaries in China were 
more likely to be terminated than those in the United States after 1999 (Figure 4.1). 
Nevertheless, with ongoing economic liberalization, China still has higher institutional 
uncertainty than the United States. Therefore, Japanese subsidiaries in China should be 
more likely to survive than those in the United States for a long time because of the 
importance of future opportunities. A possible reason for this discrepancy is that the 
present study only compares subsidiaries in two countries, and other emerging economies 
might provide better future opportunities. The choice of host countries constitutes another 
endogeneity issue in research on subsidiary performance, requiring further investigation.  
Third, existing literature has suggested that foreign MNEs are diverse in local 
partner selection (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Shi et al., 2012).  
Literature also suggests that domestic firms in China are heterogeneous in terms of their 
embeddedness in central planning or market tracks, positions in domestic network 
alliance, strategic orientation, and operational capabilities (Boisot and Child, 1996; 
Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006; Luo, 1998a; Peng and Heath, 1996; Shi, Sun, Pinkham, and 
Peng, 2014b). The heterogeneity of local partners results in variability in coordinating and 
aligning operations (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Wilkinson, 1995; Park and Ungson, 2001). 
Lacking relevant data, the present study is unable to address the variance of subsidiary 
survival caused by local partners and mutual coordination, calling for further research. 
Fourth, other mechanisms in addition to equity ownership and expatriate staffing 
may relate to the level of managerial attention and control to a subsidiary (Luo, 2003; 
Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). Managerial ties in addition to equity-based relationships may 




Zhou, and Shao, 2009; Peng and Luo, 2000). Future research may consider whether these 
factors influence a subsidiary’s survival prospect. 
Fifth, this study uses a subsidiary’s investment purpose(s) and the number of its 
sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region to roughly address the influence of its 
strategic position towards its parent MNE. Nevertheless, these factors cannot fully 
explain its degree of integration within global subsidiary networks, which influences 
subsidiary survival as well (Andersson et al., 2002; Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson, and 
Vahlne, 2011; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Lee and Song, 2012).  
Sixth, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas 
operation mode and the survival rate of its overseas subsidiaries (Banerji and Sambharya, 
1996; Brouthers, Gao, and Napshin, 2014; Makino and Beamish, 1998). Keiretsu 
membership is defined in terms of the origin of the owner of the firm, the affiliated main-
banks, and the conventional buyer-supplier links (Makino and Beamish, 1998). Lacking 
relevant data, the present study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese 
partners on subsidiary survival. Future research may control for the influence of Keiretsu 
membership of Japanese MNEs.  
Seventh, the present study has neither separated formal institutions from informal 
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility 
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature usually categorizes regulatory rules as 
formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng and 
Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions differ in 
that the former relates to local government while the latter relates to the local market (Li 
et al., 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the present study has 
only utilized the general trends of China’s institutional environment between 1990-2009 
in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide institutional uncertainty 
further based on the differences between formal and informal institutions, and refine the 





 Eighth, the present study attributes subnational disparity in institutions to 
institutional uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have investigated 
subnational legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level (Meyer and 
Nguyen, 2005; Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish, 
2008). Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into 
subnational certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of 
institutions on MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the 
subnational level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions 
at the country level. For example, since some subnational regions in China such as 
Shanghai and Shenzhen have ‘emerged’, it is feasible for future research to categorize 
China’s subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas, so that the 
heterogeneity of subsidiary survival and MNEs’ O-S relationship within in China can be 
identified. 
It would also be useful to examine the generalizability of the conclusions with 
Japanese subsidiaries in other emerging and advanced economies, or subsidiaries of 
MNEs from other countries. 
Conclusion 
This study investigates whether and how an MNE’s ownership choices and 
priority of difference values influence its overseas subsidiaries’ survival. By comparing 
Japanese subsidiaries in an emerging economy with those in an advanced economy, the 
empirical results show that the ownership level of an MNE does not influence its 
subsidiary’s survival directly. Moreover, this study finds that the survival of Japanese 
subsidiaries is associated with their profitability. In addition, institutional uncertainty may 
enhance subsidiary survival because of the options for future opportunities. As 
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Chapter 5. General Conclusions 
Introduction 
A foreign subsidiary’s sustained competitive advantage depends on its ability to 
manage the institutional context of its resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and 
Werner, 2008b; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008). The institutional context in 
an emerging economy is complicated by the coexistence of existing institutional voids 
and economic liberalization. International business (IB) scholars have recognized the 
importance of developing theories for international strategies in emerging economies 
because of their distinct institutional environments (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Nevertheless, existing literature 
has not comprehensively addressed a prominent phenomenon: the increasingly higher 
level of an MNE’s equity ownership in emerging economies resulting from regulatory 
liberalization. It is critically important to understand the underlying mechanisms about 
how managers in MNEs perceive relevant institutional conditions regarding their 
ownership choices in emerging economies, and whether these changing ownership 
choices will improve their subsidiary profitability and survival. The lack of this 
understanding may undermine scholars and practitioners’ ability to formulate appropriate 
ownership choices with respect to successful investments in emerging economies.  
As such, drawing on multi-theoretic lenses based on the institution-based view, 
this dissertation was conducted to address three broad research questions. First, how does 
economic liberalization influence an MNE’s ownership choice in an emerging economy? 
Second, how does economic liberalization change the relationship between an MNE’s 
equity ownership and its subsidiary’s profitability? Third, how does economic 
liberalization change the survival prospect of a foreign subsidiary and the relationship 
between an MNE’s equity ownership and its subsidiary’s survival? Because of the 
confounding effects stemming from multiple home and host countries, this dissertation 
compared Japanese investments in China, the largest emerging economy that adopts an 
incremental economic liberalization, and those in the United States, the largest advanced 




To investigate these questions, this dissertation synthesizes insights from literature 
on institutional transition and subnational disparity (Chan, Makino, and Isobe, 2010; Peng, 
2003; Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014). First, the dissertation analyzes how institutional 
transition and subnational disparity cause the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of 
China’s institutional conditions, which vary across the geographic scope and over time 
(Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and Tan, 2005). These important characteristics of China’s 
institutional environments complicate an MNE’s understanding of the states of 
institutions and their cause-effect on subsidiary performance. This constitutes the main 
sources of uncertainty that an MNE needs to cope with. Thereafter, this dissertation 
theorizes how these important characteristics of institutional environments influence an 
MNE’s cross-border ownership strategy. Further, the dissertation examines how an 
MNE’s ownership choice and economic liberalization jointly affect the profitability and 
survival of its subsidiaries. In addition, this dissertation addresses the endogeneity issue 
of subsidiary performance research caused by ownership choices (Shaver, 1998). 
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) investigates how economic liberalization and subsidiary 
experience jointly influence an MNE’s ownership choice. Prior literature focused on an 
emerging economy’s regulatory restriction and liberalization on foreign equity ownership 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Xia, Tan, and Tan, 2008). Essay 1 involves broader aspects of 
economic liberalization such as political decentralization and corresponding subnational 
disparity in institutions. Prior literature suggested that subsidiary experience reduces an 
MNE’s reliance on local partner(s) and leads to higher MNE ownership level (Makino 
and Delios, 1996). While this finding is true in an advanced economy, Essay 1 argues that 
it should be re-examined within the institutional context of an emerging economy. The 
institutional uncertainty stemming from the economic liberalization increases the 
importance of relationship-based exchanges. In this vein, the operating experience of a 
Japanese subsidiary is relevant to the ability to cooperate with local actors, rather than to 
the ability to operate independently. As such, Essay 1 posits that a Japanese MNE 
increases its ownership levels in China to adapt to the process of economic liberalization. 
However, a Japanese MNE also tends to maintain equity-based relationship with local 
actors with the increase in subsidiary experience. In contrast, a Japanese MNE only 




experience. Empirical tests based on growth-curve models support the theory developed 
in Essay 1. 
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between MNE ownership level and 
subsidiary profitability (O-P relationship). Prior studies suggested that a Japanese MNE’s 
ownership level is positively associated with the subsidiary profitability in developed 
countries and negatively associated with those in developing countries (Beamish and 
Banks, 1987; Nitsch, Beamish, and Makino, 1996; Pan and Chi, 1999). Essay 2 
investigates an underexplored topic, i.e., the evolution of the O-P relationship during 
China’s economic liberalization. In accord with Essay 1, Essay 2 argues that China’s 
economic liberalization has enhanced the institutional openness towards foreign 
investments, positively altering an MNE’s O-P relationship. Meanwhile, economic 
liberalization has engendered institutional uncertainty that an MNE must cope with, 
negatively adjusting its O-P relationship. As economic liberalization in China deepens, 
institutional openness increases, reducing an MNE’s reliance on local partner(s) to enter 
the market. Meanwhile, institutional uncertainty declines (Tan and Tan, 2005), reducing 
an MNE’s reliance on local partner(s) to understand the state of local institutions and their 
cause-effect on subsidiary performance. Therefore, a Japanese MNE’s O-P relationship 
positively evolves along with China’s economic liberalization. Empirical tests based on 
multilevel longitudinal model support this proposition. Even so, for most years during 
1990-2009, an MNE’s O-P relationship remains negative in China, indicating that high 
equity control does not lead to superior subsidiary profitability in China. After addressing 
the endogeneity issue caused by ownership choices, this conclusion remains true. 
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines the relationship between MNE ownership level and 
subsidiary survival (O-S relationship). While prior studies suggest that an MNE’s 
ownership level is positively associated with subsidiary survival (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 
2004; Li, 1995), they leave two research gaps. First, an MNE chooses its overseas 
ownership level according to the institutional context within which it operates. This 
indicates the necessity of addressing the endogeneity issue when investigating an MNE’s 
O-S relationship (Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood, 2012; Shaver, 1998). Second, the 




opportunities. Although Essay 2 has addressed subsidiary profitability and the O-P 
relationship, it is necessary to investigate whether and how the real options of future 
opportunities influence subsidiary survival and alter the O-S relationship. In accordance 
with the real options perspective, Essay 3 suggests that the institutional uncertainty 
positively relates to the survival of a foreign subsidiary because of the importance of 
keeping options available. Moreover, with declining institutional uncertainty in China, 
there is decreasing need for an MNE to seize future opportunities by maintaining non-
performing subsidiaries. This has resulted in a declining survival rate of foreign 
subsidiaries in China. The Event History tests show that (i) after addressing the 
endogeneity issue caused by ownership choices, the ownership level of an MNE does not 
influence its subsidiary’s survival in China and the United States; (ii) the survival of a 
Japanese subsidiary is positively associated with its profitability in China and the United 
States; and (iii) the survival rate of Japanese subsidiaries in China declines over time with 
decreasing institutional uncertainty. 
A summary of research findings in this dissertation is presented in Figure 5.1.  
Contributions 
The three essays included in this dissertation are the first studies to systematically 
examine how an MNE adapts its ownership choice to accommodate the economic 
liberalization of an emerging economy, and how this adaptation influences its 
subsidiary’s performance. They jointly provide a finer-grained picture of an MNE’s 
ownership choices and the performance of its subsidiary under the condition of economic 
liberalization.  
The three essays have made a number of theoretical contributions. They suggest 
that both existing theories and best practices may in fact not be constant in time and space 
because their inherent causalities may evolve over time or be bounded by geographies. 
The theoretical and empirical findings in the dissertation enrich the OLI paradigm by 
depicting an evolutionary relationship between institutional environment (L factor),  
MNEs’ responses in terms of cross-border ownership strategies (I factor), and consequent 




Dunning, 1977; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Specific to the institution-based view, these 
essays have suggested that the states and cause-effects of institutional conditions on 
subsidiary performance may vary across geographic space and over time. Such variation 
should be included in theoretical analyses and empirical testing when investigating MNEs’ 
cross-border strategies and their consequent outcomes. Otherwise, the relevant scholarly 
understanding may be myopic in time and space (Augier and March, 2007). 
More specifically, Essay 1 identifies that regulatory liberalization is not the only 
institutional condition that influences an MNE’s ownership choice in an emerging 
economy. It integrates three institutional influences stemming from different levels 
(regulatory openness, institutional uncertainty, and peer pressure) into analysis. When 
these institutional factors vary across geographies and over time, a foreign MNE’s 
ownership choice will change accordingly. Moreover, Essay 1 has enriched the learning 
perspective by distinguishing relationship-based experience from rule-based experience. 
It suggests that the content and roles of subsidiary experience are contingent on 
institutional conditions within which a foreign subsidiary operates. 
However, Essay 1 cannot identify whether MNEs have sufficiently perceived all 
relevant institutional influences and responded to them to an appropriate extent in terms 
of enhancing subsidiary performance. It is addressed by Essay 2 and Essay 3. These two 
essays jointly investigate the evolution of subsidiary performance under the conditions of 
economic liberalization. In particular, Essay 2 has identified that institutional advantages 
stemming from relationship-based practices of local partners are a type of critical 
complementary resources for foreign MNEs during the host country’s institutional 
transition. These institutional advantages are difficult to transfer/acquire because of their 
relationship-orientation and volatility caused by institutional uncertainty. These findings 
enrich the TCE perspective which usually only identifies specific firm assets as the 
complementary resources that an MNE needs to access by using equity-based relationship. 
In addition, Essay 3 contributes to the institution-based review by suggesting that when 
deciding whether to terminate an overseas subsidiary, the weights of subsidiary 
profitability and real options of future opportunities change along with institutional 




perspectives. While this combination has been used to explain the international entry 
mode choice (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008a; Kogut, 1991), this study suggests 
that its explanatory power can improve subsidiary survival research as well. 
These three essays have also made empirical contributions. First, they have 
adopted advanced empirical methods using multilevel models and instrumented 
regressions, in order to support theories with mathematical rigor. Second, they have 
provided empirical support for the conceptual model of institutional transition proposed 
by Peng (2003) and enriched the model with implications of subsidiary performance. 
Third, the calculation of intra-class correlation in Essay 1 has identified the necessity of 
considering subnational level analysis. 
This dissertation provides rich implications to practitioners. First, to seize 
opportunities in an emerging economy, an MNE needs to systematically and constantly 
scan changing institutional conditions at different levels and formulate organizational 
choices contingent on their strategic orientations. In particular, an MNE needs to foresee 
institutional uncertainty emerging from the process of economic liberalization. Moreover, 
when a foreign subsidiary operates in a volatile environment, managers in it should track 
evolving institutional conditions rather than solely relying on existing experience. Third, 
the empirical results show that the ownership level neither substantively influences 
subsidiary profitability, nor significantly influences subsidiary survival. This indicates 
that IJVs can perform as well as WOSs. Thus, an MNE may have overreacted to the 
economic liberalization when increasingly adopting WOS entry or converting existing 
IJVs to WOSs.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This dissertation leaves several issues for future study. First, this dissertation is 
conducted using comparative approach. It assumes that the United States is a mature free-
market with little countrywide institutional change. With this assumption, a Japanese 
MNE’s ownership choice and its association with subsidiary performance should not 
significantly change over time. Nevertheless, empirical results of Essay 2 show that an 




implying that there may be neglected institutional changes at subnational or supranational 
level (Cantwell et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014). Future research can examine a broader 
institutional setting. 
Second, in addition to equity ownership, other mechanisms such as managerial 
ties may help an MNE to assess institutional advantages in a foreign country (Acquaah, 
2007). Moreover, an MNE may hedge the influence of institutional uncertainty by 
leveraging its subsidiary portfolios around the world (Lee and Song, 2012). Further, local 
actors are heterogeneous in terms of their complementary advantages (Boisot and Child, 
1996). Therefore, more than a firm’s ownership structure, the tightness and continuity of 
its capability to coordinate the various assets it creates, or to which it has access, is 
becoming critical to its performance (Cantwell et al., 2010). Lacking relevant data, this 
dissertation has not addressed these factors. Future research may identify an MNE’s 
internal and external network portfolios and investigate how they jointly influence the 
ownership choice and its consequences. 
Third, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas 
operation mode and the performance of its overseas subsidiaries (Banerji and Sambharya, 
1996; Brouthers, Gao, and Napshin, 2014; Makino and Beamish, 1998). Lacking relevant 
data, the present study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese partners on 
subsidiary profitability. Future research may control for the influence of Keiretsu 
membership of Japanese MNEs.  
Fourth, this dissertation has neither separated formal institutions from informal 
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility 
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature usually categorizes regulatory rules as 
formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng and 
Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions differ in 
that the former relates to local government while the latter relates to the local market (Li, 
Poppo, and Zhou, 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the 
present study has only utilized the general trends of China’s institutional environment 
during 1990-2009 in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide the 




institutions, and refine the analysis of their influences on MNEs’ ownership choices and 
their consequent performance in overseas markets. 
Fifth, this dissertation attributes subnational disparity in institutions to institutional 
uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have investigated subnational 
legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; 
Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish, 2008). 
Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into subnational 
certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of institutions on 
MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the subnational 
level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions at the 
country level. Since some subnational regions in China such as Shanghai and Shenzhen 
have arguably already emerged, it is feasible for future research to categorize China’s 
subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas, so that the heterogeneity of 
MNEs’ ownership choices, the O-P relationship, subsidiary survival, and the O-S 
relationship within China can be explicitly identified. 
Sixth, Essay 2 and Essay 3 imply that an MNE’s O-S relationship might be 
mediated by subsidiary profitability. Future research may examine this possible mediating 
role of subsidiary profitability. 
Seventh, it would be useful to examine the generalizability of conclusions by 
simultaneously using multiple institutional settings. It calls for theoretical effort to 
establish comprehensive but still parsimonious constructs that can effectively measure all 
institutional conditions. 
Last but not least, based on secondary data, this dissertation leaves opportunities 
to investigate organizational choices by using first-hand data. As such, more insights 
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